

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

**A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600**

**THE ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS**

By

Ali Ahmed Alghafli

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1997

UMI Number: 9808032

**Copyright 1997 by
Alhafli, Ali Ahmed**

All rights reserved.

**UMI Microform 9808032
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

ABSTRACT

THE ENTANGLEMENTS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

By

Ali Ahmed Alghafli

The general topic of this dissertation is the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy. This research concerns itself with analyzing how the crisis of cooperation postulated by the literature on structural and protracted variant of social conflicts was approached. In so doing, I examine linkages between domestic imperatives and the international negotiating table. Chiefs of Governments' strategic actions are construed to reconcile domestic and international imperatives when going about making peace. In addressing the problem of the study, I employ Putnam's two-level games theory, thus making the analysis theory-driven throughout. Two peace agreements and four critical episodes comprise the major cases under analysis. The disciplined-configurative variant of the case-study method is selected because of its value in satisfying the substantive and theoretical objectives of this dissertation. The method of "structured, focused comparison" is used for collecting and processing the data. In addition to verifying our conceptualization of structural conflicts and the crisis of cooperation, this research has concluded that the logic of Putnam's two-level games theory is applicable to negotiating contexts inflicted with the challenging characteristics of structural and protracted conflicts, that the theory is relevant to negotiating contexts in which one of the parties is a non-state actor and, finally, that the theory can be equally useful in both explaining formal international agreements and the sustainability of the negotiation process.

**Copyright by
Ali Ahmed Alghafli
1997**

To my parents, wife, and family members.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to extend my appreciation to the Government of the United Arab Emirates for financially supporting my graduate-level studies. My thanks also go to the chairperson of my dissertation committee, Professor Gretchen Hower, whose resourceful insights, constructive research guidance, and encouragement have helped me bring this research project to fruition. I also wish to express my thanks to members of my dissertation committee, Professor Paul Abramson, Professor Jeffrey Riedinger, and Professor Barry Stein for advising me at different crucial stages of the research process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1	
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM	1
Introduction to the Study	1
Background of the Research Problem	2
The Research Question of the Study	7
Objectives of the Study	8
Importance of the Study	9
Theoretical Framework	10
The Relevance of Putnam's Theory to the Research Question	13
Topics in the Literature to Be Reviewed	14
Assumptions of the Study	15
Limitations of the Study	16
Data and Method of Analysis	17
CHAPTER 2	
LITERATURE REVIEW	18
Introduction	18
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict And the Peace Process	19
A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	19
Religious Fundamentalism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict	25
The Occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations	34
Structural and Protracted Conflicts	46
Structural Social Conflicts	46
Protracted Conflicts	50
Explaining Foreign Policy Decisions	55
Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Studies	55
International Explanations of Foreign Policy Decisions	56
Domestic Explanations of Foreign Policy Decisions	59
The Two-Level Games Theory and the Present Study	64
CHAPTER 3	
THE METHODOLOGY	67
Introduction	67
Description of Methodology Selected	68
Configuring the Case Study	70
The Two-level Games Theory	74

Theoretical Propositions of the Study	77
Sources of Data	77
Instrumentation	78
Data Collection and Analysis	79
CHAPTER 4	
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS	83
Introduction	83
The Peace Agreements	84
The Case of Oslo One Agreement	84
The Case of Oslo Two Agreement	101
Saving the Peace Process	113
The Case of Palestinian Deportees to Southern Lebanon	116
The Case of the Hebron Massacre	126
Preempting the Final Status of Jerusalem: The case of land-confiscation plan in East Jerusalem	142
Preempting the Final Status of Jerusalem: The case of the U.S. embassy transfer from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem	153
Conclusion	162
CHAPTER 5	
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	166
LIST OF REFERENCES	184

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM

Introduction to the Study

For more than forty-five years the Palestinian issue has been at the core of the conflict in the Middle East. This conflict has given rise to five wars and exacted a considerable human and economic toll. Political unrest in Israel and the occupied Arab territories, a lingering Palestinian refugee problem, terrorist acts against Israeli and Western interests launched by militant identifiers with the Palestinian cause, and strained economic relations between Israel and the Arab World have also clearly indicated the complex nature of the conflict in the Middle East.

The structural-social character of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, along with their persistent nature, makes them striking examples of a distinctive type of interstate belligerence known as protracted conflict (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin, 1978; Azar and Cohen, 1979; Azar, 1985). Protracted conflicts are qualitatively different from the standard types of conflict often characteristic of Western interstate disputes, in that the former find their impetuses in the domestic politics of the disputant countries; that animosity tends to become institutionalized and, thus, displays formidable resistance to resolution. Structural protracted conflicts also involve negative psychological predispositions which are espoused by the disputing parties toward each other, mainly because the substance of the dispute involves ethnic, cultural, and religious claims and

is not confined to disagreements over material issues.

Attempts to resolve structural protracted conflicts present a major crisis that must be effectively addressed in order to effect peaceful settlements. In fact, the literature on protracted conflicts considers hostility in conflict-ridden societies the norm and peace as the crisis. This study will concern itself with analyzing the way the crisis of peace inherent in the diplomatic negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been approached within the framework of the Middle East peace process.

Background of the Research Problem

Recent global and regional political developments served as catalysts for the initiation of the Middle East peace process (Spiegel, 1992, chapters 1 and 2). However, the process of negotiating peace between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has its own underlying logic that can explain the dynamics of the peace process as well as the substance of the agreements.

Rounds of diplomatic negotiations between Israel and the PLO must be analyzed in order to ascertain their value in explaining the attempt to break free from the protracted conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, the problem of this study concerns the Middle East peace talks between Israel and the PLO that began in 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The Middle East peace process, as developed along the Israeli-Palestinian track, has assumed an undisputed significance on the domestic, regional, and global levels. In Israel, the peace process with the PLO has foreign and domestic bearings simultaneously. Not only have diplomatic talks with the PLO leadership proven to be considerably difficult foreign policy undertakings given the history of the conflict, but they have also invited unavoidable concerns

on the part of the Israeli leadership regarding domestic coalitions and preferences that, given our understanding of the protracted conflict, have been active in influencing the substance and outcome of the diplomatic negotiations. The Israeli government, then, has faced a formidable political challenge in pursuing the peace discourse with the PLO and reaping its benefits despite the Israeli domestic landscape that has not been completely supportive of the peace process. In essence, the government has found itself in an unenviable situation in which it has to grapple simultaneously with domestic and international concerns over an issue that has overwhelming foreign and domestic security consequences.

The PLO leadership has been similarly confronted with the domestic and foreign aspects that have culminated in, and then accompanied, the peace talks with Israel. Forced to make the best out of the political situation in which it found itself in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the PLO's commitment to a peaceful settlement of its struggle with Israel is in large part strengthened by its appreciation of the political losses which it was dealt as a consequence of its support of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In essence, the peace talks appeared as an attractive foreign policy alternative to the PLO leadership in view of its political alienation from many parts of the Arab World.

Yet not unlike in the case of Israel, the PLO's participation in diplomatic peace talks is presumed to have significant linkages to its domestic politics. Given the nature of the protracted conflict, the PLO leadership must have found itself in a situation that required it to draw upon its asset of creativity in order to handle the crisis of its cooperation with Israel. Of particular importance is the interaction between the domestic and international imperatives and the strategies that must be adopted on both sides of the negotiation table in order to reconcile those imperatives with the need to sustain diplomatic talks and conclude peace

agreements.

The Middle East peace talks are consequential at the regional level as well. The peace process has called upon the disputants to engage in a pattern of relations that represents a significant departure from the conflictive and hostile relations which have come to characterize interstate interactions in the region. The leadership and people in Israel, Jordan, and Syria are faced with the need to revise their views regarding their conceptualizations of national security and, more importantly, their very definition of "enemy." The governments in these states are also confronting the challenge of gleaning the fruits of peace and synthesizing a regional system designed to foster cooperation in economic, environmental, and security issues. In view of the protracted nature of the conflict in the Middle East, it is incumbent upon the governments of these three countries to make sure that the negotiated peace is invested with the ingredients necessary to ensure its sustainability and that it is not just another episode of the "protracted peace" in the region.

In the larger context of the Middle Eastern region a recurrent hope is that normal relations between Israel and its neighboring Arab states will help assuage the violent connotations usually associated with Middle Eastern politics and change the authoritarian character of Middle Eastern regimes.¹ For hostility to become an antiquated notion, however, and for peace to be based on solid foundations, massive cultural, political, economic, and social changes must take place in order to make the environment receptive to the imperatives of the new era. The essence of the challenge is that most of the required changes are

¹ For the likely social, political, and economic ramifications of the culmination of the peace process, see Augustus Richard Norton and Robin Wright, "The Post-Peace Crisis in the Middle East," *Survival*, Winter 1994, 36(4):7-21.

structural in nature and can only be achieved over a lengthy period of time. The payoff, it is hoped by some forces in the region, is that entrenched peace would unleash the joint potential of Israeli cutting-edge technology and Arab capital and markets in a way that could enhance the chances of the Middle East becoming a major power in the international scene.

In the same vein subscribers to the broad theories of “functionalism” in the sub-fields of international relations and comparative politics propose that peace in the Middle East would be greatly bolstered by the economic growth resulting from cooperative interactions between Israel and its neighboring Arab states.² This proposition argues that an economic transformation of the Palestinians and supporters of violent political activism against the State of Israel would curtail their hostility and, in effect, contribute to peace. Clearly, such hopeful expectations could form the basis of a research agenda in the event that lasting peace and economic growth in the Middle East become a reality.

At the global level the Middle East peace process has commanded the attention and political auspices of many countries.³ The United States and Russia are two major powers whose political pressure and diplomatic inputs have been present right from the early stages of the peace process. The United States’ foreign policy in particular has been crucial in bringing Israel and the PLO to the negotiating table and in maintaining the talks as an ongoing process. The United States’ erstwhile Secretary of State James Baker (1995) in his recent book, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992* describes the role

² The United States’ Secretary of State Warren Christopher emphasized the importance of establishing a Regional Development Bank by Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians in order to strengthen peace by encouraging regional development and integration. See *Middle East Policy*, April 1995, 3(4): 155-158.

³ Western European countries’ role in the Middle East peace process has been less than their economic and political potential. For an analysis of this topic and its causes, see Francois D’Alancon, “The EC looks to a New Middle East,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Winter 1994, 23(2): 41-52.

of the United States in making the Israelis and the Arabs agree to negotiate (see chapters 8, 23, 25, 27, and 29). According to Baker's description, the task of launching the peace process was anything but easy. To be sure, the brokering diplomacy of the United States required American foreign policy makers to advance creative peace proposals and to display a persistent, yet flexible, behavior conducive to continuing negotiations. Former Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens has also provided an insider's account of the role of the United States in the peace process and its impact on American-Israeli relations (Arens, 1995). Norway, Spain, Germany, and Japan are some of the other countries whose contributions to the diplomatic talks attest to the global dimension of the Middle East peace process during both its infancy and later maturity.

In addition to the political overtones of conflict and peace in the Middle East, the sociological underpinnings of the processes that produced both confrontation and reconciliation are also present. A study (Rabbie, 1993) that was conducted to test the causal relationship between ingroup cohesion and outgroup hostility concluded that intergroup relations are not always more competitive and aggressive than interpersonal relations, as often has been assumed. Furthermore, intragroup cohesion and intergroup hostility are not inevitably positively correlated with each other, but are rooted in two independent social-psychological processes: intragroup cooperation and intergroup competition. According to this analysis, intergroup cooperation and peaceful coexistence may not be unrealistic propositions after all but rather workable options. This study presents some hope for peaceful relations to counterbalance the notion of the internalization of conflict that Rapoport (1974) has described. Especially those who might be doubtful of the possibility of long-term peace between Israel and its neighboring Arab states could find some solace in some successful

examples in which protracted hostile relations have improved. The end of the cold war, the somewhat successful normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, and the significant improvement of relations between France and Germany since the Second World War are some illustrative cases which can be used to support the findings of Rabbie's study.

In short, the diplomatic peace talks between Israel and the PLO invite our attention to a research area that has at least three distinct, yet interrelated, levels of analysis: domestic, regional, and global. This research area, as the above discussion has illustrated, is replete with potential research questions that are worthy of political scientists' attention. While some of those questions may cater to the specific research interests of students of either comparative politics or international relations, other questions are best addressed by approaches that would integrate an appreciable understanding of the two sub-fields.

Such approaches must be based upon theories that make assumptions about, among other things, how domestic and international politics interact in order to shape a political phenomenon. They must also be able to provide more adequate explanations of aspects of that phenomenon than what either the domestic or international imperatives alone would be capable of explaining. I will develop my argument about the proposed theoretical approach in a subsequent section in this chapter.

The Research Question of the Study

The problem of this study is to address the issue of how the interactions between international and domestic politics can explain the dynamics of the diplomatic negotiations and the substance of peace agreements that Israel and the PLO eventually endorsed. Since the peace talks have actually resulted in two major peace agreements, Oslo One and Oslo

Two, the general research question with which this dissertation will be concerned is how the crisis of cooperation between the Israelis and the Palestinians was handled in order to make these two agreements possible.

My choice of this specific research question is based on my belief that it captures an important aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that remains largely *terra incognita*. Although the linkages between domestic and international politics in the negotiations between the two parties are suspected, a systematic understanding of the nature and direction of those linkages is still lacking. By establishing and validating those linkages, I hope to make a seminal contribution to the literature on the interactions between international and domestic politics.

Furthermore, I believe this question is worthy of researching because of Azar and Cohen's contention that the crisis of cooperation represents challenging questions as to the "creativity" of decision-makers when tackling the issue of making peace (1979, p. 167). Indeed, decision-makers are required to strike the right balance between securing peace deals on the one hand and securing their ratification without jeopardizing their own bases of popularity or legitimacy on the other hand. Whatever Azar and Cohen mean by the term "creativity" must be sought in the diplomatic interactions between Israel and the PLO within the framework of the peace process, as well as in the agreements the two parties have managed to complete.

Objectives of the Study

1. To analyze the dynamics of the diplomatic negotiations process between Israel and the PLO. This will be done by monitoring the substantive shifts that have taken place in

each side's stances at the negotiating table over the course of the peace process. An important element of this objective will be to identify the strategic shifts that have led to the two parties' convergence toward making peace agreements.

2. To explain these shifts, or lack thereof, by emphasizing the entanglements between the domestic and international politics. At this juncture I will attempt to show how the interactions between these two spheres influence the negotiators' strategies at the negotiating table, and, in effect, the prospects for reaching agreements and the substance of those agreements.

Importance of the Study

1. Given our understanding of protracted conflicts in general, diplomacy seems the only means by which belligerence can be settled. In other words, the fact that military actions have proven incapable of ending the conflict in the Middle East makes it impossible to exaggerate the importance of diplomatic negotiations as a method of attempting to break the cycle of conflict in that part of the world.

2. The above observation leads us to believe that the outcome of diplomatic negotiations between the two parties is not inconsequential. The success of diplomatic interactions in terminating the conflict in the Middle East would set a model for approaching similar protracted conflicts elsewhere. Failure of diplomacy, however, may set the stage for renewed violence either by giving anti-peace forces more reason to resort to violence or simply by reinvoking the basic logic of protracted conflict--i.e., periodic occurrence of war. In either case we need to be able to understand the motivations.

3. By employing Robert D. Putnam's (1988) theory of two-level games, the study will also serve as an opportunity to respond to Putnam's concluding statement that "far-ranging empirical research is needed now to test and deepen our understanding of how such games are played." The present study will attempt to apply the theory within the peculiar context of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, thus testing its propositions within the structural and protracted structures of the conflict.

4. The concept of protracted conflict as portrayed in the literature is still vague, to say the least. One way of enhancing our understanding of this concept, I believe, is to communicate it in different ways while preserving its basic characteristics. Therefore, by analyzing the manner in which examples of protracted conflict are approached in an effort to find peaceful resolution to them, we avail ourselves of an important opportunity to cast some light on this concept.

Theoretical Framework

The analysis of the entanglement between domestic and international politics in the Israeli-PLO peace talks will be informed by Robert D. Putnam's two-level-games theory. This theory provides an integrative analysis of domestic and international politics in a manner that surmounts the deficiencies usually associated with the application of either the international or domestic approaches in addressing the dynamics of international relations.

Analysis in terms of two-level games offers a promising response to [the challenge of formulating concepts and theories which take into account the entanglement between domestic and international politics]. Unlike state-centric theories, the two-level approach recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about what the "national interest" requires. Unlike the "second-image" or the "second-image-reversed,"

the two-level approach recognizes that central decision makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously. . . . statesmen in this predicament face distinctive strategic opportunities and strategic dilemmas (Putnam, 1988, p. 460).

Putnam's theory posits that international negotiations incorporate two simultaneous games. First, there is bargaining between negotiators at the international table with the purpose of striking a deal that might constitute a basis of agreement. Second, each chief negotiator is involved in some sort of bargaining with his own domestic politics. Put succinctly, the two-level approach emphasizes a number of momentous characteristics of the links between diplomacy and domestic politics, such as:

1. The theory distinguishes between cases of voluntary and involuntary defection from international agreements (Putnam, p. 460).

2. The theory establishes a contrast between two tendencies toward domestic interests. First there are issues on which domestic interests can be described as homogeneous, "simply pitting hawks against doves." Second, there are "issues on which domestic interests are more heterogeneous, so that domestic cleavage may actually foster international cooperation" (Putnam, p. 460).

3. The theory posits that strategic moves at one game-table may give rise to unanticipated coalitions at another table, thus making synergistic issue linkages possible (Putnam, p. 460).

4. Domestic institutional arrangements which enhance the power position of decision-makers in relation to their constituencies can play the paradoxical role of weakening their bargaining position at the international negotiating table (Putnam, p. 460).

5. Chief negotiators target international threats, offers, and side-payments while assessing their domestic effects at home and abroad (Putnam, p. 460).

6. In order for agreements to be reached, negotiators on each side of the negotiating table must be convinced that the proposed deal is within the opposite side's win-set and that it is ratifiable. Uncertainty about the ratifiability of the agreement in side A's domestic politics lowers the expected value of the agreement to side B and enables side B to demand more favorable side-payments from side A than otherwise would be needed under conditions of certainty (Putnam, p. 453).

7. Occasionally, international pressures tend, perhaps unintentionally, to "reverberate" within domestic politics, thus changing the domestic balance and, consequently, influencing the international negotiations (Putnam, p. 454).

8. Chief negotiators are not disinterested actors; rather, they are motivated by three concerns. First, they endeavor to strengthen their political standing in the domestic game by "increasing their political resources or by minimizing potential losses" (Putnam, p. 457). Second, they are interested in influencing the domestic balance of power in favor of policies they privately prefer but are incapable of pursuing at home. And third, chief negotiators are interested in pursuing their own visions of national interest in the international arena (Putnam, p. 457).

In *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (1993) Putnam's two-level games theory has been applied in a host of case-studies dealing with different research areas. The authors of the twelve studies in the book have demonstrated that Putnam's theory is capable of explaining the dynamics of negotiations in many international relations problems such as security issues, interstate economic disputes, and North-South tensions.

The Relevance of Putnam's Theory to the Research Question

Putnam's theory is relevant to this topic for the following reasons:

1. Putnam's two-level games theory purports to explain both international negotiations and the domestic ratification (formal and informal) of negotiated agreements. The research question of this study endeavors to cast light on these two aspects in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and, therefore, Putnam's theory is a commendable candidate for handling the theoretical and empirical purposes of the study.

2. The Arab-Israeli conflict is conceptualized as a protracted conflict. One basic characteristic of this variant of conflict is the fact that hostility is institutionalized in the domestic politics of the belligerents. Therefore, when studying the process by which this conflict is being resolved--i.e., bilateral diplomatic peace negotiations-- it is only appropriate to take into consideration the role that domestic politics plays in shaping the substance of both the negotiations and peace agreements.

If our understanding of the way protracted conflict is conceptualized is correct, we should expect to see the structures of opportunities and constraints inherent in domestic politics influence the peace process and its outcomes in two important ways. First, domestic politics should play a role in determining the substance of negotiations as well as the agreements reached. Domestic forces, coalitions, and preferences should present the national leaders of the countries participating in diplomatic negotiations with an amalgam of challenges and incentives which we can expect to see reflected at the negotiating table. Second, domestic politics should serve as a crucial arena of strategic actions for the national leaders. The purpose of these strategic actions should be to make the domestic political landscape more susceptible to the dynamics of the negotiation process as well as the dictates of the

peace agreements reached. Putnam's two-level games theory, I believe, lends itself very well to capturing the logic of the Israeli-PLO peace process on both counts.

3. The political atmosphere in which the diplomatic peace negotiations are carried out is generally characterized by the absence of a *crisis* situation in the relations between Israel and the PLO and, therefore, is very receptive to the logic of the two-level games theory. The assumption of the absence of a crisis can best be defended by saying that neither Israel nor the PLO found themselves on the verge of an imminent military entrapment. The logic behind this line of reasoning is that, unlike crisis situations in other types of conflicts, protracted conflicts are characterized by lengthy periods of relative peace—i.e., absence of military engagements between the belligerents. In the case of the Israeli-PLO conflict, peace negotiations were initiated and conducted during a period that cannot be characterized as a military crisis in any meaningful way and, therefore, is suspected of having invited domestic politics to play an important role.

The presumption of an absence of a military crisis situation, and hence the lack of a basis on which domestic politics may legitimately and effectively be forced to the sidelines, if correct, would allow domestic politics in both political systems to play a more conspicuous and sustained role in influencing the negotiation strategies that national leaders adopt. It would also give the national leaders ample opportunity to handle domestic politics in ways that would favor their strategies at the international negotiation table.

Topics in the Literature to Be Reviewed

Three bodies of literature will be reviewed in order to present the theoretical and empirical contexts within which this topic is nested. First, I will review the literature on the

Arab-Israeli conflict and some pertinent aspects of the Middle East peace process. The purpose will be to acquaint myself and the reader with the history and substance of the conflict, to ascertain the domestic and international dimensions of the territorial dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and to discuss the different political, economic, and psychological issues attending the peace talks. Second, I will review the literature on structural and protracted conflicts with the purpose of illuminating the special theoretical character of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its implications for the crisis of negotiating peace between the two parties. The third body of literature to be reviewed pertains to explaining foreign policy decisions. The issues involved in the choice of level of analysis in international relations studies and the international and domestic explanations of foreign policy behavior will be addressed in this section.

Assumptions of the Study

The following are the major assumptions of the study:

1. In international negotiations, Chiefs of Governments endeavor to propitiate domestic and international imperatives at the same time.
2. Although a Chief of Government acts as a representative of his constituents' preferences most of the time, at the international negotiation table he may well pursue his own preferences which could be different from those of his constituents.
3. Individual negotiators on each side of the negotiation table do not have independent preferences. A team of negotiators acts with a set of coherent preferences.
4. As the negotiations go on, negotiators acquire fairly accurate information about their own and each other's constituents' preferences.

Limitations of the Study

1. The Middle East peace process comprises a multiplicity of negotiation tracks. Among these are the diplomatic talks between Israel on the one hand, and the PLO, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, on the other. This study will concern itself with the Israeli-Palestinian track and may deal with the other tracks only where they seem to have direct implications on the dynamics of the Israeli-PLO peace talks.

2. Although this study is concerned with, first, the dynamics of the diplomatic negotiations between Israel and the PLO within the framework of the Middle East peace process and, second, the resulting peace agreements, it will not be directly concerned with the effectiveness of either the process or its outcomes in successfully breaking the cycle of the protracted conflict.

Data and Method of Analysis

In order to meaningfully approach the present study's twofold objective of theoretical and intrinsic knowledge, the analysis will follow case-study method and will be theory-driven throughout. Although a fuller discussion of the pertaining methodological aspects of this study will be developed in the third chapter, a brief account will be given in this section.

The design of the analysis will combine the great virtues of two types of case studies, the disciplined-configurative type and the heuristic type. The choice of these two types is based on their potential for contributing to the process of theory building. A fastidious application of theoretical propositions to the case-study method requires that careful attention be devoted to configuring the empirical case under examination in order to make sure that, first, the theory receives unbiased opportunity to perform and, second, that the

contextual underpinnings of the case chosen are highlighted and correctly incorporated into the analysis. As will become evident in the methodology chapter, this consideration is especially crucial in view of the asymmetry between the Israeli and the Palestinian contexts, as well as in view of the intention of the present researcher to introduce aspects derived from the structural and protracted nature of the conflict into the analysis.

The data collection and analysis procedures will also emphasize theory and, therefore, will adopt the method of “structured, focused comparison.” Accordingly, the analysis will address only those aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic peace talks which I have theoretical justifications to highlight. As a result, the analysis will proceed by breaking the general research question outlined in this chapter into more specific, theoretically-driven questions.

Inasmuch as this study is an attempt to theoretically and empirically contribute to the project embraced in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, the analysis will be structured comparably. In this sense, I will examine the process and outcome of the Israeli-PLO negotiations and relate my findings to potential generalizations about domestic-international interactions.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Since no research topic exists in isolation it is necessary to establish where it is placed within the relevant literature. This chapter will review the pertinent scholarly works in three bodies of literature. These are the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the ensuing peace process, the literature on the interactions between domestic and international politics as exemplified by research concerning war and security issues, and finally the literature on structural and protracted conflict.

Overall, the purpose of reviewing these three bodies of literature is to place the present research topic within its proper substantive and theoretical contexts. It should be noted, however, that any attempt to cover these subjects, especially the first and the second, in an encyclopedic manner runs the risk of obfuscating the research topic. Instead, the discussion in the present chapter will concern itself with, first, exploring the multiple dimensions of the subject matter, i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process, and, second, ascertaining the theoretical orientation of the research question, i.e., the interactions between domestic and international politics. In addition, valuable theoretical insights made by the literature on protracted conflict will be presented in order to further illuminate some germane aspects of the topic under examination.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND THE PEACE PROCESS

A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict not only provides a background to the Middle East peace process but also provides the bases of the territorial claims of the two disputing parties. Since the Israelis' interpretation of the history of the conflict is fundamentally different from that of the Palestinians, it is best to begin by presenting the two versions. As this is not primarily an attempt to summarize the history of the conflict, many of the details will be left out.

The Jewish people's nationalistic dream, accompanied by sustained efforts to establish a homeland of their own in Palestine, had culminated in the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.⁴ Religious claims, modernism, and the Holocaust, as well as a determined political program and active diplomacy effectively carried out by the Zionist movement, worked to win the support of the international community for the new state.⁵ In addition to the theological origins of the Jews' claims to the land of Palestine, they contend that their stance is legally reinforced by the principles of the Balfour Declaration of 1917,⁶ by the historical status of Palestine under the Ottoman rule, in which Palestine did not constitute a distinct political entity; by the fact that the Arabs lost all five wars against Israel, making Arabs' claims to

⁴ At various stages, other locations were considered for settling the Jews, such as Argentina and Uganda. However, Theodor Herzl quickly opted for Palestine.

⁵ For an excellent historical analysis of the role of modern bureaucracy in administering the Holocaust under Hitler's dictatorship, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁶ The Balfour Declaration states that "His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing will be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Palestine substantially unrealistic; and by the observation that the Arabs already enjoy control over the overwhelmingly greater geographic area that encompasses the Arab World, which is capable of easily accommodating their Palestinian brethren (Zilkha, 1992).

The Palestinians' historical version of the conflict emphasizes the fact that the land had been predominantly inhabited by Palestinian Arabs for hundreds of years. Generally accepted figures estimate that, by the time of the Balfour Declaration, the population of Palestine was 570,000 Muslims, 70,000 Christians, and 60,000 Jews. However, the Palestinians acknowledge that, from the beginning, they were no match for the Zionist program, and, therefore, they have been on the defensive. More specifically, the Zionist movement benefitted from its close strategic alliance with Britain, which, at its peak of power, provided it with the necessary political, material, and moral support. Even after the demise of the British empire, the United States became a close ally of Israel. In addition, while the Palestinians lacked organizational and political skills, the Zionist movement enjoyed the advantage of understanding the inner workings of Western society and was able to influence centers of power in favor of the Jewish cause (Muslih, 1992). Whatever support the Palestinians received from Arab governments proved to have hindered the former from taking control over their own national cause. The entanglement of Arab states in the Palestinian question doesn't seem to have offset the initial disadvantage that has characterized the Palestinians' power position in relation to that of the Israelis.

The creation of the State of Israel has resulted in the creation of a refugee problem, caused by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their lands during the 1948-1949 war. Like with other aspects of the conflict, the Israeli explanation of the origins of the refugee problem differs from that of the Palestinians. While Israel claims that

the Palestinian refugees abandoned their homes, partly willingly and partly in response to calls from the Arab armies for evacuation during the military engagement, the Palestinian explanation claims that the refugees were deliberately driven out of their homes by the Israeli forces in an attempt to create new realities on the ground. Joel Beinin's (1992) essay on the revisionist history of specific aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict cites research works which question the official Israeli explanation of the Palestinian exodus and provides evidence suggesting that numerous cases of Palestinian expulsion reflected an official Israeli policy.⁷

Initially waged by the Arabs but decisively won by Israel in June 1967, the Six Day War marks a significant phase in the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the aftermath of the war, Israel captured Gaza and the West Bank, previously under the control of Egypt and Jordan, respectively. While before the war Israel had controlled about 77 percent of Mandatory Palestine, the devastating defeat of the Arab armies brought Palestine in its entirety under Israeli control. The outright loss of Palestine along with Jerusalem dealt a psychological and political blow to the Arab intellect; the setback was of catastrophic proportions, hence the use of the Arabic term *al-naksah* (catastrophe) to describe the whole episode.

The war has had some other important consequences as well. Israel has become aware of the evident threat leveled at her existence by the hostile neighboring Arab states (Beloff, 1994, p. 33), but at the same time the American mind began to rank Israel at the top

⁷ For a detailed discussion of the evidence pointing to the active involvement of the Israeli authorities in the creation of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a general discussion of the Palestinian refugee problem and its bearings on the Middle East peace process, see Don Peretz, *Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1992).

of its priorities (Reich, 1994, p. 66). In fact, the new military and political balance brought about by the outcome of the Six Day War confirmed Israel's utility to the United States' Middle East policy (Stork, 1993, p. 132). Israel's domestic politics have also been affected by the acquisition of Gaza and the West Bank. The question of what to do with regard to the Occupied Territories has become the central issue on the Israeli political agenda. Political parties and extraparliamentary groupings have engaged in debates spanning the gamut from the annexation to the partition of the territories (Bar-On, 1993, p. 29; Dowty, 1994, p. 76). The glorious proportions of Israel's victory in the 1967 war had contributed to the re-emergence of the radical right; the victory was interpreted by the proponents of the annexation of the territories as a message from God signaling the historical relevance of the right's grand vision of the kingdom of Israel (Sprinzak, 1993a, p. 121)⁸.

On the Arab side, the defeat of June 1967 contributed to another outcome that was instrumental to the policy objectives of Israel and the United States, namely, the political defeat of Nasserism and its associated Arab nationalistic program (Aruri, 1993, p. 99). Furthermore, the defeat was conducive to the creation of an Islamic-oriented political climate precisely because, first, the military blow to Nasser's Egypt made Nasserism appear groundless. The ideological vacuum that the defunct Nasserist agenda left behind was occupied by the seemingly more original Islamic agenda. Second, the Saudis, to whom regional power shifted after the 1967 war, brought secularism under increasing attack and advanced the idea of "Islamic Solidarity." And third, the loss of Jerusalem to Israel moved

⁸ Jewish fundamentalists believe that God communicates to his chosen people through history. Therefore, while the Holocaust is interpreted as God's way of driving Jews to the Promised Land, the Six Day War is seen as a heavenly signal that the process of Redemption has begun (Lustick, 1993, p. 113).

the issue of Palestine well beyond the borders of the Arab World, taking it to the more encompassing Islamic agenda (Piscatori, 1993, p. 82-83).

Any discussion of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, no matter how brief, is incomplete without dealing with the entanglement of the United States in this conflict. The special relationship between the United States and Israel has had its origins in, first, the cultural, religious, and ideological affinities, and, second, the strategic importance of Israel to the superpower. Profound biblical and historical emotions and ideology, in addition to a guilt factor resulting from the annihilation of six million Jews by Nazi Germany, made president Harry Truman and others receptive to the idea of creating a safe refuge for the Jewish people in a nation state all their own.⁹ Although the camaraderie that joins the United States and Israel has certain strategic values, the ideological-emotional factors pre-date whatever overt or covert strategic cooperation the two states have synthesized. In fact, the strategic value of Israel for the United States can only be fathomed in view of the Cold War and the United States' concern with checking the Soviet Union's attempts to make ideological and political inroads in the Middle East. With the exception of the 1973 oil embargo, the United States' interests in the Middle East have not suffered any significant inimical effects because of this special relationship (Reich, 1994).

According to Naseer Aruri (1993), the U.S.-Israeli special relationship began to evolve at the point when the Eisenhower Doctrine became law on March 9, 1957, matured in the aftermath of the Six Day War, and graduated into a strategic alliance during Reagan's

⁹ The United States' support to the creation of a national home for Jews had been evident even before the creation of the state of Israel. For example, Woodrow Wilson, along with Congress and numerous state governments, endorsed the Balfour Declaration. Also, in 1922 Congress sanctioned the Lodge-Fish resolution that supported a national home.

presidency. Originally formulated to target Egypt's advocacy of revolutionary Arab nationalism, the Eisenhower Doctrine threatened to employ U.S. military force against "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." The Doctrine meant in essence that Israel would be considered the only remaining pro-West power in the Near East (Chomsky, 1983, pp. 20-21). It also reflected the U.S. policy of checking the advances of communism through military alliances.

The outcome of the June 1967 war not only augmented the United States' commitment to the security of Israel, but also made the utility of the latter to the former's interests in the Middle East all the more evident. In fact, the Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine was articulated in recognition of the ability of Israel, supported, of course by American economic and military reinforcements, to enforce the policies and protect the interests of the superpower in the region. The Nixon-Kissinger Doctrine was expressive of the United States' policy of containing the threat of communism in the Middle East through influential regional actors.

Overall, both the religious affinity and strategic utility bases of the special relationship between the United States and Israel have contributed to the asymmetrical character of the relationship between the superpower on the one hand, and the Israelis and the Palestinians on the other. The elevation of Israel's ranking in the United States' policy priorities from that of client to surrogate to strategic ally has been in contrast to the marginalization of Palestinian claims in U.S. policy (Aruri, 1993, p. 113). Successive American administrations, for example, have continued to refuse to negotiate with the PLO until the latter unilaterally declares its recognition of the State of Israel and its acceptance of United Nations' Security Council Resolution 242. In addition, the United States continues to refuse to deal with the

Palestinian question as anything more than a refugee problem. It was not until the first year of Carter Administration that American verbal acknowledgment of Palestinian claims was made. But even Carter was opposed to the idea of an independent Palestinian state by the end of 1977. Finally, Reagan's rejectionist years were conducive to an Israeli massive invasion of Lebanon with the aim of curtailing the Palestinian presence there (Stork, 1993, pp. 136-140).

Religious Fundamentalism and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Religious fundamentalism is a significant factor in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, if only because of the theological predicaments of the territorial dispute. The territorial claims made by the Israelis and the Palestinians rest not only on secular nationalistic foundations, but are also compounded by traditional religious beliefs. However, certain strands of Islamic and Jewish fundamentalisms espouse ideological views which are not necessarily harmonious with the nationalistic objectives of the politicians.¹⁰ Because the geographic proximity of Jewish and Muslim fundamentalists has contributed to the creation and persistence of the conflict in the Middle East, we need to investigate the role of religion-based politics. Also, religious fundamentalism is theoretically suspected to have contributed to shaping the dynamics of the peace negotiations, not the least because extremist religious groups and activists are profoundly interested in the outcome of the peace process.

¹⁰ In this chapter only Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist forces will be considered. A more complete picture of religious and secular forces will be presented in Data Presentation and Analysis Chapter.

Despite the conceptual and methodological difficulties inherent in the definition of the concept of fundamentalism,¹¹ most authors believe that Jewish, Christian, and Islamic fundamentalist groups share opposition to modernity, secular Western values, and antipathy toward “others” outside their own historic groups (Silberstein, 1993; Lazarus-Yafeh, 1993). Lazarus-Yafeh adds that fundamentalists oppose the idea of the nation state and the democratic system of governance, denigrate institutionalized religion, which they associate with the corrupt political system, and call for the establishment of a Muslim or Jewish state. They also believe in the unqualified validity of their respective holy Scriptures and give their unquestionable allegiance to charismatic religious leaders, whom they believe are endowed with unrelenting and infallible shrewdness.¹²

In their encounter with modernism, religious fundamentalists experience pressures which amount to an identity crisis. Fundamentalists, who emerge as a result of the interaction between orthodoxy and modernity, believe that history has gone astray and, therefore, are faced with three options as to how to deal with the world outside their community. They can simply refuse to deal with the outside world, reconcile the sacred traditions with the social and cultural forces of the modern world, or actively resist modernity and its associated pressures which would dilute the purity of religious traditions (Hunter, 1993).

¹¹ The following three books are especially relevant on the subject of defining fundamentalism: Lionel Caplan, ed., *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987); Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989); and Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

¹² Lazarus-Yafeh enumerates ten characteristics of fundamentalism; however, only those which are relevant to the present research are mentioned here.

To better understand the political dimension of fundamentalism, which is an important defining aspect of the phenomenon, the focus must shift from the domain of ideas to the socio-structural realm. Accordingly, the social base of fundamentalism, its style of legitimating social action, and the social structural relationships out of which it arises are elements important to comprehending modern fundamentalism (Mittleman, 1993). Expressing cosmically ordained and unyielding imperatives, the political activism of fundamentalists is directed toward achieving the swift and comprehensive transformation of the society (Lustick, 1993).

The recent electoral successes of the ultra-orthodox religious parties in Israel, according to Kirschenbaum (1993), should not be seen as an indication of a sudden upsurge of fundamentalism. Instead, he explains the rise of the religious right in terms of the general growth of Jewish orthodoxy since the Second World War, which is fueled by increased birth rates among the Orthodox, the resurgence of ethnic pride among *Sephardic* Jews (Jews from oriental origins), and the growing movement of *Baalei Teshuvah* (Born-again Jews) (p. 20). The fact that during the previous 15 years neither the Labour nor the Likud party has been able to secure a governing majority in Israel without receiving the support of the religious camp should attest to the electoral strength of the religious parties (Capitanchik, 1994).

The fact that Zionism has been involved in providing novel alternatives to the traditional theological conceptions of Judaism, Jewish identity, and Jewish history has placed it onto a collision course with anti-modernity *Dati'im* (orthodox Jews). More specifically, by advocating a secular nationalist way of Jewish life and history, molding religious terms in a secular language, and flouting the hegemony of traditional religious authorities, Zionism as a political program and socio-cultural movement has posed itself as the “other” in relation to

the traditional Jewish establishment.

Two radical Jewish forces are especially relevant in this regard. These are the *Haredim* (Ultra-Orthodox Jews) and *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful). The political program of anti- and non-Zionist *Haredim* espouses the goal of replacing the present secular, nationalist Zionist ideology with a spiritual, religious ideology (Friedman, 1993; Cromer, 1993). The orthodox Jewish *Gush Emunim*, on the other hand, seeks to replace the prevalent secular connotations of Zionism with a religious, messianic Zionist discourse (Lustick, 1993; Sprinzak, 1993b). Therefore, whereas *Haredim's* *raison d'être* has been to do without the Zionist movement altogether, *Gush Emunim's* has been to change the secular character of Zionism in favor of a an overtly religious make-up.

Although various levels of fundamentalism exist within the *Haredi* community, the *Edah Haredit* and the *Neturei Karta* (Guardians of the City) are the most extreme in their opposition to Zionism as well as the State of Israel it has created. Hence *Edah Haredit* and *Neturei Karta* are best characterized as anti-Zionist groups. The majority within the *Haredi* community, however, is more pragmatic in that it rejects secular Zionism and extends a de facto recognition to the State of Israel. Hence *Haredi* is characterized as a non-Zionist force in Jewish life. Both anti-Zionist and non-Zionist groups, and the *Haredi* community in general, have adopted policies favoring withdrawal from, and conquest of, Israeli politics as their response to modernity (Cromer, 1993).

Religious Jewish groups like *Neturei Karta* define their present historical reality as a state of Exile, and consider traditional Jewish society as their context of reference. They, therefore, are classified as conservative fundamentalists. These groups consider zealotry a legitimate religious phenomenon in the context of Judaism, and therefore tend to express their

views in violent activities. The purpose of zealotry is to confront Zionist Israeli politicians' plan to abolish the state of Exile. In fact, extremist *Haredi* zealots are not driven by an interest in assuming positions of power within the Israeli state apparatus. *Haredi* zealots' violence is largely limited to verbal and written harassment, as well as the destruction of property (Friedman, 1993).

While the *Haredi* community considers itself in a historical state of Exile, *Gush Emunim* deems itself in the state of Redemption. The latter's historical frame of reference is broader than that of the former in that it incorporates the political realities which emerged in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Hence, Friedman describes *Gush Emunim* as an innovative fundamentalist group. The purpose of *Gush Emunim*'s religious orthodoxy is to replace Zionism's pragmatic, defense-oriented political discourse with a religion-based Zionist discourse. Also, *Gush Emunim* differs from mainstream Zionism with respect to the place of Western values in Jewish culture; whereas prevailing Zionist thinking has sought to incorporate the values of Western humanism, *Gush Emunim* considers the Jewish faith and the humanism of the West as disapproving of each other (Lustick, 1993).

Put succinctly, the group views its mission as that of the revitalization of Zionism. It does not share the rejection of the state of Israel with extremist groups such as *Neturei Karta* and *Satmar Hsidics* and the ultra orthodox *Agudat Israel* (Association of Israel). The homage paid to the state of Israel, however, has not prevented *Gush Emunim* from engaging in confrontations with the government, the police, and the army (Sprinzak, 1993b).

The question of the Occupied Territories is well within the orthodox right's zone of deference. In fact, the Israeli right is not characterized by a conservative social or fiscal program, but rather by its militaristic view of the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as

well as a maximalist vision of the proper borders of Israel. Two political orientations can be identified among the Israeli right with regard to this issue. The “pragmatic right”, while loyal to the notion of the *Eretz Yisrael* (Land of Israel), is considerate of the imperatives imposed by the opinions and interests of external forces, and is cognizant of the possible role of diplomacy and foreign policy. The “radical right”, on the other hand, is so immensely attached to the idea of *Eretz Yisrael* that it tends to ignore Israel’s inability to defy the pressures of the world community. In the view of the “radical right”, neither diplomacy nor foreign policy are relevant to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sprinzak, 1993a).¹³

Members of *Gush Emunim* view the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza as a theological requirement and the settlement of *Eretz Yisrael* as the most important Zionist and Jewish value. The group considers the problem and plight of the Palestinians non-existent, and the Arabs’ territorial claims as an attempt to destroy the State of Israel (Sprinzak, 1993b). The capture of the territories by Israel in 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 are interpreted as episodes in the redemptive process communicated to the Jewish people through history (Lustick, 1993).

In addition to articulating ideas, *Gush Emunim* has been successfully active in disseminating its ideology, thus achieving political and cultural supremacy within the populace in the West Bank and Gaza. An elaborate, yet invisible, political, economic, and cultural network has been especially serviceable in promoting the group’s cause and furthering its influence. As a result, important aspects of the affairs of the approximately 100,000 Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories are administered by *Gush Emunim*, which exercises solid

¹³ Sprinzak’s chapter also gives a historical account of the evolution of the Israeli Right from the Revisionist Movement in 1925 until the ousting of the Likud Government in 1992.

control over fiscal, educational, and political jurisdictions (Sprinzak, 1993b).

Gush Emunim pioneered Jewish settlements in the West Bank in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. To the adherents of the group, the creation of civil settlements has meant the realization of a permanent Israeli presence in the Occupied Territories. According to Mordechai Nisan (1994), five factors are especially important in explaining the group's drive toward civil settlement in the disputed region. First, the members of the group believe that Jewish people possess a clear sense of national identity and carry with them historical roots; therefore, the mandate of contemporary Israel cannot be anything less than ancient Israel. Second, *Gush Emunim's* unwritten ideological law with respect to settling *Eretz Yisrael* recognizes the right of any Jew to dwell anywhere on the Land of Israel. Third, the bond between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel has been recognized by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, as well as by solidified international support of the Zionist claim received in 1920 and even after the 1948-49 Palestine War. Fourth, from a security standpoint, the acquisition by Israel of the West Bank is integral to any effort to protect the otherwise vulnerable boundaries of the state against any Arab army poised to attack from the Jordanian direction. Finally, the question of the Occupied Territories affects the ideological justification behind the right of Israel to exist. More precisely, "if the Jews have no legitimate claim to these parts of Eretz Israel, what legitimate claim can she have to other parts of the country which, ideologically, are less historically significant (Tel-Aviv!), than Shiloh, Beit-El, and Hebron? The real ideological strength of Zionism is rooted in Judea and Samaria before anywhere else" (Nisan, p. 20).

As mentioned above, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war and the attending political turmoil and sense of shame contributed to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a

significant force in Middle Eastern politics. A *fatwa* (a ruling made by Muslim religious authorities) issued in early 1968 categorically rejected the notion of making peace with Israel on the basis that the latter usurped holy Islamic sites, foremost among which was the al-Aqsa mosque. In addition, after the October War of 1973, sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, a prominent Muslim scholar and director of *Dar al-Ifia* (the religious institution responsible for issuing *fatwas* in Saudi Arabia) declared that “the Palestinian problem is an Islamic problem first and last.” (Piscatori, p. 85).

Disapproval of the existence of the State of Israel on Arab land is shared by many Islamic religious groups, such as *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* (Muslim Brethren), *Hizbullah* (Party of Allah), and *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (the Movement of Islamic Resistance), known by its Arabic acronym *Hamas*, the Arabic word for enthusiasm. *Hamas*, the principal Islamic organization in the West Bank and Gaza, is committed to the liberation of the land of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian nation.

The first Islamic fundamentalist group to emerge on the Palestinian scene was the *Islamic Jihad*, whose advent in the late 1970s was greatly influenced by the success of the Ayatollah Khomeini revolution in Iran. While the PLO made Islam one element in its national political theory, the *Islamic Jihad* made Islam the primary theme of its definition of enemies and its actions toward them. Generally speaking, the *Islamic Jihad*, borrowing from Iranian activism, chose the tenets of martyrdom and self-sacrifice as representative of their conception of militant activism. During the first year of the Palestinian *Intifada* (Shake-off, or Uprising) against the occupation authorities, the group played a leading role in mobilizing the masses around a proclaimed Islamic revolution. But soon afterward the *Islamic Jihad* was succeeded by *Hamas* as a central Islamic power in the West Bank and Gaza, partly because of the heavy-

handed policy of Israel against key figures in the group (Rekhess, 1993).

The Muslim Brethren movement in the Gaza Strip was the first fundamentalist Islamic group to call for the return to orthodox Islam in the region. Muslim Brethren escaped Israeli persecution partly because its members disassociated themselves from overt activist encounters with the occupation reminiscent of those of the *Islamic Jihad*. The brunt of the group's activism involved political and educational work, but with the outbreak of the *Intifada*, Muslim Brethren created *Hamas* to serve as a special military arm of the movement, causing direct confrontation with Israeli authorities. The organization was later outlawed.

Hamas believes that nationalism and religion are integral to building a Palestinian state, that *jihad* (holy warfare) is the means by which Palestine in its entirety is to be liberated. *Hamas* sees the liberation of the Palestinian land as a collective Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim responsibility and believes that Palestine must remain an Islamic *waqf* (trust) until the Day of Judgement. Therefore, it is safe to say that despite the group's success in mobilizing the Palestinian masses in the West Bank and Gaza around an Islamic sentiment toward the conflict with Israel, the soundness of its political program is wanting because its realization is dependent upon an unforeseeable pooling of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim wills and resources (Taraki, 1994). In addition, the organization presents itself as an alternative to the PLO as long as the latter continues its conciliatory, secularist, peaceful approach to the resolution of the conflict. Also, during the Palestinian Uprising *Hamas* appeared to be competing with the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising to direct the daily course of the struggle in the Occupied Territories. In fact, the powerful Islamic orientation of *Hamas* in the West Bank and Gaza has contributed to the ideological and political erosion of the Palestinian unity as well as the Islamicization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Rekhess,

1993).

The Occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations

Israel's present geographic boundaries are of two kinds. First, the colonial boundaries were created by colonial powers during the first quarter of the twentieth century, with Britain playing a significant role in drawing them. The second kind of boundaries are called post-1948 boundaries, known formally as "armistice lines," "cease fire lines," or "lines of separation," created in the aftermath of the Palestine War, the Six Day War, and the Yom Kippur War, respectively. The creation of the Gaza Strip was based on a formal international agreement signed in 1949 over a bulge of Egyptian-held territory. Gaza's present population is more than 700,000, fully exploiting its meager agricultural resources. There are 14 Jewish settlements in the strip, with a population of 5,000 settlers, controlling approximately five percent of the territory. The West Bank (historically known as Judea and Samaria) was created as a result of the armistice agreement signed by Israel and Jordan in the spring of 1949, which delineated a boundary made up partly by the former colonial boundary between Mandatory Palestine and Transjordan. The new boundary of the West Bank, also known in Israel as "the Green Line", was arbitrarily drawn, thus leaving each of the villages through which it cuts divided between the Israeli side and the Jordanian side. The line contributed to recurrent violent border disputes, as well as depriving many of the villages of their arable land and water resources. (Brawer, 1994). After the 1967 war, the West Bank in its entirety came under Israeli control, including eastern Jerusalem. After more than twenty years of occupation and generous Israeli investments, there are about 1,050,000 Palestinians and approximately 120,000 Jews living in the West Bank, thus making Israel's settlement

capability in the Occupied Territories, according to Elisha Efrat (1994), seem largely restricted on economic and demographic grounds. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles of September 1993 has served to bring the Jewish settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza to an end, thus contributing to the growing frustration among the Jewish settlers.

According to Ian Lustick, the issue of the annexation of, or withdrawal from, a closely-held territory can be depicted as a model of territorial state-building. The model emphasizes three stages and two thresholds which are bound to be experienced by the central state. The stages are “Incumbency Stage”, “Regime Stage”, and “Ideological Hegemony Stage.” The two thresholds must be crossed by the state in the direction of territorial incorporation if the territories are to be annexed on a permanent basis. Applied to the case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, Lustick’s model estimates that incumbency and regime risks are present in case of Israeli withdrawal from the territories and that psycho-cultural risks are not present if Israel decides to disengage its military presence from the territories (Lustick, 1994a). Elsewhere, Lustick shows that the decisiveness of the “Incumbency stage” in annexing the Occupied Territories to Israel was evident during the period between 1967 and 1977, and that Israel actually moved past the regime crisis attending the incorporation of the territories and toward annexation during the period between 1977 and 1984. This means that an Israeli territorial compromise with the Palestinians in the direction of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza involves a difficult regime-level struggle, the passage of which would require the Israeli government to “strip the territories question of its regime-threatening aspect” (Lustick, 1994b).

The Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza have availed themselves of a number of non-violent strategies in an attempt to combat the Israeli military presence there. These strategies reflect the structures of opportunities and constraints with which Palestinians living under occupation have to deal, such as the lack of arms and military training, the absence of lines of communication through which arms can be transferred to them, the economic dependence on Israel, the lack of a local leadership, as well as persistent Israeli plans to add a Jewish character to the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian response to the occupation has been to call for demonstrations to articulate positions and express solidarity, to obstruct Israeli authorities from pursuing their policies of land seizure and building settlements, and to refuse to cooperate with the occupiers, thus making it difficult for the latter to govern them. The occupied people have also harassed the Israelis and their collaborators as they administer the occupation policies, boycotted Israeli goods in the Arab markets, created alternative institutions and methods in order to avoid dealing with those of the occupier, and adopted civil disobedience as a method of downplaying the effects of the instruments of repression on themselves (Awad, 1994).

The eruption of the *Intifada* in December 1987 represented a very unusual mixture of civil disobedience and sub-conventional force on the part of the Palestinians. The *Intifada* reflected the communal dimension of the protracted conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Caught by surprise, the crystallization of the Israeli response to the *Intifada* went through four chronological stages (Inbar, 1994). During the first stage, which began with the outbreak of the *Intifada* and lasted until January 1988, the civil unrest was considered by the Israeli government to be a typical “current security” problem, one that customary measures would suffice to handle. The seriousness of the situation was realized

by Prime Minister Rabin only toward the end of December 1987, at which time a contingency plan was implemented to handle the unruly behavior of the Palestinian masses with “wise firmness.” The second stage of the Israeli response began in early January 1988 and lasted for two months. During that period the Intifada called for a political campaign against the very existence of the State of Israel, thereby heightening the Israeli perception of threat. In response, the number of Israeli troops deployed in the territories was increased, and the role of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) was changed from one of providing back-up to one of charging Palestinian demonstrations. In addition, the Border Police were ordered to use sticks, and a policy of beating was initiated. The new policy, nonetheless, failed to end the demonstrations.

The third stage commenced in March 1988 and lasted until the new Likud Government came to power in June 1990. In that stage the Rabin Government perceived the *Intifada* as a surprising display of Arab struggle against the Israeli state and, therefore, started to integrate civilian and military means to confront the situation and force the Palestinians in the territories to eschew their ambitions for an independent state. The Israeli response was characterized by a novel strategy of attrition, composed of a sustained sequence of intermittent actions. Limited use of military force, judicial and administrative measures, and administrative and economic pressures were all used in this stage to curb the violence. With the beginning of the fourth stage under the Likud Government, the level of friction with the Palestinians was lowered due to the reduction of military presence in areas farther away from the main roads. The troops were also ordered to minimize their contact with the Palestinians, thus lowering the level of violence and the number of fatalities sustained by the Palestinians.

In *Walking the Red Line: Israelis in Search of Justice for Palestine* (Hruwitz, 1992), the notion that the Israelis are united with regard to the status and future of the Occupied Territories comes under a dashing attack in writings by several Jewish and Palestinian Israelis. The essays in the book attempt to argue the need to arrive at a just and dignified resolution to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as the civil unrest of the *Intifada* draws the world's attention to the plight of the Palestinians. The diverse Israeli peace groups struggle to combat the inevitability of the Arab-Israeli conflict by searching for common grounds of peace which could mitigate the troubling side effects of living in an overly militarized society.

Whereas before the outbreak of the Uprising the Israelis saw the West Bank and Gaza neither as part of Israel nor as part of a foreign country, after the *Intifada* they saw the territories as a zone where they could not feel comfortable. The message that the Palestinians tried to send to the Israeli public was that occupation could not be cost free, and the message seemed to be getting through. On the issue of the final status of the Occupied Territories, the Palestinian *Intifada* intensified and deepened the political division in Israel. The implications of the message sent by the *Intifada* differed substantially between those who championed the annexation of the territories and those who advocated territorial compromise. More precisely, territorial maximalists interpreted the *Intifada* as another episode of the Arab Israeli conflict designed to threaten the existence of Israel and therefore became less willing to accept withdrawal as a viable option. The advocates of territorial compromise interpreted the Uprising as an indication of the hefty moral and political price Israel would have to pay if the occupation were to continue, and therefore became more committed to their conclusion that the Palestinians' national aspirations must be accommodated in order to steer Israel away

from a disastrous kismet (Tessler, 1994).

The *Intifada* not only renewed the Palestinians' hopes for ending the occupation but also inaugurated a serious discussion about the problems attending the creation of an independent Palestinian state. These problematic aspects of Palestinian statehood concern the process and form of the future state. First, there is the problem of redefining the relationship between the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and those living in the Diaspora. Second, in view of the fact that the Occupied Territories lack the functional equivalent of a national elite group, the relationship between the internal forces in the West Bank and Gaza on the one hand, and the external leadership assumed by the PLO on the other, is largely articulated through factional bodies in the Occupied Territories, not through the bureaucracy of the PLO. The reason behind this situation is that while PLO's constituent factional and non factional components are located in the territories, its bureaucratic apparatus was developed in the Diaspora (Tamari, 1992).

An analysis of the resolutions issued by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) shows that the legislative body's characterization of the objectives of the Palestinian nationalistic movement, as well as the means of achieving these objectives, have evolved through three major phases. The first phase, which encompasses the first four PNC resolutions from 1964 to 1968, championed the total liberation of Palestinian land by Arab armies. It was not before the fourth PNC resolution that the burden of liberation was shifted to the Palestinians themselves. The spirit of the phase was dominated by the bitterness caused by the creation of the State of Israel on 77 percent of Mandatory Palestine in 1948, an episode that the Arabs refer to as the *al-nakbah*, or calamity. The second phase, which began with the fifth PNC and lasted until the eleventh in 1973, advocated the establishment of a secular democratic state

which would include Arabs as well as all Jews who would disavow Zionism. The third and final phase began in June 1974 and lasted through November 1988, when the Palestinian state was declared. The PNC's resolutions during this phase were expressive of Palestinian pragmatism which culminated in a rhetoric heralding a decrease in the emphasis placed upon the armed struggle, and acceptance of the two-state solution (Muslih, 1994).

The 1967 war and the subsequent occupation of the territories have had enervating ramifications on Israel's foreign policy. The domestic political cleavage caused by the debate over the fate of Gaza and the West Bank resulted in the collapse of national consensus and, hence, impasse and immobilism of Israel's foreign policy during the period between 1967-1973 (Shlaim and Yaniv, 1994). Israeli foreign policy also suffered major setbacks, foremost among which was the adoption by the United Nations' General Assembly of an anti-Israeli resolution on 10 November 1975, which called Israel a racist regime in Palestine and equated Zionism with racism. Furthermore, on 14 December 1984 more than 140 United Nations state members endorsed a resolution identifying Israel as a non peace-loving member state and called upon the world community to suspend economic and technological relations with her. The brunt of Israeli diplomacy during the previous two decades had been driven by a defensive orientation designed to control the damage to the state's foreign policy. That picture to the contrary, Israel's foreign policy has made vigorous strides in the present decade, largely due to increases in the decision-making power of the foreign ministry compared with that of the ministry of defense, as well a successful restructuring of foreign policy objectives and the techniques employed to achieve them. (Klieman, 1994).

During the years of occupation, the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been negatively affected by the occupation policies of Israel, most notably by the one-sided

customs and the *de facto* monetary union systems. Suffice it to say that the better proportion of the Palestinians' income in the territories is nondomestically generated, and that the already small economies of the territories have been dealt fiscal and political shocks associated with the occupation. In addition, over the period between 1970 and 1987 the commercial and monetary integration of the Occupied Territories with Israel resulted in a substantial resource transfer from the former to the latter, estimated to range between 13 percent and 25 percent of the Palestinian GNP (Hamed and Shaban, 1993).

The economy of the Gaza Strip under occupation grew increasingly weaker between 1967 and 1987. Unable to provide adequate employment opportunities to its people and incapable of generating more than 55 percent of its national income from local resources, the Gazan economy became heavily reliant on the Israeli economy, as well as economic aid from external sources. In general, Israel's revenues from the Occupied Territories have consistently been larger than her expenditures there. In 1985 Israel accrued a net profit of over 25 million dollars from the Gaza Strip alone. The economic hardship in Gaza was exacerbated by the outbreak of the *Intifada* in December 1987. By the second year of the Uprising, Gazan Gross National Product fell by 35 percent of its 1987 level due to a combination of Israeli and Palestinian policies. The agricultural, industrial, trade, and labor force patterns have all been negatively affected during the years of the *Intifada* (Roy, 1994).

It is presumed that the resolution of the territorial conflict would bring about a peaceful environment that would yield some level of economic benefits to the Arabs and the Israelis. A number of studies have dealt with the economic effects of reaching a just and lasting peace between Israel and Egypt (Handoussa and Sahfik, 1993), Israel and Syria (Hilan, 1993), and Israel and Jordan (Abu-Jabarah, 1993). Hopes on the economic front, however,

are largely conditional upon the implementation of workable political settlements to the dispute. For the Israelis, ending the state of belligerency is thought to translate into less societal effort expended for defense requirements, recently calculated to be consuming 15 percent of the GNP. Nevertheless, even after concluding peace settlements with the Arabs, Israel is very likely to find herself needing to continue her high level of defense spending in order to deter those countries with whom she has no peace agreements, as well as to discourage Arab countries with whom she has peace agreements from reneging from their commitments. Consequently, the potential economic dividends of peace are likely to be wiped out by the persistence of the country's defense concerns (Zakheim, 1994).

By entering into negotiations with the Palestinians within the framework of the peace process, Israel's economic development is positioned to benefit in many ways. First, foreign governments will be willing to lend Israel the funds necessary to absorb the Jewish immigrants, and the promised peace will attract foreign private investments to the country's markets. Second, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will result in lifting the Arab secondary economic boycott imposed against foreign firms conducting more than "normal" business with Israel. Third, by putting an end to the *Intifada* Israel will be able to shift part of its security spending to the economic realm, although the net gain is estimated to be approximately only 1 percent of the Israeli GNP (Halevi, 1993). The Israeli economy is also predicted by Ben-Zion Zilberfarb to indirectly benefit from the peace process through the establishment of trade relations with countries outside the Middle East region with which Israel did not have economic relations in the past and also through possible increases in foreign investments in Israel (1994).

According to Ephraim Ahiram (1993), “dovetailing” seems the best strategy for the development of the Palestinian economy. The strategy entails, first, the establishment of industries for production of goods for domestic demand, as well as for future export. Second, as the Palestinian entrepreneurs and laborers eventually acquire the experience necessary to produce quality goods, the industrial establishment should shift to producing purely export-oriented goods. The future investments by Palestinians in the Diaspora in the West Bank and Gaza will revive the Palestinian economy and also encourage foreign investors by convincing them of the lowered economic and political risks associated with investment in the Palestinian economy (Hamed and Shaban, 1993). Hisham Awartani (1993) studies the possibilities of cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian economies in trade, agriculture, industry, tourism, and water and concludes that such cooperation hinges upon a political decision aimed at restructuring the relationship between the two entities in order to replace subjugation with complementarity. Zilberfarb (1994) argues that because of economic factors and political constraints, the direct effects of cooperation between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the areas of trade, industry, infrastructure, and agriculture will be minimal. Ephraim Kleiman (1993) discusses the predicaments concerning the flow of goods and of factors of production in the future economic relationships between Israel and whatever Palestinian political entity that may emerge as a result of the peace process. Kleiman concludes that the Palestinians’ choice of one economic regime or another depends to a large measure on decisions made by neighboring countries such as Jordan and Israel, thus placing some restrictions on the Palestinians’ political sovereignty as well.

The onset of the Middle East peace process in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 marked changes in the positions held by Israel, the PLO, and major Arab states with regard

to the Palestinian question. The Israelis were faced with a choice between dealing with the risks presented by peaceful settlements on one hand, and the risks presented by the continuation of the conflict, on the other. They also discovered the historical irony that the creation of an independent political entity for the Palestinians is a prerequisite for the preservation of Israel as a Jewish, not bi-national, state. In addition, the Palestinians' support of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait eroded much of their credibility and caused the popularity of their national cause to dwindle among Arab intellectuals. Furthermore, the role played by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria in sanctioning a military action under the leadership of the United States against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait made these states sensitive to Arab public opinion demanding an end to the Israeli occupation of the territories (Harkabi, 1992). These developments resulted in making the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the land for peace formula seem increasingly acceptable to the parties concerned.

Challenges to peace in the Middle East are suspected to arise from the attitudes of the Arab masses to the state of Israel. However, Tessler and Sanad's study of the attitudes of the Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Palestinians found that, in the case of Palestine, economic and political factors are sometimes more important than cultural considerations in explaining the varying attitudes among the Arabs toward Israel. Moreover, the study concludes that "there is no Arab way of looking at Israel, and certainly no innate and immutable Arab hostility towards the Jewish State" (1994, p. 70).

In order to address the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, best characterized as the mutual denial of national identity, certain psychological prerequisites must be satisfied to foster acceptance. First, both the Palestinians and the Israelis must develop adequate insights into each other's concerns, as well as the perspectives which produced them.

Second, each side must be convinced that there is an element to talk about and that there is someone on the other side who is willing to talk. Third, each party to the talks must be able to divorce the dreams from the operational programs of the other side. In other words, the Palestinians' dream of a united Palestine and the Israelis' dream of the ingathering of the exiles must be distinguished from what each side is actually capable of achieving. Fourth, the Palestinians and the Israelis must be persuaded of the importance of creating a new situation by making mutual concessions, thus laying the groundwork for a process of negotiation and change. Fifth, each side must also become convinced that the leadership on the other side has undergone structural changes and now is willing to make moves conducive to stabilized peace. Finally, each side must demonstrate sensitivity to the fundamental human concerns and psychological needs of the other side, typically through specific gestures calculated to reflect the acceptance of each other as fellow-human beings (Kelman, 1994).

Palestinian and Israeli peace negotiators are faced with serious difficulties, such as the discontentment of religious zealots and right wing nationalists with such concepts as compromise and political accommodation, especially when the subject of negotiation concerns an issue of utmost religious and national value. Also, there is a lack of trust between the adversaries in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, largely due to the longevity of the conflict and the profound sufferings, to different degrees, the two peoples have had to endure (Vatikiotis, 1994). Of utmost importance, therefore, is the fostering of a semblance of trust between the Palestinians and the Israelis through the application of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) (Ben-Dor and Dewitt, 1994). Designed to help the disputing parties avoid mutually ill-omened outcomes, these techniques should be sensitive to the security concerns of the Israelis (Dowty, 1994) and the implications of statelessness for the Palestinians (Brynen, 1994).

Religious and political groups on both sides are primary candidates for the application of CBMs in the effort of resolving the outstanding conflict (Gal-Or, 1994).

According to Edward F. Sherman (1992), there exist three levels at which dispute resolution techniques could be applied in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first of these concerns addressing distrust and misunderstandings between individual Palestinians and Israelis. The second has to do with resolving sources of dispute at the level of religious and nationalistic groups. This level is much more difficult to handle because the group as a collectivist entity must agree to reconcile its hostility with the enemy. The third level involves setting in motion mediation and reconciliation efforts by a recognized international diplomacy body which has the consent of the disputing parties. Robert A. Rubinstein (1992) discusses the role of introducing culture, and consequently symbols and negotiation styles, in increasing the possibilities of arriving at successful outcomes in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Cultural factors, such as meta-communicative expectations, affect how negotiators respond to their interlocutors, perceive the fairness of offers, and conduct rounds of negotiations.

STRUCTURAL AND PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

Structural Social Conflicts

Johan Galtung (1969) gives a broad definition of violence and argues that “it is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realization” (p. 168). In what Kenneth E. Boulding (1977) has described as a normative thought that views reality in a manner that lacks dynamism, Galtung highlights the “structural” sources of violence as well as the “personal” or direct ones. In general terms, Galtung steers his discussion toward investigating types of violence (which he

makes very inclusive) and actors who inflict violence. From among six dimensions of violence inherent in his definition, Galtung makes a basic distinction between “structural” and “personal” violence.

Structural violence is characterized by the inability to identify the actor, and instead, is attributed to factors built into the structure within and between countries and not necessarily intended by anybody. Conversely, in personal or direct violence, the actor inflicting damage can be identified and his motives known. Galtung then devotes a substantial part of his study to examining the relationship, if any, between personal and structural violence. He raises some important questions, such as: “Is there a distinction between personal and structural violence at all?” “Are personal and structural violence empirically, not merely logically, independent of each other?” “Are there structures where violence is structure-variant?” And finally, “is one type of violence, structural and personal, necessary or sufficient to abolish the other type?”

Galtung’s discussion of these questions concludes that “the two types of violence simply do not seem to be more tightly connected empirically than logically--and as to the latter, the whole exercise is an effort to show that they may be seen as logically independent even though they are continuous with other, one shades into the other” (p. 182).

Anatol Rapoport (1974) recognizes two types of conflict: endogenous, “wherein the conflicting systems are parts of a large system that has its own mechanisms for maintaining a steady state,” and exogenous, characterized by the absence of a common authority over the conflicting parties. The question that he seems to be interested in addressing is whether the “internalization of endogenous conflict by individuals in a society facilitates or inhibits the institutionalization of exogenous conflict.” Rapoport’s answer to this question is that

conflict-prone individuals add up to a warlike society.

Central to Rapoport's "frustration-aggression theory" is the notion of "Us against Them," which he claims is essential to every serious conflict involving aggregates. Also, of similar relevance to his theory is the distinction among three ways of perceiving the opponent. In a "fight," the opponent is perceived as an "enemy" who must be removed. A "game," on the other hand, is characterized by an analysis of a situation. Here stress is added to the situation while attitudes toward the opponent are generally neutral or even friendly. In the third way of perceiving an opponent, "debate," the purpose of the conflict is to convince rather than to eliminate the opponent (as in a fight), or to outwit him (as in a game).

Elaborating on aspects of endogenous conflicts, Rapoport identifies three sources of conflict—namely, conflict over the allocation of resources, the struggle for power, and the need for autonomy. The fact remains, however, that according to the author, "strong and real as the substantive issues may be, the need for identifying with a group remains the strongest factor in instigating, perpetuating and exacerbating social conflict" (p. 190).

The idea of the institutionalization of conflict, and hence of war, is brought home by Rapoport in his concept of the "internalization of conflict," according to which "the 'enemy' in a fight is an enemy not only because one happens to be fighting him. He is identified as an enemy, regardless of time and place" (p. 197). Furthermore, Rapoport describes conflict as a perpetual perception of "Self and Other" in the sense of being culturally transmitted and thus resulting in attitudes toward conflict being inculcated in each individual and internalized by the larger systems: groups, tribes, societies, and nations. Consequently, "all aspects of organized conflict have been conducive to the internalization and the institutionalization of war in almost all societies" (p. 200). Likewise, war and war systems serve the twofold

function of promoting domestic cohesion and cooperation as well as providing the basic motivation for primary social organization.

Rapoport's theoretical formulation has many levels of analysis, such as the experiences of conflict individuals have through their life, the groups which share common attitudes toward feuds, and nations which may be characterized by specific, culturally-based, conflicts predispositions. The multiplicity of levels of analysis has clearly enriched the theoretical construct presented by Rapoport by giving the reader a useful sense of the whole picture, although it leaves much to be desired in the way it presents the evidence necessary to link these levels of analysis to one another in the manner the author would like us to believe.

In evaluating Rapoport's theory, one needs only to contrast the rigidity of his notion of the institutionalization of conflict with what has actually happened in some nations. Until a few years ago, the socialist states were largely successful in constraining both protest and rebellion. On the rare occasions when domestic resistance did occur, it was repressed with intense violence, as was the case in Hungary in 1956 and China in 1989. After 1989, however, the patterns of political conflict and violence in the socialist bloc increasingly resembled those of Western democracies: Protest became widespread and authorities were restrained in their use of violence by the new institutional arrangements.

A number of comments are in order. First, the fact that Galtung has maintained personal and structural types of violence as independent from each other drives home the idea that concerns about peace should lead to concerns about both types of violence, not just personal violence. Second, while Rapoport concludes that the internalization of conflict at the individual level leads to the internalization of conflict at the system level, Galtung argues that structural violence (which can be viewed as parallel to Rapoport's system conflict) is by

no means influenced by lower-level types of violence. Another difference that can be shown between the two theories is that conflict in Rapoport's conceptualization takes the form of "fight" and often assumes pronounced forms (i.e., wars and revolutions) and thus can be expected to find expression through violent developments, whereas, according to Galtung's formulation, violence and damage can be said to have been inflicted even during generally peaceful times (e.g., violence to mind and spirit). Third, the difference in perspective between Galtung and Boulding is evident in the latter's argument that violence can best be dealt with by recognizing the dynamic, evolutionary, nature of violence and its associated ills, not (as Galtung has argued) by structural changes. In fact, I find Boulding's advocacy of our need to address the processes which produce violence through increased "production" more reasonable than Galtung's prescription of power and wealth "redistribution" because no structural change is conceivably possible without first understanding the processes of interaction and then changing them in a way conducive to more peaceful structures.

Protracted Conflicts

Edward Azar and Stephen Cohen (1979) pursue the same line of thought followed by Rapoport and Galtung and propose the notion of "protracted conflict" that is characteristic of the Third World. According to the authors, the Arab-Israeli conflict is best conceptualized in terms of a protracted conflict, which they define as one which "lingers over time and appears to have no single or distinguishable breakpoint" Compared with standard conceptualizations of conflict, protracted conflict is characterized by the following features:

1. Protracted conflict is viewed in terms of a process that is part of a social system. As such, protracted conflict displays the tendency to recur because of disputes over the same

issues which find their origins in the social system.

2. Borrowing from Rapoport (1974), the prevailing nature of conflicts in European countries is issue-oriented and conflict is exogenous (i.e., agents of conflict are governments), whereas in protracted conflicts in the Third World, conflict is endogenous (i.e., whole societies are the agents of hostility and hatred).

3. Protracted conflict is also characterized by the observation that agents in dispute are incapable of settling their differences once and for all through a major war that might ordinarily give rise to an arrangement that could institutionalize a semblance of peaceful relations between the disputants.

4. Azar and Cohen, following Rapoport's delineation, argue that protracted conflict is internalized and, hence, institutionalized.

Azar and Cohen utilize what is referred to as the "Normal Relations Range" (NRR) to conceptualize the structure of interactions between Israel and the Arab states, or any two states for that matter, and argue that movements toward cooperation or toward conflict are constrained by a "Lower Critical Threshold" and an "Upper Critical Threshold" respectively. These constraining thresholds make both cooperation and conflict equally serious matters for national decision makers, hence the notion of peace as crisis. "For the leaders of Israel and the Arab confrontation states, it is actually the crisis of cooperation which raises the larger number of new questions as to the nature of their decisions and their creativity as leaders" (p. 167). The crisis of cooperation, according to the authors, is further reinforced by the problem of communication which makes it difficult for the parties in conflict to send or receive messages of cooperation. Azar and Cohen then proceed to propose that "whatever can be done to free the content of the message from ambiguity will increase its chances of delivery.

Considering the context as well as the content is one way to help do just this" (p. 173).

Azar (1985) contends that the identity group--social, religious, ethnic, cultural--is a more compelling choice of unit of analysis in protracted conflicts than either the nation state or the international system. The domestic struggle to satisfy the basic needs of social groups, according to Azar, finds expression in international conflict, thus making the demarcation between domestic and international conflict largely artificial and misleading. The resolution of protracted conflict requires, first, addressing the needs of the opposing parties and, second, effecting structural changes in order to overcome underdevelopment.

Michael Brecher (1984) in "International Crises and Protracted Conflicts" uses the basic characteristics of protracted conflict set forth by Azar and Cohen (1979) to unfold the differences in crisis profiles between protracted and non-protracted conflict cases in the period between 1945-1975. The first difference is that international crises within protracted conflict systems are more likely to be triggered by violence than in other types of conflict. Second, crises within this type of conflict are more likely to involve a perceived threat to higher stakes, i.e., a threat to more fundamental values related to ideology, civilization, and belief systems. Third, crises within the protracted variant of conflict are more likely to be characterized by violent response to the actor who initiated the crisis, as well as a more conspicuous role for violent acts in managing the crisis, including outright war. The fourth difference is that crises in protracted conflicts invite greater involvement and higher military activity on the part of superpowers because of the potentially dangerous threat they pose to the stability of the international system. Fifth, the United Nations tends to become involved in handling crises within protracted conflict systems more frequently than it does in non-protracted conflict crises. And the sixth difference between the two types has to do with the

substance of the outcome; while crises within protracted conflict systems tend to culminate in indecisive stalemates and compromises, crises outside this type of conflict end in victory fifty percent of the time.

Having reviewed these different arguments about structured conflict and violence, one is tempted to look into the incentives for providing breakpoints (i.e., sustained peace and cooperation) inherent in the concepts of “protracted conflict,” “structure of conflict,” or “systemic conflict.” As Boulding has commented, “there does seem to be a certain underlying tendency for a structuralist to think in a rather deterministic term” (p. 78), yet some authors give some hope for cooperation and peace either through better communication (Azar and Cohen) or through influence on the process that produces violence (Boulding). In contrast, Rapoport’s notion of institutionalized conflict and war makes peace a rather difficult objective to achieve. Similarly, by arguing that neither personal nor structural violence is influenced by the other, Galtung does not make the task of achieving peace any easier. In short, the authors’ different ways of conceptualizing conflict have resulted in differences in the feasibility of peace.

Philip A. Schrodt (1981) in “A Mathematical Model of the Persistence of Conflict” postulates that in every nation there are two groups with opposing interests in interstate conflict. The first is comprised of “nationalists,” who are interested in supporting and maintaining conflictive foreign policy because of economic, military, or political interests. In order to preserve their interests, this group of people opposes any tendency to allow conflict to drop below a certain level. The second group is made up of “internationalists” whose economic, budgetary, or philosophical interests drive them to support lower levels of conflict as long as the very presence of the state is not threatened. The mathematical model

developed by Schrodtt is capable of simulating a conflict process that captures the underlying logic of protracted conflict theorized by Azar and his associates.

Also capable of capturing the protracted conflict variant of interactions is the more simplified mathematical model developed by Walter Hill (1990) in his "Persistent Cyclical Conflict by Way of a Time Lagged Logistic." Hill, however, refers to the two basic groups which drive the process of "Protracted Social Conflict" as the government and the opposition.

Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin (1978) explain the long duration of protracted conflicts in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular by stating that "forces very much part of the conflict dynamics constantly work to return deviations from the NRR in interaction levels or frequencies back to the Arab-Israeli norm, to the NRR, to the dominant tenor of the relationship" (p.55). Powerful identity crises on a personal, structural, as well as national scale are brought on by movements signaling attempts to terminate the conflict.

In this section I have reviewed the major works in the literature on the structural and protracted variants of conflict. It is well to conclude this section by emphasizing that the literature on structural and protracted conflict has identified the domestic origins of interstate conflict. In addition, the literature has captured the difficulty inherent in the movement toward peaceful settlements and has convincingly characterized it as a crisis of peace. My contention that the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic peace talks are expected to invite the active involvement of the domestic politics of both parties is justified by the plausible insights drawn from this literature. This contention will be shown to be further justified by the following review of the literature on the origins of foreign policy behavior.

EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

In this section scholarly approaches pertaining to the explanation of foreign policy decisions of nation states will be reviewed. The purpose in so doing is to shed light on the theoretical purport of the present study by emphasizing its relation to the established literature and its contribution to it. Due to the nature of the substance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it should be noted that only studies pertaining to war and security issues are reviewed, while those concerning international political economy are deliberately left out.

Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy Studies

The issue at hand concerns the level of analysis which the researcher should consider when attempting to account for foreign policy decisions such as the initiation of war. Generally speaking, there are three such levels or images, each claiming some support in the writings of a group of major philosophers. The first level is that of individual statesmen as decision makers (St. Augustine, Spinoza, Niebuhr, and Hadley Cantril); the second level deals with certain characteristics, both political and economic, of individual nation states as sovereign actors in the international arena (Kant, Gladstone, Mill, and Woodrow Wilson); and the third level is found in the anarchic nature of the international system comprising all nation states (Jean Jacques Rousseau) (Waltz, 1959). K. J. Holsti (1972), in *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, argues that all three levels of analysis are needed, since no single level can account for all aspects of reality, and that the choice of level of analysis depends on the nature of the problem under examination. Holsti, however, concludes that the state and individual decision makers are the two most important levels in explaining the formulation of foreign policy objectives. Holsti (1991) employed all three levels in *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* to inform his analysis of the issues which cause

foreign policymakers to decide to go to war, the attitudes toward war among those who make state policy and how these attitudes have changed over time, and, finally, the determinants of the problem of building the international order and who defines this order.

James Rosenau's essay, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Farrell, ed. 1966), provides five clusters of variables which influence foreign policy choices. These are "idiosyncratic" variables pertaining to the values, talents, personality traits, and experience of the makers of foreign policy; "role" variables which capture the behavior resulting from organizational imperatives; "governmental" variables which reflect the structure that constrains or facilitates foreign policy behavior; "societal" variables emphasizing all informal social aspects which bear on the state's behavior in relation to other states; and "systemic" variables which reflect events occurring at the international level and shape foreign policy decisions of individual states. The choice of which level should be employed in foreign policy analysis, Rosenau contends, should be informed by the "issue area" under examination and the nature of both the political and national systems involved.

International Explanations of Foreign Policy Decisions

International systemic theories associated with both the Realist and neo-Realist approaches have tended to explain changes in nation states' foreign policy choices mainly in terms of changes in the external international environment but not in terms of domestic variables. Morgenthau's (1954) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* is a classic example of the Realist variant which emphasizes the role of power at the systemic level in explaining war. As Vasquez (1983) concludes after reviewing the theoretical and

empirical literature on international relations covering a period of three decades, the realist paradigm has dominated the major activities of scholars in the field. Three central assumptions have characterized most of the research carried out by international relations scholars. These are that nation states are considered the most important actors in the international arena, that international relations are reduced to the struggle over peace and power, and that a conspicuous conceptual demarcation can be drawn between domestic politics and international politics.

The more recent liberal orientation of the neo-Realist approach, on the other hand, stresses the notion that war is an inevitable outcome largely because of the interdependence among states in the world community. Kenneth N. Waltz's (1979) *Theory of International Politics* advances the concept of "structure" as the basis for a productive utilization of the systemic approach and argues that structures can be either anarchic or hierarchical. Waltz's book provides a basis for the balance of power theory but falls short of expounding the explanatory and predictive power of this theory. Criticism of the book also points to Waltz's tendency to define the international system in a manner that ignores the possible effects of international economic processes and institutions on states' behavior. In addition, Waltz has been hasty in assuming that the differentiation in states as units can be dropped as a characteristic of the structure of the international system (Keohane, ed., 1986). In *War and Change in World Politics*, Robert Gilpin (1981) theorizes that the international system experiences a state of disequilibrium in which economic, political and technological developments have increased considerably the potential benefits or decreased the potential costs to one or more states seeking to change the international status quo. This disjuncture within the system represents a crisis in the international system which, as history has

demonstrated, can be resolved through the principal mechanism of systemic change: hegemonic war. Richard Rosecrance (1986) concludes that although world reality has changed since the end of the Second World War, the academics are still embracing such notions as power conflicts and state hegemony. Rosecrance argues that transitions to economic prosperity and even world leadership can be achieved through international trade. The effect of economic interdependence has been to dramatically increase the benefits of peace and decrease the attractiveness of war as a method of expanding influence.

The concepts of rationality and preferences are at the heart of international relations studies.¹⁴ Systemic explanations of foreign policy decisions have tended to consider the introduction of domestic politics into the study of international relations problematic, especially because of the potential threat posed to the rational behavior assumption. Therefore, some scholars have resorted to using psychological factors for the dual purpose of bridging the gap between psychology and foreign policy as well as accounting for the departures of systemic analysis from the assumption of rational behavior. Robert Jervis (1976), for example, applies the concepts of perception and misperception of decision makers to the problem of state actors within the context of international relations. However, in marrying insights from the perceptual psychology of individuals to foreign policy decision making, Jervis does not pay due attention to the plausible role of political institutions and processes in shaping individual perception and behavior.

¹⁴ For the "thin" and "broad" definitions of rationality and a lucid discussion of the problems of rational decision making in conflict situations, see Michael Nicholson *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict* (England: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Likewise, Deborah Welch Larson (1985) provides a psychological explanation for the evolution of the U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union during Truman's presidency. Larson uses the cognitive social psychology explanation to account for the conviction held by President Truman that he understood the Soviet leader Stalin. The author's psychological explanation posits that Truman's encounter with the Soviet dictator reminded him of Kansas City political chief Tom Pendergast, an authoritarian figure whom he knew well. Also, according to psychologists' characterization, individuals, including foreign policymakers, are prone to oversimplifying complex information and remembering events which never took place. Truman's false retrospective claim that he had issued an ultimatum to Stalin to withdraw Russian forces from northern Iran in 1946 is an example.

Stephen Walt (1987) entertains the question of what determines the state's decision to join one alliance or another and concludes that such decisions are driven by state preferences which are unrelated to either bandwagoning or reactions to power by itself. Instead, Walt asserts that states choose to join alliances based on their desire to counter a nation that poses threats. He explains threats in terms of "perceived intentions," which he postulates largely in terms of domestic factors.

Domestic Explanations of Foreign Policy Decisions

The domestic explanations of foreign policy can be classified into three tendencies.¹⁵ The first of these places emphasis on legislatures, interest groups, and public opinion as means of translating societal pressures into foreign policy objectives. The contributors to *Domestic*

¹⁵ I have benefitted from the categorization provided by Andrew Moravcsik in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam's *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, 1993.

Sources of Foreign Policy (Rosenau, ed. 1967) attempt to ascertain the relationship between societal variables and foreign policy choices, but they generally fail to establish a comprehensive framework. The essays by Lester W. Milbrath and Theodore J. Lowi can be considered the finest among the eleven. Milbrath examines the methods and objectives of interest group representation with respect to foreign policy issues. Lowi attempts to determine the sorts of power patterns found in foreign policy, and argues that whereas during crisis situations the handling of foreign policy tends to be accomplished by a narrow consensual elite, noncrisis foreign policy situations which involve either the regulation or distribution of resources tend to invite domestic political forces. In *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau, eds., 1987), additional insights are provided with regard to the role of societal forces such as opposition (e.g., Joe Hagan's chapter) and culture (e.g., Martin Sampson's chapter) in shaping foreign policy behavior. John Lewis Gaddis (1981) argues that from the Truman Administration to the Carter Administration, U.S. containment policies employed against the Soviet Union have alternated between two major types: symmetrical containment and asymmetrical containment. Gaddis' analysis theorizes that shifts in American strategies between the two types have been influenced by economic considerations, the most important of which was the perception of resources available. Bruce Russett and Thomas W. Graham (1988) conclude that, in the process of making foreign policy decisions, public opinion is responsible for structuring constraints and providing incentives in very important ways. An additional example is provided by Bruce Russett's (1990a) "Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict," in which he finds that in both democratic and nondemocratic states, domestic conflict in terms of civilian protest is positively related to interstate dispute

participation.

The second scholarly tendency has been to identify the administrative and executive apparatuses of the state as sources of foreign policy behavior. Graham Allison (1971), in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, delineated three analytical models to explain the crisis. These are the rational actor model, the organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model. The second and third models are representative of the state-based origins of foreign policy behavior. The organizational process model assumes that international politics is comprised of standardized organizational outputs designed to handle standard day-to-day situations. During the Cuban crisis, however, each agency performed what it was designed to do without adherence to the same security standards. Therefore, bureaucratic confusion is theorized to account for the U.S. decision to blockade Cuba and the Soviets' decision to withdraw their missiles. The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, characterizes foreign policy decisions as the product of decentralized coordination of the various pressures leveled by representatives of interest groups inside and outside the government. Waltz (1967) compares the effectiveness of the American presidential system with the British parliamentary system in matters of foreign policy and concludes that the former is superior to the latter. More precisely, the observations that the Prime Minister is more inclined than the President to value party unity above that of the public interest and that parliamentary debates thwart deliberation and hamper policy adjustments reinforce the conclusion that American governmental structures are more effective in determining and steering domestic and foreign policy.

Another example of state-centered explanations of foreign policy is found in John Steinbruner's cybernetic theory (1974). Applied in the context of the U.S. Air Force decision

to purchase the B-71 bomber over objections expressed by the Department of Defense in the early 1960s, the cybernetic theory holds that the Air Force officers were focusing on a set of a few selected variables for which they were receiving information feedback, i.e., the characteristics of the forces accumulated by the enemies. Morgan and Campbell's (1991) finding that, for major powers, the level of domestic structural constraint in the form of the executive selection process, decisional constraints in terms of the number of individuals and institutions that must approve of a decision for war within a state, and the level of political competition, are all linked to a state's likeliness to engage in war also supports state-centered explanations. To cite an additional example, Morgan and Bickers (1992) found that in the United States from the year 1953 to 1976 the presidents have resorted to using low levels of external force whenever they suffered a deterioration of support from within their ruling coalitions.

The third orientation with respect to explaining foreign policy behavior has been to establish linkages between state and society through the representative and administrative institutions, including education. R. J. Rummel (1983) shows that political freedom (i.e., civil liberties and political rights) and the freedom of groups and individuals to pursue their socioeconomic interests free from government coercion are conducive to the reduced use of foreign violence. Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. and Brian L. Job (1988) use cybernetic theory to specify a model that predicts the American President's decision to use foreign force for political purposes (i.e., use of force short of war). The model incorporates international, domestic, and political variables, where the latter two categories capture internal variables. The authors operationalize the domestic and political variables in terms of public opinion attitudes toward the use of force, the state of the economy, and presidential approval rate.

They find that a president's decision to use foreign force for political purposes is influenced more by the internal variables, both domestic and political, than by the international ones. Similarly, Bruce Russett (1990b) examines the relationship between international politics and democracy and concludes that public opinion, measured in terms of percentages of approval or disapproval of the President's performance in office, influences national security policy by constraining the options available to the chief executive.

In *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives*, Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) concern themselves with trying to explain why leaders of nation states choose certain courses of action, but not others, as these states engage in different interactive processes. After testing international and domestic models against each other, they decide to give more credence to the domestically constrained perspective. In so doing, the authors advance the International Interactions Game Theory, which posits that domestic considerations constitute the structure of constraints and incentives within which foreign policy decision makers function. These constraints and incentives, in turn, are believed to shape most leaders' preferences, influencing the prospects for cooperation or conflict between pairs of states. Domestic political opposition against the use of foreign force, as well as costs in terms of lost life and property, according to the authors' specification, reduce the decision maker to an agent of implementation for whatever objectives the domestic political process produces, although the authors do not explicitly include their ideas on domestic constraints in the model that they have formulated.

The Two-Level Games Theory and the Present Study

The central ideas of Putnam's theory were presented in the first chapter and will be further delineated in the following chapter. The present study is based upon Putnam's theory, and both should be viewed within the context of studying the linkages between domestic politics and foreign policy behavior. The theory concerns itself with the dynamics of diplomacy and interstate negotiations and, as its author has claimed, is applicable to all issues of negotiation in all contexts.

The process of empirically testing Putnam's theory, or any theory for that matter, should satisfy two important purposes. The first has to do with introducing new case-specific contextual elements to the application of theoretical propositions, with the objective of exploring the universality claims of the theory. In *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, the theory has been tested within twelve cases comprising four areas of research. However, as Peter B. Evans has rightly noted in the concluding chapter of the volume, "[f]ocusing on cases where interactive dynamics play a role leaves instances of unremitting bilateral hostility or xenophobia under-represented relative to those where differences were negotiable" (p. 398). The present study, therefore, should be noted for endeavoring to correct for this shortcoming by testing the Two-Level Game theory within the Israeli-Palestinian context, which is characterized by institutionalized and protracted conflict. The religious, ethnic, and cultural aspects of the conflict, along with its persistent nature, should be viewed as new dimensions which are going to be introduced by this study to the process of testing the theory.

The second purpose behind conducting theory-driven empirical studies has to do with the need to continually refine the theoretical propositions by simply applying them to as many

cases as possible. By so doing, the theoretical specification of the propositions is fine-tuned in response to the new insights gained along the way. The theory can still benefit even when different authors apply the same theoretical propositions to the same case. Jeffrey W. Knopf (1994), for example, has refined the Two-Level Game theory by emphasizing the role of third parties in his analysis of domestic-international interactions in the INF talks, thus giving a different analysis from that presented by Richard Eichenberg in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*. Knopf's analysis introduces three levels of domestic-international interactions, which he calls transgovernmental, transnational, and cross-level. Knopf also introduces the role of institutional links among groups of states, reminiscent of military alliances.

A number of studies also attempted to construct formal models in order to capture some aspects of the logic of the two-level games theory. James Morrow (1991) empirically examined the outcome of the bargaining behavior between the United States and the Soviet Union over the question of arms control during the 1970s. He found that in view of reelection pressures, the U.S. tended to make increased concessions when inflation and unemployment were on the rise, but the concessions decreased when the economy became very weak. The Soviets' willingness to negotiate, on the other hand, was influenced by Congressional action on defense bills: they made less concessions when Congress was voting on critical bills, offered additional concessions after bills favoring defense passed, and offered fewer concessions otherwise.

Keisuke Iida (1993) also used the two-level games theory to integrate international negotiations and domestic decision-making in a simplified formal model, and concluded that the reality of international negotiations was much more complicated than Putnam's initial framework. Iida asserted that perceptions of domestic constraints were as significant as the

actual constraints themselves, but in either case the analyst was faced with the challenging task of discovering both types of constraints.

Chapter 3

THE METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to address the question of how the crisis of cooperation was handled in the diplomatic peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO. Toward this objective, the interactions between international and domestic politics in both Israeli and Palestinian contexts will be analyzed in order to assess their role in shaping the dynamics of the diplomatic negotiations and the substance of the two peace agreements that Israel and the PLO eventually reached.

Based on our understanding of the structural and protracted nature of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, it is necessary to identify the domestic variables on both sides which have influenced the dynamics of the negotiations over the Arab territories (Gaza Strip and the West Bank) occupied by Israel since 1967. According to the logic of integrative analysis inherent in Putnam's theory, the interactions between domestic and international politics within the peace process between Israel and the PLO are assumed to have been present in the "bargaining" and "ratification" stages of negotiating the two peace settlements in 1993 and 1995.

The case-study method is especially serviceable for achieving the theoretical and substantive objectives of this research. The present research will attempt to arrive at the two kinds of knowledge usually associated with the use of the case-study method: intrinsic and

instrumental (Stake, 1995; Becker, 1968). More precisely, our interest in understanding the role of the recent rounds of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in resolving the crisis of cooperation that has long characterized the protracted conflict between the two belligerents will be addressed by utilizing the functionality of the case-study method in arriving at an intrinsic knowledge of the phenomenon being analyzed. In addition, the present research will attempt to utilize this method as an instrument to test the explanatory performance of the two-level games theory within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

Description of Methodology Selected

In “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” Harry Eckstein (1975) distinguished among five different types of case studies. These are configurative-ideographic studies, disciplined-configurative studies, heuristic studies, plausibility probe studies, and crucial-case studies. In conducting my research I propose to utilize a combination of the disciplined-configurative type and the heuristic type; I base my choice on the import of these two variants of case studies in the process of theory-building.

As explained by Eckstein, disciplined-configurative case studies are constructed so as to test theoretical propositions within the contexts of particular cases and also to “impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not. It may also point up a need for new theory in neglected areas. Thus, the application of theories to cases can have feedback effects on theorizing . . . ” (p. 99).

The “disciplined” element in such case studies requires that any interpretation of a particular case be based upon comparatively valid theoretical propositions (Putnam’s theory in the present study); the “configurative” element means that an attempt is made to present

an overall delineation of the configuration (i.e., those aspects of the peace process between Israel and the PLO which are highlighted by the theory employed).

Succinctly put, the method of disciplined-configurative case studies is tied into theoretical inquiry essentially because it provides the researcher with the opportunity to test theory, interpret specific cases, and identify new puzzles (Eckstein, p. 100). It is this strength of the disciplined-configurative case study method that the present researcher hopes to capitalize on when attempting to make his contribution to the substantive and theoretical elements inherent in the topic being researched.

More importantly, the present study is even further tied into the process of theory building by the heuristic purposes it endeavors to fulfill. By testing the performance of Putnam's two-level games theory within the particular context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the ensuing peace negotiations, this study, in fact, adopts the building-block technique believed to be conducive to constructing more plausible and increasingly refined theoretical constructs (Becker, 1968). The heuristic function of this study is dictated by my belief that Putnam's theory needs to be evaluated within as many different bargaining contexts as necessary in order to discover new ways to further refine it (see Knopf, 1993, p. 601). My expectation about the heuristic merits of the present study is based upon the plausibility of the notion that the basic characteristics of structural and protracted conflict may play a role in revealing new theoretical knowledge. Such theoretical discoveries could give us more reason to believe that some theoretical relationships posited by Putnam's theory are valid, that some others need to be specified differently, or that a more convincing interpretation of the case calls for a theoretical modification of some sort.

In short, the disciplined and heuristic calibers of the method selected in this study reinforce each other in both structure and function: they make the inquiry theory-driven--hence disciplined; they also make the analysis based on clearly specified hypotheses--the applicability of which are to be tested and, if necessary, the refinement of which are to be sought--hence heuristic. The configurative caliber of the method permits the analysis to take into account the relevant attributes of the particular case being examined, thus facilitating incorporation of the systemic attributes of the two polities under examination as well as the basic characteristics of structural and protracted conflict in the process of evaluating Putnam's two-level games theory.

Configuring the Case Study

The purpose of configuring the case study is twofold. First, it is important to make sure that the design of analysis gives the theory being tested an unprejudiced opportunity to perform within the chosen context, so that whatever conclusions reached with regard to the acceptance or rejection of the theoretical propositions are based upon considerations of explanatory efficacy, rather than the unsuitableness of the cases selected.

This first consideration is especially relevant in the present case study because of the evident asymmetry between the two parties to the diplomatic peace negotiations, i.e., Israel and the Palestinians. This asymmetry warrants commenting on the similarities and differences between the two species, with the purpose of showing that both the Israeli and the Palestinian politics are in fact sufficiently comparable in ways which allow us to use them to test the two-level games theory while avoiding methodological charges over the inappropriateness of the choice of the empirical context.

It is apparent that while Israel is a democratic, modern, and powerful state with entrenched political institutions and defined boundaries, the Palestinians are still by and large a stateless community. Yet this difference between the two entities does not make the utilization of the two-level games theory any less relevant. Rather, Israeli and Palestinian contexts are equally capable of providing the sophistication necessary to handle all of the theoretical propositions that guide the analysis in this study. Much to the credit of Putnam's theory, the fact that the Palestinians have been lacking in terms of entrenched statehood has not thwarted the theory's ability to point to those concepts, variables, and theoretical constructs in the Palestinian context which are functionally equivalent to those found in the more entrenched Israeli political system.

First, both Israeli and Palestinian national aspirations and movements are strong. There is certainly no shortage of evidence pointing to the ability of the Jewish and Arab Palestinian peoples to perceive themselves as holding two distinctive national identities. While the creation of the State of Israel represents a culmination of the Jewish people's striving to fulfill their nationalistic dreams, the mere fact that the Palestinians have been able to maintain their collective nationalistic attributes intact both inside and outside the occupied territories (despite relentless Israeli attempts to deny, and at times even suppress, Palestinians' national claims) should attest to the strength of their sense of nationhood.

Second, Israel's modern procedural democracy could be said to be paralleled by the competitive nature of Palestinian politics. Here, it is essential to emphasize that neither the Israeli government nor the Palestinian Authority is immune from influences and pressures arising from the complex and highly active domestic politics of the two polities, especially when it comes to an issue of prominent political significance such as the diplomatic peace

negotiations. State-society interactions are thus believed to be present in both the Israeli and the Palestinian contexts, although each context retains its own distinctive patterns of shaping and processing these interactions.

Third, comparability can also be established with regard to the formal and informal political institutions in the two contexts. The Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian National Council, Fatah's Central Council, the Executive Committee, along with a host of Palestinian political parties and societal forces, constitute a functional match to the Israeli state apparatus as well as the overall political system within which it is immersed. These three areas of comparability between Israeli and Palestinian politics are sufficient to mitigate the apparent asymmetry between the two entities to an extent that should make the application of Putnam's theory meaningfully relevant.

The second reason behind the need to carefully configure the case study is to make sure that the language of the theory being tested is congruent to the peculiar contexts of the polities comprising the case study in terms of both conceptualization and identification of variables. In other words, the proper names of the political systems should give way to the theoretical concepts, variables, and relationships which guide the analysis, without, of course, losing sight of those traits of the overall context which made the choice of the political systems empirically relevant in the first place. It is exactly here where some of the basic properties of structural and protracted conflict should be meaningfully integrated in the present case study.

At this juncture, two important properties of protracted conflict are of immediate relevance. The first is that conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is endogenous, meaning that whole societies are the agents of hostility and that the Israeli government and

the Palestinian Authority are not the sole agents of conflict. The second is that the conflict is both internalized and institutionalized, meaning that hostility is deeply rooted in the domestic politics of the two polities, both in political and ideological terms. The combination of these two properties along with the characterization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an existential one has two crucial implications with regard to the dynamics of peace negotiations between the two parties and therefore should be incorporated in the configuration of the study.

The first implication is that the purpose of the resolution of the conflict through diplomatic negotiations has been to change the status quo (i.e., the occupation of the territories and its accompanying policies), rather than preserve it. This fact means that negotiating peace is likely to invite different social and political forces (much to the pleasure or displeasure of COGs) to become interested actors in the dynamics of the diplomatic efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement. It is precisely because the process of resolving the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians touches upon many profound ideological and political preferences on both sides that the two political communities are expected to actively become entangled in the diplomatic negotiations.

The second implication is closely related to the first one and concerns identifying those forces and political preferences in the Israeli and Palestinian politics which are believed to bear influence on the dynamics of peace negotiations. In so doing, we should be guided by our understanding of the protracted conflict as internalized and institutionalized in the domestic politics of the two disputant parties. Here, we should be able to further configure the analysis in this study by identifying the different political and ideological preferences and actors, institutionalized or otherwise, within the Palestinian and the Israeli political

communities.

In both the Palestinian and Israeli context, four major political forces which espouse distinguishable attitudes toward peace negotiations can be identified. In the Palestinian context, these are the pragmatic nationalist supporters, the pragmatic nationalist critics, the national rejectionists, and the Islamic rejectionists (Brynen, 1994). In the Israeli context these are the ideological hawks on the right of the political spectrum, the ideological doves on the far left, the pragmatic hawks, and the pragmatic doves (Dowty, 1994, p. 84).

The Two-level Games Theory

Putnam's two-level games theory emphasizes a number of concepts, variables, and theoretical relationships. In this section I will identify those concepts and variables, both dependent and independent, which constitute the essence of the hypothesized relationships outlined in Chapter One.

Domestic win-set for a given domestic constituency is defined as the set of all possible agreements reached at the international bargaining table that would win the necessary majority among the constituents when presented for ratification by vote at the domestic level (Putnam, 1988, p. 437). The effects of win-set on international agreement:

1. *The larger win-sets are, the more likely it is that an international agreement will be reached. Agreements are capable of being reached only when win-sets overlap.*
2. *The relative size of win-sets influences the bargaining advantages of the respective negotiating parties and, in turn, the distribution of gains from the international agreement.* Determinants of the win-set:

*Domestic Actors and Preferences:***i) Actor Preferences:**

- Hawkish;
- Dovish.

ii) Preference Configuration:

- Preferences are homogeneous;
- Preferences are heterogeneous.

iii) Transboundary Domestic Alliances:

- Domestic groups form transboundary connections with the domestic forces in the other polity to enhance their resources toward common goals;
- Domestic groups form transboundary connections to influence the government of the other polity.

*Domestic Political Institutions:***i) Formal Domestic Institutional Opportunities and Constraints:**

- Ruling party's (or faction's) relative power position;
- Legislative requirements for ratification of international agreements.

ii) Informal Domestic Institutional Opportunities and Constraints:

- Party discipline within the governing party or faction;
- The importance of securing the informal support of political forces interested in the outcome of the agreement.

Negotiation Strategies at the International Negotiation Table:

i) Side-Payments, Offers, and Threats:

- Chiefs of Governments use side-payments, offers, and threats to attract marginal supporters of the agreement within their respective polities;
- COGs use side-payments, offers, and threats to increase the likelihood of ratification within the recipient nation.

ii) Negotiators' Status:

- Negotiators (COGs) try to enhance one another's standing within their respective domestic politics;
- The enhanced status of COGs enables them to make more side-payments;
- A "kinky" domestic win-set is utilized by a COG to convince his counterpart on the opposite side of the international negotiating table that further concessions will make ratification of the agreement unlikely.

iii) Restructuring And Reverberation:

- COGs resort to restructuring their respective as well as one another's domestic politics in order to influence the size of win-sets;
- International pressures have the potential of reverberating within domestic politics, and, as a result, influencing the international negotiating table.

Theoretical Propositions of the Study

The substantive question of the present study deals with explaining how the crisis of cooperation between the Israeli government and the PLO was handled within the framework of the diplomatic peace negotiations. In order to address this research question, two theoretically-derived questions are asked. The first question is based on the proposition that the negotiating status of Chiefs of Governments influences the chances of completing peace agreements. The question asked is whether in the course of the diplomatic negotiations the PLO leader and the Israeli Prime Minister attempted to enhance each other's standing within their respective domestic politics, and whether resolving the crisis of cooperation can be attributed to the facilitating effect of such attempts. And the second question is based on the proposition that Chiefs of Governments resort to restructuring their respective domestic politics in order to enhance the chances of reaching international agreements. The question asked here is whether the diplomatic talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians were accompanied by efforts to restructure the domestic politics, and whether the handling of the crisis of cooperation throughout the peace process was influenced by such efforts.

Sources of Data

Sources of data used for the purpose of this study are diverse. First, the diplomatic records of the peace process between Israel and the PLO will be consulted. These records should include the documents of the peace agreements as well as the records pertaining to press conferences and media briefings reflecting the accounts given by key participants to the proceedings of negotiations. Second, Arabic and English language newspapers will be consulted in order to monitor the dynamics of Israeli and Palestinian domestic and interstate

politics over the course of peace negotiations. The information pertaining to the peace process as well as the Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics are mainly drawn from the following news sources:

The Jerusalem Post, June 1992 – June 1996;

Journal of Palestine Studies, June 1992 – June 1996;

Mideast Mirror, January 1993 – December 1995;

The New York Times, June 1992 – December 1995;

The Sunday Times (London), January 1993 – December 1995; and

The Times (London), January 1993 – December 1995.

And third, some collected data pertaining to opinion polls and socioeconomic measures in Israeli and Palestinian politics will be obtained from the relevant published reports.

Instrumentation

Instruments used to collect data are of two sorts. The first is electronic and makes use of computer-assisted data retrieval systems. Conspicuous among these is the Internet (for the advisability of using the Internet for academic purposes see King, 1995), on which valuable and updated data about the peace process is readily available. Only those documents downloaded from Internet sites maintained by scrupulous sources are consulted and used for purposes of analysis in this study. The documents of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, as well as media briefings and press conferences pertaining to the diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian teams are the only type of data downloaded from a World Wide Web-server maintained by the Consulate General of Israel to the Midwest. Whenever possible, due care is exercised in order to ensure the legitimacy and transparency of data

downloaded from the Internet. In addition to gaining access to the Internet, Computer-assisted retrieval instrumentation is also used to read and collect data from *The Jerusalem Post on CD Rom*, which is published by the C.D.I. Systems (1992) LTD. Israel. The second instrument of data collection utilizes the library setting and is especially useful for the collection of data from printed sources such as newspapers, learned journal articles, and other publications.

Data Collection and Analysis

The process of data collection will be informed by the method of “structured, focused comparison” recommended by Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown (1985) and praised by King and colleagues as a systematic procedure for gathering information (King, et. al., 1993). This method emphasizes theory for guiding the process of formulating explanatory questions. Additionally, this method places high importance on discipline in the way data is collected in that an attempt is made to compile information about the same variables across the selected units. According to George and McKeown, the method of “structured, focused comparison” contributes to making a useful and explicit methodology for case studies:

A comparison of two or more cases is “focused” insofar as the researcher deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study. Similarly, controlled comparison is “structured” when the researcher, in designing the study, defines and standardizes the data requirements of case studies. This is accomplished by formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case. The method is presented as a way of performing a small number of case studies in such a way as to make the assessment of the comparability of the cases much more systematic and defensible, but the general approach we outline also is well suited to the performance of a single case study (p. 41).

The great virtue behind employing the method of “structured, focused comparison” when conducting case studies is twofold. First, by emphasizing the role of theory in guiding the analysis, this method represents a commendable departure from those case studies which have failed to contribute satisfactorily to the development of theories because they lack theoretical focus. Second, the method of “structured, focused comparison” encourages structuring case studies in a comparable fashion and thus facilitates the cumulation of the results of individual cases (p. 42).

The notion of the comparability, and thus cumulation, of results derived from individual structured case analyses, according to George and McKeown, constitutes the basis of the much needed theoretical rigor in case study research. The essence of this rigor is the “congruence procedure” that George and McKeown describe as one variant of explanations based upon a within-case, as contrasted with cross-case, comparison of relationships between variables. The underlying logic of the “congruence procedure” is that the researcher begins the analysis of the case with a sufficiently defined theory. Next, “the researcher . . . establishes the value of the independent and dependent variables in a particular case. The researcher then compares the observed value of the dependent variables with those predicted by the theory, given the observed independent variables. If the outcome is consistent with the prediction, then the possibility of a causal relationship is strengthened” (p. 30).

It is, however, necessary to safeguard against making indefensible claims of causal relationships based upon mere consistency between empirical observation and theoretical predictions. More precisely, it is necessary to make sure that “consistency is not spurious.” Here, the importance of structuring individual case studies which purport to explain a common general phenomenon with the same theoretical body in a comparable fashion

becomes all the more manifest. Using the same logic inherent in Bayesian decision theory, the researcher's posterior assessment of the hypothesized theoretical relationship between the dependent and independent variables is partly determined by the researcher's prior estimate of the probability that the relationship is actually causal. The higher the prior probability that the theoretical relationship is valid, the higher the posterior probability the researcher may assign to the claim that consistency between theory and empirical evidence is not spurious. It is therefore crucial to determine how the researcher's prior probability with regard to the performance of the theory is set. According to George and McKeown, prior probability is estimated from research findings of previously completed and similarly structured case studies (pp. 30-32).

In short, both the logic of the congruence procedure and the requirements of the method of "structured, focused comparison" should contribute to making across-case causal interpretations more disciplined and knowledge increasingly cumulative. They both reinforce the notion that a research project is best conceived of as a process in which theory is continuously refined through iterative formulation, observation, and revision (George and McKeown, p. 34).

The process of collecting data for the purpose of satisfying the objectives of the present case study will be guided by the prescriptions of the "structured, focused comparison" method. This means that the analysis will deal only with those aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations which are called upon by the two-level games theory. Therefore, I will proceed by first identifying the general questions which reflect the postulated propositions in the theory being utilized; I will then ask these questions of the case being analyzed. The formulation of these general questions will be informed by the outline

presented above under the “The Two-level Games theory” section in this chapter. Answers to these questions will then constitute evaluations of the theoretical hypotheses of Putnam’s two-level games theory within the Israeli-Palestinian context of diplomatic negotiations. The performance of the theoretical hypotheses will be monitored within Israeli and Palestinian contexts, as well as over the international negotiating table, in order to assess their explanatory value. The evaluation of working hypotheses will be guided by the congruence procedure described above, in which the observed relationships will be compared with the predicted theoretical relationships.

Chapter 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

In this study the diplomatic talks between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization were treated as a discrete system. Within this system, two theoretically-derived questions were asked of the Oslo One (1993) and Oslo Two (1995) agreements which had been concluded between the two parties. In addition, four crises were identified during the course of peace talks and the same two questions were asked of them. These questions were formulated by the theoretical and substantive considerations accentuated in the Literature Review chapter, as well as by the methodology employed and described in the Methodology chapter. Answers to these questions constitute the body of this chapter and are treated as the bases upon which the two theoretical propositions advanced by the two-level games theory are assessed.

The first issue concerns the negotiating status of Chiefs of Governments. The question asked here is whether, in the course of the diplomatic negotiations, the PLO leader Yasir Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin attempted to enhance each other's standing within their respective domestic politics and whether concluding the two agreements and resolving the four crises can be attributed to the facilitating effect of such attempts. The second issue concerns the influence of restructuring domestic politics on facilitating agreements and successfully settling the crises. The question raised within this respect is

whether the diplomatic talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians were accompanied by efforts to restructure domestic politics and whether the accomplishment of the two agreements and salvaging the peace process was made more feasible by such efforts.

The boundaries of the search for information necessary to answer these questions were set to begin with the inauguration of the Rabin Government in July 1992 and end with the election of the Netanyahu Government in June 1996. The choice of these two dates was dictated, first, by the fact that the election of Rabin and the ousting of Shamir marked the beginning of a new set of rounds of more promising and engaging negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Very little was achieved in the first five rounds of negotiations between the two parties under the Likud Government, largely because of Shamir's strategy which was designed to evade making any progress in diplomatic talks with the Palestinians. Second, the two major breakthroughs, i.e., Oslo One and Oslo Two agreements, are encompassed within the designated boundaries of the search and, therefore, any information necessary to assess the theoretical propositions are expected to be found within the designated period.

THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

The Case of Oslo One Agreement

In this case, the concept of domestic win-set pertained to reaching a formal agreement at the international negotiation table between the Israeli government and the PLO. Foremost among the domestic factors which influenced the win-set and, consequently, facilitated the accomplishment of the Oslo One Agreement were the dovish preferences of Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat relative to those of Israeli and Palestinian forces which opposed

the prospect of peacefully settling the dispute. In addition, negotiation strategies at the international negotiation table embodied in the two leaders' efforts to restructure, both conceptually and practically, certain aspects of their respective domestic politics further consolidated the convergence toward concluding a formal peace agreement. By utilizing the tied-hand technique, however, Chairman Arafat convinced the Israeli government that amending the Palestinian National Charter to be agreeable to the Israeli public would damage the chances of ratifying the agreement.

According to the rules established at the Madrid Conference in October 1991, the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations were formally structured to be between representatives of the Israeli government on one hand, and representatives of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the other hand. The PLO, therefore, was formally barred from directly engaging in the peace talks with Israel, primarily because under the National Unity Government the Israeli Knesset passed a law in 1986 which made it illegal for Israelis to meet with members of the PLO. The Palestinian delegation to the talks, however, conducted the negotiations with its Israeli counterpart while maintaining close consultation with the PLO leadership in Tunis, and the Rabin Government was aware of that liaison and tolerated it.

Oslo One Agreement, also known as The Declaration of Principles (DoP), was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 and dealt with the interim Palestinian self-government arrangements in Gaza and Jericho. The agreement represented a major breakthrough in the long process of resolving the crisis of cooperation between the Israeli government and the PLO. The agreement was facilitated by a number of linkages between the domestic politics and the international negotiating table.

From the Palestinian perspective, the conditions under which the Palestinians engaged in the diplomatic peace negotiations with Israel were, to say the least, less than ideal. To be sure, the balance of negotiating power was tremendously tilted in favor of the Israeli government. Whereas the Israeli government was enjoying actual control over, and presence in, the territories, the Palestinians believed that the Israeli presence there was illegal. Although the Palestinians, as occupied people, had little to offer Israel beside promises of peaceful coexistence in return for Israeli withdrawal from the territories, the Palestinian negotiators believed that the legal foundations of the PLO's territorial claims were, theoretically, bolstered by their interpretation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 which called upon Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, by the refusal of the world community to recognize the Israeli occupation of the territories, as well as by the lack of any legal justification for the occupying government to continue to rule a distinct people.

Within the framework of diplomatic talks, however, the legally-based reasoning championed by the otherwise militarily and politically weak PLO was rendered less relevant by the fact that Israel wielded actual control over the territories despite the Palestinian conception that the Israeli occupation was legally-barren. To be sure, when the peace process was initiated in 1991, it was the Israeli government which enjoyed control over the land and people of the territories, through both military and administrative apparatuses. Assured of the futility of any non-peaceful option as a means of realizing any degree of foothold over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and, obviously, having to negotiate from the unenviably underdog position, the PLO's leadership was thus willing to negotiate on Israel's terms. Therefore, while the Palestinians' claims were supported by what they believed to be

undisputed legal bases, the Israelis enjoyed the uncontested discretionary decision of how much control they should transfer to the PLO, according to what terms of reference and at what price. The formal Palestinian negotiating team's conviction that the Israeli control of the territories was illegal, however, appeared as the major obstacle that seriously stood in the way of making progress toward reaching peace agreement. Negotiating on Israel's terms, therefore, meant that the government must first effectively shift the terms of reference--i.e., the very characterization of Israel's control of the territories--away from the underlying connotations of the occupation in order to counterbalance what the Palestinians believed was the legal bases of their territorial claims. Israel needed to affect such a shift, and the fact that she was the more powerful party which was wielding actual control over the territories enabled her to achieve it. The Palestinian negotiating team insisted that Israel was an occupier and considered Israelis' attempt to make the shift as a vicious misrepresentation of the issue under negotiation and, therefore, resisted it.

At least for the benefit of validating the diplomatic talks as a means of resolving the territorial dispute, as well as the completion of Oslo One and Oslo Two Agreements, an explicit, though major, restructuring was achieved with respect to the characterization of Israel's relationship to the territories under her control since 1967. Israel was interested in mitigating the problematic consequences the connotations of occupation could have on both her negotiating status and the feasibility of concluding a formal peace agreement with the Palestinians. The Israeli government, therefore, had to affect a different characterization of the nature of her control over the territories from that emphasized by the Palestinians. Without such restructuring, the very notion of negotiating a settlement would have seemed untenable. In other words, had the Israelis accepted at face value the implications of the

Palestinian negotiating team's characterization of the occupation of the territories as illegal, they really would have stripped themselves of much of the maneuvering space they needed in order to negotiate with the Palestinians on more constructive terms.

The Palestinian negotiators understood that, legally speaking, nothing less than expeditious and full evacuation may correct for an illegal occupation of land and people. Israel's concerns with security and ideology, however, prevented her from accepting the notion of outright evacuation from the territories. Israel, therefore, had to reconstruct the terms of reference in order to push the prospect of full military evacuation out of any short-term settlement agenda by basically downplaying the occupational dimension of her control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A review of the media briefings and press conferences delivered by key participants in the diplomatic talks on both sides revealed that during the phase of negotiating the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangements (PISGA), Israel actually succeeded in changing the frame of reference to fit her preference.

Israel's exit out of the dilemma, during the negotiations, was to emphasize the administrative dimension of her control over the territories without denying the military dimension of the occupation. Israeli negotiators utilized the fact that there had been an elaborate administrative dimension to the occupation of the territories to propose a handover of functional and administrative responsibilities to the Palestinians while keeping the land under Israeli control. The Israeli negotiators tried to convince their interlocutors that self-rule, or autonomy, was better than nothing and urged them to seize the offer. The Palestinian negotiators repeatedly protested and resisted Israel's attempts, which were designed to draw a distinction between delegating administrative functions and granting autonomy to people on one hand and conceding legislative functions and autonomy of land on the other hand. The

response of the Palestinian negotiators, as conveyed by Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, spokeswoman for the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace talks, was that “they [the Israelis] don’t want us to start on the track of statehood and we don’t want them to close the door to statehood and to preempt the outcome by keeping us under occupation perpetually.”¹⁶

In fact, a running theme throughout much of the peace talks had been the contention between the Israeli and the Palestinian positions with respect to what powers to transfer to the Palestinians and upon what legal basis. As early as the beginning of the sixth round of talks in August 1992 (the first under Rabin’s Government), the Palestinian delegation to the diplomatic talks argued that within any peaceful settlement, legally speaking, it was only befitting to have a Palestinian source of legislative authority because the Israeli source of authority, which had been based on occupation of land and people, was illegal itself. Clearly, the Palestinian rationalization flew in the face of Israeli designs to retain any degree of legislative control over the disputed land after reaching peaceful settlement. Even as late as the end of the ninth round of negotiations held in May 1993, and just a few months before signing the Oslo One Agreement in September, the Israelis had been insisting that they were not willing to concede more than administrative functions to the Palestinians. Asked whether there actually existed a basic difference between the Palestinians’ and Israel’s perceptions of the relationship between the latter and the territories, Elyakim Rubinstein, Head of the Israeli delegation to the talks with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, emphasized the administrative liaison between Israel and the territories, without denying the military

¹⁶ *Media Briefing: Dr. Hanan Ashrawi*, August 27, 1992. The Information Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry--Jerusalem. Downloaded from WWW-server maintained by the Consulate General of Israel to the Midwest, Chicago, IL.

dimension of the relationship. He went further to expound Israel's position which held that since there had never been a recognized sovereignty in the territories before the 1967 period, Israel cannot be said to be occupying the territories. As he put it, "if there is no sovereignty you do not occupy a territory."¹⁷ The Palestinian delegation was agitated by Rubinstein's statement and considered it indicative of Israel's future attitude toward the territories during the final-status negotiations. By refusing to admit that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were Occupied Territories, Israel effectively weakened the legal basis of Palestinians' claims and, consequently, escaped what the Palestinian negotiators believed was Israel's obligation of full and unconditional withdrawal.

Although the formal Palestinian delegation to the peace talks with Israel, which were held in Washington, consistently refused the Israeli delegation's proposals to concede administrative power to the Palestinians without legislative authority, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat was willing to accept them through his secret talks with the Rabin Government held in Norway. Amidst initial Palestinian surprise and later skepticism, the Rabin-Arafat behind-the-scenes agreement, known as Oslo One, seems to have incorporated the same formulation advanced by the formal Israeli delegation to the talks with the Palestinians in Washington. By accepting the administrative autonomy formula, Arafat was considered, by Palestinian friends and foes alike, to have forfeited the Palestinians' legal claim to the land. The fact remains, however, that the negotiations in Washington, which had been going on for two years when the Oslo One Agreement was reached, were stalled. The formal negotiators failed

¹⁷ *News Conference: The Israeli Delegation*, May 13, 1993. The Information Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry—Jerusalem. Downloaded from WWW-server maintained by the Consulate General of Israel to the Midwest, Chicago, IL.

to make the breakthrough necessary to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. Had it not been for Arafat's acceptance of the transfer of administrative functions to the Palestinians without sovereignty over the land, chances are the Oslo One Agreement breakthrough would not have materialized.

A number of factors contributed to facilitating Arafat's acceptance of the Israeli formulation, which had been originally resisted by the formal Palestinian delegation to the negotiations in Washington. First, Chairman Arafat, perhaps more than many other Palestinian forces and groups, correctly judged the power position of the Palestinians in relation to that of Israel and, thus, concluded that the PLO, at least in the short-term, stood little chance of getting more concessions from Israel than those related to the delegation of administrative and functional powers. Second, the fact that Israel already had an extensive administrative structure in place throughout the territories--which had been perceived by the Palestinians as a constant reminder of the occupation--served as an incentive for the PLO's leadership to accept Israel's proposed transfer of administrative powers. Acquiring control over administrative functions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho was certainly no trivial achievement for the PLO and its supporters, especially in view of the fact that the Palestinians had little to offer Israel in return. Although the self-rule arrangement fell short of the Palestinians' aspirations after political freedom, dismantling the occupation's administrative apparatus and redeploying the military forces could reasonably be utilized by the PLO leadership as reasons to convince its constituents that their daily lives were about to improve, despite the vexatious mystery that was allowed to cloud the final status of the territories. Third, it seems that the formal Palestinian and Israeli delegations to the diplomatic talks in Washington had real difficulty coming to terms with the distinction between

negotiations over the interim self-government phase and negotiations over the final-status phase. A review of the media briefings and press conferences showed that the Palestinian negotiators in Washington continually expressed their dissatisfaction with Israel's refusal to negotiate matters considered by the latter as appropriate for the final-status phase. Israel's insistence on maintaining the distinction between the two phases enabled her to exclude discussing the fate of Jewish settlements and Palestinian statehood from the interim self-rule phase. Chairman Arafat was more willing than his representative delegation in Washington to respect the distinction drawn between the two phases, apparently out of recognition of the limits of the Israeli government's concessions. By accepting Israel's formulation of administrative concessions and troop redeployment, Arafat agreed to withdraw the Palestinians's demands for immediate Israeli evacuation of the Occupied Territories and put aside their claim to East Jerusalem. Arafat, therefore, was accused by members of the formal Palestinian delegation to the diplomatic talks in Washington as well as fellow Palestinians of giving up too much, too soon.

Therefore, the validation of diplomatic negotiations as a means of resolving the outstanding territorial dispute between the Palestinians and the Israelis was facilitated by a crucial conceptual restructuring which the Israeli government implemented and Chairman Arafat had no choice but to realistically accept. More specifically, by shifting the characterization of Israeli control over the territories away from an outright occupation and toward a greater emphasis on the administrative dimension of that control, the Israeli negotiators created the space they needed in order to escape what the Palestinian negotiators believed was Israel's obligation to unconditionally evacuate the territories. Although the formal Palestinian delegation to the negotiations in Washington resisted that conceptual

restructuring, Chairman Arafat accepted it and, thus, facilitated the arrival at the Oslo One Agreement of September 1993.

In addition to the above-mentioned conceptual restructuring, the Israeli government and the PLO restructured other aspects in their respective domestic politics in order to successfully approach the crisis of cooperation and facilitate the completion of the Oslo One Agreement. Those restructuring measures were designed to overcome many of the taboos which have long characterized the Palestinian-Israeli relations.

Chronologically ordered, the Israeli government undertook the first restructuring according to which the Parliament passed a resolution which lifted the proscription imposed on establishing contacts between the Israelis and the PLO. Lifting the ban on contacts with the PLO—by 39 votes in favor to 20 votes against—in the Knesset in January 1993 legalized meetings between members of the Israeli government and members of the organization which once was considered a terrorist group. As expected, the resolution represented a woeful development to the right-wing opposition, especially the Likud which resented the notion of legitimizing the PLO, which the Knesset's move amounted to. As Likud MK Uzi Landau stated, "If you recognize the legitimacy of this organization, you can't avoid also granting legitimacy to its objectives."¹⁸

Although the repealing of the ban was sponsored by MKs from the governing coalition led by the Labor Party, the Rabin Government reaffirmed its rejection of the notion of directly negotiating with the PLO during the interim self-rule phase of the negotiations. Rabin himself insisted that the formal Palestinian delegation to the negotiations in Washington be limited to

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 1/21/1993.

representatives from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.¹⁹ Lifting the ban on contacts with the PLO, nonetheless, was a significant restructuring because it proved to be especially serviceable to the secret diplomacy between the Israeli government and the PLO in Norway. The initiation of the Norwegian diplomatic channel in January 1993 which brought together Yossi Beilin, Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, and Abu Ala, the PLO's Financial Chief, was a direct beneficiary of the Knesset's resolution to repeal the ban on contacts with the PLO during the same month.²⁰ Had it not been for the Knesset's move toward legalizing direct talks with the PLO, the Norwegian channel, along with nine months of secret negotiations and 14 meetings between the representatives of the PLO and the Israeli government, would have been rendered--from the perspective of the Israeli domestic politics--a legally questionable basis on which to conclude any agreement with the PLO. Without first legalizing direct negotiations with the PLO, the Rabin Government would have found it extremely difficult to push the Oslo One Agreement through the Knesset, let alone defend it against attacks from the opposing factions. Had the ban on contacts with the PLO been left intact, the Rabin Government would have been found at fault for breaching the ban, thus tremendously diminishing its chances of successfully defending the concessions it offered to the PLO.

The second step toward breaking the proscription imposed against the formal participation of the PLO in the peace negotiations was undertaken by Chairman Arafat in August 1993. The essence of Arafat's move was to appoint the three most prominent

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, 1/20/1993.

²⁰ *The Times*, London, 9/15/1993.

members of the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations with Israel, held in Washington, as officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization. By transforming the status of Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Faisal al-Husseini, and Sa'eb Erekat from representatives of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to official members of the PLO's negotiations steering committee, Chairman Arafat had effectively ended the interdiction which Israel had been imposing on the formal participation of the PLO in the peace negotiations in Washington.²¹ Arafat made the move after meeting with the three negotiators and successfully convincing them to withdraw their resignations, which they sought in protest against the Chairman's handling of the negotiations and his authoritarian leadership style. Therefore, the fact that the Rabin Government accepted to continue to negotiate with the three Palestinian negotiators, despite their new status (thus abandoning a policy which had been stipulated by the Shamir Government at the beginning of the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued to be observed by the Rabin Government for two years later), meant that Israel would be negotiating openly for the first time with the PLO officials. In addition, Arafat's move demonstrated to the officials of the Israeli government, especially the Leftist doves, that he was the only Palestinian leader with whom they could conclude a peace agreement, primarily because he was demonstrably powerful enough to silence internal opposition to any concessions he was about to make to the Israelis through the secret talks in Norway. Therefore, while the Knesset's resolution to repeal the ban on contacts with the PLO represented an Israeli step toward establishing direct, albeit secret, linkages with the organization once considered terrorist, Arafat's decision to transform the status of the three Palestinian negotiators by

²¹ *The New York Times*, 8/13/1993.

appointing them as officials of the PLO secured the Palestinian-Israeli rapprochement by establishing a direct and formal bridge to the Israeli government.

Arafat's ability, and perhaps willingness, to restructure his domestic politics, however, stopped short of yielding to the Rabin Government's demand that an article considered by the Israelis as controversial be removed from the Palestinian National Charter. At issue was both the Charter's description of the existence of the state of Israel as illegal and its call for the liberation of all of Palestine. The disputed article states that "Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit," and it is the goal of the PLO to "liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine." From the perspective of Prime Minister Rabin, it was important that Chairman Arafat see to it that the Charter be made agreeable to the Israelis, in order for him to present his constituents with a meaningfully convincing case in favor of the full recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Chairman Arafat, on the other hand, believed that he had already made substantial concessions to Israel through the Gaza-Jericho deal and, therefore, calculated that it was not to the best interest of the PLO to be viewed by Palestinians as prematurely relinquishing fundamental elements of its historical claims in return for securing Israel's recognition of the organization. Arafat preferred to spare himself, as well as the peace negotiations, the troublesome effects of attempting to press the member factions of the PLO to formally modify the Charter. Accordingly, the PLO's response to the Israeli demand was twofold. First, referring to the remarks Arafat made on May 2, 1989, Bassam Abu Sharif, a Senior Adviser to Chairman Arafat, announced that the disputed article was no longer operative because "President Arafat already declared in Paris that the Charter was *Caducue* (null and void). This means that the present program of the PLO has superseded

the Charter.”²² Second, Arafat utilized the tied-hand technique by publicly arguing that it was beyond his ability to secure the modification of the Charter. As part of a concerted public campaign to that effect, Arafat stated in interviews with Egyptian newspapers that since a two-third majority of the Palestine National Council must be secured in order to amend the Charter, any attempt to do so might blow a setback to finalizing the Oslo One Agreement by needlessly provoking a rancorous debate among the different Palestinian factions. In the same vein, Nabil Sha’ath, a Senior Aid to Chairman Arafat, emphasized the potential difficulties inherent in altering the Charter by stating that, “We are just looking for a word or two, something that would allay Israeli fears but at the same time not strike at the constitutional complications of changing a Charter. The issues now are purely logistic, purely linguistic, not political at this stage.”²³

The combination of, first, verbally declaring that the controversial parts of the Charter, for all intents and purposes, were already null and void, and, second, giving the appearance of being expressively incapable of affecting the modification required by the Rabin Government, seemed adequate to convince the latter that Chairman Arafat had actually gone as far as he could in renouncing the objectionable parts of the Palestinian National Charter. The PLO’s twofold response to the Israeli demands successfully averted a setback to the conclusion of the Oslo One Agreement; so much so that on September 9 Arafat and Rabin exchanged letters of recognition in which, first, the PLO recognized the right of Israel to exist in peace and security and renounced terrorism and other acts of violence, and, second, the

²² *The Times*, London, 9/1/1993.

²³ *The New York Times*, 9/8/1993.

Israeli government, only 10 hours later, recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.²⁴

The announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) accord between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel was received by varying degrees of support and rejection from different forces in the region. The Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) endorsed the accord and Hamid al-Ghabid, ICO Secretary-General, described it as a “bold first step towards achieving the goal of a just and comprehensive settlement.” Also, member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) supported the accord and called it a first step to achieve a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace.”²⁵ Among the Palestinian forces, the Palestine People’s Party (PPP) expressed its support for the DoP accord and referred to it as a step toward resolving the problematic issue of Palestine.²⁶

Embittered Palestinian forces were quick to express their opposition to the Israeli-PLO deal. A statement signed by over 100 notable Palestinian figures attacked both Chairman Arafat’s single-handedness in finalizing the agreement, as well as his failure to deliver on most of the issues at the core of their zone of deference. The notables expressed profound dissatisfaction with the fact that Arafat accepted Israel’s reformulation of her relationship to the West Bank and Gaza Strip under her control since 1967-- a reformulation according to which Israel was not considered occupying but administering the territories--thus rendering the sovereignty of the Palestinian land and people disputable. They also criticized

²⁴ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Autumn 1993.

²⁵ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 9/6/1993.

²⁶ *al-Dustur*, Jordan, 9/7/1993.

the failure of the deal to address the issue of Jewish settlements and the future of Jerusalem.²⁷

Strong opposition to the DoP accord was also expressed by Nayef Hawatmah, Head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), who said that it would enable Israel to “liquidate the intifada,” and George Habash, Head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who denied Arafat the status as representative of the Palestinians because the DoP was concluded without reference to the rights of diaspora Palestinians.²⁸

Arafat’s greatest challenge, however, was to allay the potentially explosive opposition of Hamas, whose rhetoric and militant activism in its stronghold, the Gaza Strip, afforded it with the opportunity to disrupt the implementation of the DoP accord. In fact, the announcement of the Israeli-Palestinian Gaza-Jericho deal brought about fears of intensified Palestinian infightings which could amount to a civil war. It seems, however, that the prospect of a Palestinian civil conflict—an outcome which almost all Palestinian forces and groupings, including Hamas, detested—contributed to forcing Hamas to behave responsibly by not escalating its dispute with the PLO to alarming levels during that crucial juncture of the Palestinian struggle for independence. In fact, Hamas even made a conciliatory gesture to the PLO when Muhammad Nazzal, its Spokesman in Amman, announced that his organization might participate in the Palestinian elections in enclaves vacated under the Gaza-Jericho plan.²⁹ Also, in a joint effort to prevent, no matter how temporarily, the prospect of a civil conflict from materializing, Chairman Arafat and Hamas concluded a six-point truce

²⁷ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Winter 1994.

²⁸ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 9/2/1993.

²⁹ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 8/31/1993.

under which both sides agreed to disavow violence among Palestinian people while tolerating their freedom to peacefully protest against the DoP accord.³⁰ In their joint statement, PLO and Hamas asserted that “stemming from our keenness to maintain our people’s unity and its coherence, we forbid fighting and violence and guarantee the right of self-expression” through demonstration and other peaceful means.³¹ As the discussion in the next section shows, however, the conclusion of the Oslo One Agreement brought to the forefront the need to continually safeguard the status of Chairman Arafat against the vehement opposition of radical Islamist and nationalist Palestinian forces. In fact, much of the period that elapsed between the Oslo One Agreement and Oslo Two agreement was signified by attempts to protect the status of Chairman Arafat from dangerously eroding.

To summarize, crucial linkages between domestic politics and the international negotiating table facilitated the completion of the Oslo One Agreement in September 1993. Those linkages found expression in a number of restructuring measures which the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization implemented in order to overcome the obstacles, both conceptual and practical, which impeded the accomplishment of the agreement. More specifically, the Rabin Government conceptually reformulated the very characterization of Israel’s control over the territories by emphasizing the administrative dimension of that control and de-emphasizing its occupational dimension. That reformulation effectively caused the issue of Palestinians’ sovereignty to become negotiable and, therefore, enabled Israel to escape what the formal Palestinian delegation to the negotiations in

³⁰ *The Sunday Times*, London, 9/19/1993.

³¹ *The New York Times*, 9/17/1993.

Washington believed was Israel's obligation to unconditionally evacuate the territories. Chairman Arafat accepted that reformulation through his secret negotiations with the Rabin Government in Norway. In addition, in order to facilitate formal negotiations, both the Israeli government and the PLO undertook restructuring measures which amounted to breaking the taboos which once had prevented them from establishing direct contact. By utilizing the tied-hands technique however, Arafat convinced the Rabin Government that it was beyond his ability to satisfy the Israelis' demand that the PLO Charter be amended. Finally, in order to prevent the Palestinian forces' disagreement over the concessions which Arafat made to the Rabin Government from evolving into a Palestinian civil conflict, Arafat and Hamas jointly agreed to confine the opposition to the Oslo One Agreement to nonviolent means.

The Case of Oslo Two Agreement

In this case, at issue was the domestic win-set in the Israeli and Palestinian politics which pertained to concluding a second formal agreement with the PLO. Several deadly militant attacks carried out by Palestinian religious groups against Israeli civilians caused support for a second peace agreement to dwindle among the Israeli people. In order to facilitate the conclusion of the agreement, Prime Minister Rabin needed to strategically enhance Chairman Arafat's negotiating status, and the latter needed to consolidate his status by cracking down on Islamic activism.

Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat signed the Oslo Two Agreement in Washington, D.C. on September 28, 1995, two years after the Oslo One Agreement was signed. Known formally as 'The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,' the agreement marked the conclusion of the interim self-government phase

of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Designed to incorporate and replace the Oslo One Agreement of September 1993, Oslo Two Agreement extended Palestinian self-government to several more cities and hundreds of villages in the West Bank. The agreement promised the Palestinians self control over most of the area of the West Bank. It also specified the mechanism of Palestinians' exercise of their autonomy by calling for the election of 82 representatives to a Palestinian Council entrusted with running local affairs until May 1999. In addition, the agreement called for the election of a *Ra'ees* (Chairman or President in Arabic) to head the Palestinian Authority which was instituted after the Israeli-based Civil Administration had been dismantled and the occupation's military forces had redeployed. According to the agreement, the Palestinians were given legislative and administrative power over areas relegated to them by the Israeli government, but the latter retained both the power to examine the policies made by the Palestinian Authority, as well as control over the self-rule government's foreign policies and diplomatic relations.

The spirit of the Oslo Two Agreement is similar to that of the Oslo One Agreement, primarily because both are based on continuing to deprive the Palestinian people of both actual political freedom and sovereignty over the territories. Therefore, it is safe to argue that the negotiation of the Oslo Two Agreement benefitted from the same conceptual restructuring which facilitated the accomplishment of the Oslo One Agreement and, according to which, the very notion of the Palestinian people's sovereignty was made disputable and, hence, negotiable. In addition, the process of negotiating the agreement was facilitated by the same restructuring measures which Israel and the PLO implemented in order to legalize formal and direct contacts between their respective negotiators.

The essence of the unique crisis of cooperation which Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin had to handle in preparation for the Oslo Two Agreement can only be sketched by examining the political situation that prevailed in the territories in the aftermath of the Oslo One Agreement. More specifically, a meaningful analysis of the developments which facilitated the accomplishment of the Oslo Two Agreement necessitates emphasizing that both Palestinian domestic politics and the rejectionist forces' mood inside and outside the Occupied Territories differed from those which prevailed at the time when the Oslo One Agreement was being negotiated two years earlier. Since this study deals with the entanglements between domestic politics and the international negotiating table, it is important to take these differences into consideration, in order to provide an accurate description of the way the domestic politics in the territories were configured when the Oslo Two Agreement was being negotiated.

The first difference has to do with the fact that whereas before the completion of the Oslo One Agreement the PLO was negotiating with Israel from its exile in Tunis, the implementation of the agreement gave the PLO the right to operate from within the Occupied Territories. More importantly, by enabling the PLO to establish its political and administrative apparatuses in the Gaza Strip, Oslo One Agreement emphasized the governing dimension of the organization's operations at the expense of the revolutionary one. By gaining a foothold in the Gaza Strip and Jericho, the PLO became primarily concerned with empowering itself as a governing body entrusted with direct administrative responsibilities toward the Palestinian people, as well as political and security obligations toward the Israeli government. In order to meet these responsibilities and obligations, the PLO established new bureaucratic bodies in the Gaza Strip. Foremost among these bodies were the Palestinian

Authority (PA) headed by Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Preventive Security Forces (PSF) headed by Colonel Jibril Rajoub. While the PA was vested with the responsibility of carrying out local government functions, the PSF was made responsible for maintaining security and public order.

Second, the conclusion of the Oslo One Agreement demonstrated to the different rejectionist Israeli and Palestinian forces that, in spite of the outstanding structural conflict, finalizing a peace deal between the Israeli government and the PLO was not impossible. In fact, Oslo One Agreement served to alarm both Palestinian Islamic militants and extremist Jewish settlers about what the future could potentially be holding for the rest of the Occupied Territories, especially the main cities in the West Bank. As the Israeli-PLO negotiations progressed after the signing of the Oslo One Agreement in September 1993, Islamic and Jewish rejectionist forces in the Occupied Territories grew more forceful in attempting to derail the peace process and hampering a peace deal that would extend Palestinians' self rule to the West Bank. Whereas Islamic militants were alarmed by the prospect of a second peace agreement that could amount to the PLO's completely forfeiting the Palestinian people's aspirations after full political freedom over the land of Palestine, ultra-religious and nationalist Jewish settlers in the West Bank were alarmed by the fact that the peace negotiations were increasingly zeroing in on their existence on the land which they considered an integral part of *Eretz Yisrael*.

The combination of these two domestic politics considerations constituted the essence of the crisis with which Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat had been presented when negotiating the Oslo Two Agreement. From the perspective of Islamic militants and Jewish settlers, the surprise element that would have accompanied finalizing a second Israeli-PLO

peace deal was consumed by the declaration and subsequent signing of the Oslo One Agreement. Therefore, from September 1993 onward, Palestinian and Israeli rejectionist forces became increasingly convinced that it was not enough to adopt the 'expectant mode' toward the evolution of the peace process, but that they should adopt an 'active mode' in approaching the future of the peace talks between the PLO and the Israeli government.³² Accordingly, instead of remaining contracted against an overpowering environment by waiting for the future to bring about a second much detested peace agreement, Palestinian and Jewish rejectionist forces in the territories calculated that they ought to go into the future of peace negotiations with greater control over the events which determined their environment. Much to the displeasure of the Israeli government and the newly-founded and struggling Palestinian Authority, that active mode meant greater violent opposition on the part of the rejectionist forces designed to derail the peace process and weaken the prospect of a second compromise peace deal.

In what follows, both Chairman Arafat's and Prime Minister Rabin's dilemma with Palestinian religious extremists' active resistance to the prospective Oslo Two Agreement that would extend Palestinians' self-rule over the West Bank is discussed. The analysis focuses on evaluating the restructuring proposition and the status of the Chief of Government proposition in view of the crisis created by the violent opposition of Palestinian Islamic militancy.

³² The distinction between the expectant and active modes toward the future was formulated by Eugène Minkowski in *Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies* (Evanston, 1970). For an interesting discussion and application of these concepts see Stephan Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983).

The fact that Palestinian rejectionist forces engaged in the active mode in their opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations while the PLO was engaged in establishing itself as a local government in the territories had meant that Chairman Arafat became doubly accountable; first to the Palestinian people and second to the Israeli government. Arafat was required to demonstrate that the Palestinian Authority could cater to the Palestinians' economic and political needs through an effective and praiseworthy government. He was also required by the Rabin Government to demonstrate that Israel's security interests were better protected against militant Islamists' attacks with the PA than without. Therefore, the real challenge which Arafat's newly-founded Palestinian Authority had been facing was to satisfy its obligations toward protecting Israel's interests against threats leveled by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, lest the Israeli government conclude that expanding Palestinians' self-rule was conducive to compromising the security of the Israeli people and, thus, decide to refrain from making further conciliatory concessions to the Palestinians.

On several occasions throughout 1994 and 1995, Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out a series of violent attacks in the Occupied Territories and Israel proper, leaving tens of innocent Israeli civilians and military personnel dead. A partial list of some of the most deadly attacks includes two strikes carried out by Palestinian suicide bombers in April 1994, one in the northern Israeli town of Afula which killed eight Israelis and wounded 44 others and another in Hadera which killed five and wounded 30 people. Again, in one of the deadliest militant attacks in Israel's history, in October 1994 Hamas claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in Tel Aviv which killed 20 Israelis and wounded 48 others. Also, in January 1995 Palestinian suicide bombers set off two deadly explosions at the Beit Lid junction in the

central Israeli town of Nordiya killing 21 people. In April 1995 Arafat's ability to protect Israeli interests in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority became increasingly questionable when Palestinian militants killed six Israelis and wounded 45 others in two car bombings in the Gaza Strip. Also, in July 1995 five Israelis were killed and 32 were wounded when a militant suicide bomber set off a bomb in a bus in Tel Aviv during morning rush hour. Finally, in August 1995, in an attack which was expressively designed to weaken Rabin's chances of getting reelected in the 1996 Israeli General Elections,³³ a Hamas suicide bomber killed five Israelis and wounded 100 others aboard an Israeli bus in Jerusalem.³⁴

The Palestinian militants' suicidal attacks against the Israeli people inside Israel and the Occupied Territories acutely endangered the continuation of the peace negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO, but they fell short of actually fulfilling their very objective of fatally disrupting the drive toward a peaceful agreement. The deadly attacks managed to create an angry uproar among the Israeli people against the peace talks with the Palestinians. For example, on February 1, 1995, thousands of Israelis, including MKs from the Likud, Tsomet, Moledet, and Shas parties, demonstrated against the continuation of the peace process.³⁵ Clearly, from the point of view of the Israeli public, seeing Islamic-Palestinian militants cause bloodshed on the streets of the Israeli cities did not coincide with what they envisioned as a logical outcome of the peace negotiations with the Palestinian

³³ According to the statement issued by Hamas after the August 1995 attack, the objective which the extremist group was trying to achieve was to ensure that Rabin didn't get reelected. Since that was the first time that Hamas ever stated such a political objective behind any of its militant attacks, it is safe to say that the group became convinced that it could not derail the peace process as long as Rabin continued to head the Israeli government.

³⁴ This partial list of Palestinian Islamists' militant attacks was compiled from *The New York Times*.

³⁵ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 2/2/1995.

Authority. So how were the potentially damaging ramifications of the Palestinian militants' attacks kept from actually disrupting the drive toward the accomplishment of Oslo Two Agreement?

Chairman Arafat needed to achieve two things in order to ensure that the peace negotiations progressed toward an agreement over the West Bank despite the negative ramifications of the terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. First, Arafat was required to demonstrate that he was forceful in cracking down on Palestinian militant fundamentalists in order to preserve the image of his Palestinian Authority as a credible protector of Israeli security interests. The fact that the militant attacks which were executed in Israel proper originated from the Occupied Territories made Arafat's obligation to fight Palestinian religious militancy appear all the more pressing. Second, Arafat needed to secure a sympathetic understanding from the Israeli government of any shortcomings on his part to effectively and quickly eradicate Islamic militancy and ensure the cessations of their deadly attacks. These two objectives were Arafat's major concerns during the better part of the period that separated the signing of Oslo One and Oslo Two Agreements.

Whereas Arafat's first concern amounted to the need to institutionalize a special structure, under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority, that would be responsible for curbing the militant activism of Palestinian religious fundamentalists, satisfying Arafat's second concern meant that the Rabin Government ought to demonstrate a renewed commitment toward enhancing the Palestinian Authority's status as a partner in the peace negotiations and a legitimate governing body for the Palestinian people in the territories. An analysis of the data collected with respect to these two considerations showed that both of Arafat's concerns were adequately handled in a manner that facilitated the accomplishment

of the Oslo Two Agreement.

In a move that was criticized by the PLO's Palestinian National Council and fellow Palestinians as an infringement upon human rights and democratic practices, Chairman Arafat established a military court system to try offenders of security and public order.³⁶ Arafat was so determined to fulfill his obligation to crackdown on Islamic militancy that his police even arrested Raji Sourani, a Palestinian human rights lawyer and a prominent critic of Arafat, on charges of protesting the decision to set up the military court.³⁷ In addition, Arafat's Preventive Security Forces resolutely persecuted Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants during a number of raids on their centers. For example, on January 25, 1995, the Palestinian police arrested 20 members of the Islamic Jihad, including Abdullah al-Shami, the group's chief ideologue.³⁸ Also, on March 22, 70 members of Hamas were arrested. By April the Palestinian Authority detained more than 300 Islamic extremists, many of whom were sent to the military court for trial and sentenced to different prison terms. Arafat's decisive measures against Palestinian militants prompted 497 Islamist and nationalist leaders representing different parts of the Muslim world to issue a "Statement of Support and Solidarity" in which they praised Hamas' struggle to liberate Palestine and remonstrated with Arafat about detaining Islamist Palestinians.³⁹ Arafat's offensive against radical Islamist militants, nonetheless, prompted Israeli officials to declare that they were impressed by the

³⁶ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 2/13/1995.

³⁷ *The New York Times*, 2/16/1995.

³⁸ *The New York Times*, 1/26/1995.

³⁹ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 5/5/1995.

Palestinian Authority's efforts to curb Palestinian extremism and enhance security.⁴⁰ By and large, therefore, Chairman Arafat succeeded in demonstrating that he was adequately forceful in meeting his obligation to enhance the security of the Israelis against militant attacks.

Consequently, Chairman Arafat's need to ensure that the Israeli government understood the sensitivity of his position was also satisfied by a number of measures which Prime Minister Rabin undertook in order to defend the status of the Palestinian leader and, at times, even attempt to enhance it. First, in spite of the angry reaction of the Israeli public opinion in the aftermath of each of the terrorist attacks carried out by militant followers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad inside Israel, Rabin repeatedly resisted calls for terminating the peace negotiations with the PLO and instead affirmed renewed commitment to conclude a peace agreement with Chairman Arafat. More importantly, Rabin even refused to accept Israel's President Ezer Weizman's call to temporarily suspend the peace talks with the PLO in response to the January 1995 bombing attack in Beit Lid until the Palestinian Authority effectively suppressed Islamist fundamentalists.⁴¹ Clearly, President Weizman, generally described as a supporter of the peace talks with the PLO, stepped out of his prescribed domain of formal prerogatives when he interfered in a critical foreign policy issue such as deciding the fate of the diplomatic talks with the Palestinian leadership. President Weizman, nonetheless, was reflecting the Israeli public mood which was outraged by the militant attacks down the streets of the Israeli towns. In his television appearance on the Israeli Channel One, Weizman's argument held that the Israeli government was "conducting negotiations with

⁴⁰ *The New York Times*, 7/10/1995.

⁴¹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 1/23/1995.

[Chairman Arafat] on the assumption that he is the leader of the Palestinian side. The government ought now to suspend these talks and tell Arafat to make a greater effort to put an end to this slaughter.” Weizman added that, “If Arafat has no influence or control . . . then the talks with him ought to be halted and there must be some very tough, hard, and thorough rethinking . . . I know am saying harsh things and that when these words come from someone like me, they carry no small significance.”⁴² Despite his dovish record, the President even suggested that the government consider taking military actions against militant Palestinian Islamists in the self-rule areas.

Although irate Prime Minister Rabin dismissed President Weizman’s advocacy of terminating negotiations with Chairman Arafat, he, nonetheless, could afford to completely ignore neither the Israelis’ hostile sentiments toward the peace negotiations with the PLO, nor the President’s unequivocal representation of those sentiments. Rabin needed to demonstrate that his government was sensitive to the Israeli public’s despair, lest he further estrange embittered Israelis by giving the impression that blindly pursuing what they believed was an illusionary peace program with the Palestinians was his primary concern. Therefore, instead of actually halting the negotiations with the PLO, Rabin decided to slow down the pace of the peace talks by suspending two conciliatory gestures which the Israeli government had earlier agreed to make toward the Palestinians before the January bombing. In an emergency Cabinet meeting on the day of the bombing, Rabin decided to freeze the release of Palestinian prisoners and to indefinitely delay the opening of the “safe passage” between the Gaza Strip

⁴² Ibid.

and the West Bank city of Jericho.⁴³

The second measure which the Rabin Government undertook in defense of Chairman Arafat's status, in view of the increased rate of Islamic militants' suicidal attacks, was to ward off criticisms of the Palestinian Authority's performance in fighting terrorism emanating from the self-rule areas. More specifically, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin asked the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to stop monitoring and compiling the PA's compliance with its obligations toward cracking down on Palestinian terrorism. Beilin actually linked the negative effects of the compliance reports which AIPAC prepared with the prospect of the continuation of the American financial aid to the PA. He asserted that "The issue is sensitive. If it's portrayed that we [i.e., the Israeli government] think aid should continue, and AIPAC says no, then it hurts not only the Palestinians, but us."⁴⁴ In the same vein, Beilin also asserted in a meeting with a group of Jewish-American activists that, "If Arafat complies exactly with the Oslo Accords or not, it is none of your business. It's not the business of Jewish organizations, not of AIPAC, not of the American Congress and not of any other country in the world except the State of Israel. Only Israel signed the agreement with the PLO and only Israel will decide when and in what form it will demand from Arafat to behave."⁴⁵ By so doing, therefore, the Israeli government demonstrated that it was concerned with enhancing Arafat's status by, first, ensuring the flow of international financial aid to the Palestinian Authority and, second, by reserving to itself the right to judge Arafat's

⁴³ *The New York Times*, 1/23/1995.

⁴⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/30/1995.

⁴⁵ *The Jerusalem Post*, 4/2/1995.

performance with respect to curtailing Palestinian Islamists' militant activism.

To summarize, therefore, the efforts expended by the Rabin Government to defend and enhance the status of the Palestinian Authority contributed to preserving the peace talks with Chairman Arafat amidst an Israeli public opinion that was disenchanted with the peace diplomacy because of the Palestinian Islamists' deadly militant attacks. More specifically, by affirming his renewed commitment to reaching a peace deal with Chairman Arafat in the aftermath of each terrorist attack, and by repeatedly rejecting calls to suspend the peace negotiations with the PLO, Prime Minister Rabin demonstrated an adequate understanding of the importance of protecting the status of the Palestinian leader. In addition, by asking AIPAC to stop recording and publishing information about the performance of the Palestinian Authority in fighting terrorism, and by asserting that the Israeli government alone reserved the right to judge Arafat's fulfillment of his obligations toward the security of Israel, the Rabin Government displayed strong concern with enhancing Arafat's status by ensuring that the flow of American financial aid to the PA was not hampered.

SAVING THE PEACE PROCESS

Sustaining the momentum for peace agreements by at least not allowing the talks to stall in disruptive ways had been a source of concern for the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators. Salvaging the peace process at hazardous junctures was especially crucial in view of the protracted nature of the conflict and the efforts made by the enemies of the peace talks to derail the peace process. Certain of these junctures were of crisis proportions and exceptionally perilous because the threat to the perseverance of the diplomatic negotiations was heightened to alarming levels.

Allowing the diplomatic talks to degenerate into stalemate or disenchantment with the prospect for a peaceful resolution of the conflict had been construed to result in renewed and increased violence. Militant attacks on Israeli targets would increase because religious Palestinian radicalism embodied in Hamas and Islamic Jihad would attempt to seize on the opportunity to regain the popularity lost to the secular PLO. Even secular Palestinian groups like the Fatah faction of the PLO would be lead to conclude that resuming violence was their best bid in view of the political uncertainty produced by a degenerate peace process. Finally, renewed violence would frustrate the flow of international economic aid, thus contributing to a deepened sense of hopelessness among the Palestinians which, in turn, would result in more violence. After all, violence had always been a conspicuous component of the protracted conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians and, therefore, resorting to it remained an option. The efforts expended by the Israeli government and the PLO leadership in order to salvage a degenerate peace process was, therefore, expected to parallel those allotted to negotiating the peace agreements themselves. More specifically, the negotiating parties were hypothesized to engage in restructuring their respective domestic politics, as well as strengthening each other's status in relation to the domestic constituents.

Four critical instances were identified throughout the duration of the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The first of these was the decision made by the Rabin Government in December 1992 to deport more than 400 Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to a no-man's zone in southern Lebanon. The second was when Jewish settler Dr. Baruch Goldstein massacred about 29 Muslim worshipers in the West Bank city of Hebron in February 1994. And the third and fourth cases concern attempts to preempt the status of Jerusalem when, first, the Rabin Government announced a plan to expropriate

134 acres of Arab-owned land in East Jerusalem in April 1995 in order to expand Jewish neighborhoods, and, less than two weeks later, the Republican Congressional leadership announced its proposal to transfer the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The critical dimensions of the four episodes as well as their ramifications on the peace talks is expounded below.

These precarious junctures represented shocks to the system of diplomatic negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and therefore were included in the analysis. The inclusion of these shocks was dictated by substantive and methodological considerations. Substantively, the future of the entire peace process seemed to be dependent upon preventing the dire consequences of these critical junctures from toppling the negotiating table itself. Analyzing how these four crises were resolved is integral to the analysis of the overall crisis of cooperation between Israel and the PLO which this study attempts to examine. In addition, the successful emergence from each of these crises was a breakthrough at par with those of reaching the peace agreements of 1993 and 1995 themselves.

Methodologically, these crises served as four additional opportunities to ask the two theoretical questions which informed the analysis. They, therefore, were utilized along the Oslo One and Oslo Two Agreements to contribute to the evaluation of the two theoretical propositions advanced by the two-level games theory. In other words, the explanatory efficacy of the restructuring proposition and the Chief of Government's status proposition was tested within the context of a total of six cases, instead of only two. By so doing, we should be in a better position to evaluate the two propositions within a research design that better approximated the virtues of the method of "structured, focused comparison." This gain

on the methodological front was achieved in conjunction with increased intrinsic understanding of the dynamics of the peace talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The Case of Palestinian Deportees to Southern Lebanon

In this case, the domestic win-set within the Palestinian context pertained to overcoming the threat leveled against the international negotiation table and resuming the peace talks with the Israeli government. Prime Minister Rabin initially failed to appreciate the damaging consequences of his decision to deport hundreds of Palestinian militants on both Chairman Arafat's political status and the Israeli-PLO peace diplomacy. Both resolving the deportees crisis and salvaging the negotiation table were facilitated by restructuring measures which the Rabin finally managed to implement in his respective domestic politics. More specifically, the government modified the deportation decision and defeated the hawkish Likud party's attempt in the Knesset to thwart the return of the deportees.

The Israeli government's decision to deport more than 400 Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants to a no-man's zone in southern Lebanon had echoed in the negotiating room between the Israelis and the Palestinians in Washington. The sensitivity of the forcible transfer of those Palestinians which was carried out in a manner that deliberately short-circuited the Israeli judicial process was emphasized by Nabil Sha'ath, Palestinian Delegation Political Adviser, when he said:

We are all very sensitive to Jewish fears, and therefore of Israeli fears of security. But if there is anything the Palestinians are sensitive about is throwing them out of their very homes. This has been the tragedy of Palestine since 1948; then 1967; then 1982. And everybody—one of the wars that Israel has actually waged against our people, it is the fear of deportation, the fear of losing one's roots, the fear of being thrown out of one country—transfer, ethnic cleansing. This is a war crime by the Geneva Conventions, a war crime

that cannot possibly be pardoned.⁴⁶

The Palestinian delegation refused to attend the negotiations in protest and demanded an immediate reversal of the deportation decision. During the same news conference, Dr. Haidar Abdul Shafi, Palestinian Delegation Spokesperson, described the magnitude of the disruptive effects of the deportation decision when he said, "certainly, this act comes as a terrible blow where we feel it has, you know, it has ignited the emotions of the people in such a manner that it makes it really impossible for us to come back to the negotiating [table] if no measures are taken to raise the hopes of the people in the peace process." Nabil Sha'ath even went further to emphasize one more troubling aspect of the Israeli government decision by drawing a distinction between random actions and concerted state actions.

But here this is not a random killing, this is not like somebody who really has acted out of revenge or out of insanity or out of anything like that. This is an action that took actually 48 hours between the Cabinet decision and the Supreme Court decision. Mr. Rabin had ample time to reconsider that decision. Four hundred people out of a population of 700,000 in Gaza is equivalent to 150,000 Americans in terms of American population. This is a very, very large number--in fact the largest ever deported by any Israeli government, including that of Mr. Shamir. And therefore the matter is really entirely different from random killings here and there, which we condemn on both sides.

The deportation decision served as an occasion of potential rapprochement between Hamas and the PLO, its political and ideological rival, in order to jointly confront the common Israeli challenge. In a meeting between Chairman Arafat and four Hamas leaders in Tunis, Hamas proposed heightening the armed attacks against Israeli targets and the

⁴⁶ *News Conference: The Palestinian Delegation, December 17, 1992.* The Information Division of the Israeli Foreign Ministry--Jerusalem. Downloaded from WWW-server maintained by the Consulate General to the Midwest, Chicago, IL.

withdrawal of the Palestinian delegation from the diplomatic talks.⁴⁷ In fact, the very decision of the PLO to discontinue its participation in the talks represented the determination of mainstream PLO to stand by Hamas, whose members constituted the majority of the deportees. The deportation decision, therefore, had the effect of, first, embarrassingly weakening Chairman Arafat's standing in relation to his Palestinian constituents by demonstrating that, despite engaging in the peace talks, he could not stop the excesses of the Israeli government against their basic human rights. Second, it afforded Hamas the pretext to escalate its militant attacks, thus counteracting the effect of the policy of mass deportations as an Israeli tool of curbing militant activism. Third, it threatened the peace process by drawing the PLO and Hamas closer in opposition against continuing the negotiations with Israel. Yet the Hamas-PLO's coming together was only indicative of the weakened status of Chairman Arafat and his conciliatory course with Israel.

Prime Minister Rabin's stance with respect to the deportation decision was so adamant that he initially repeatedly insisted on denying the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross access to the deportees through Israeli lines. Israel even rejected appeals from the United States to permit Palestinian deportees to locate in the security zone along its northern borders.⁴⁸ In an attempt to deflect international criticism, however, Rabin later agreed to permit two officials of the ICRC to visit the deportees.⁴⁹ The crisis lingered on and the peace process came to a complete halt before it was resumed in April 1993.

⁴⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 12/25/1992.

⁴⁸ *Davar*, 12/24/1992.

⁴⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 1/8/1993.

On 18 December 1992, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 799 which was drafted by the Council's Third World members and the PLO.

Quoting directly from the text of the resolution, the Security Council declared that it:

1. *Strongly condemns* the action taken by Israel, the occupying power, to deport hundreds of Palestinian civilians, and expresses its firm opposition to any such deportation by Israel;

2. *Reaffirms* the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and *affirms* that deportation of civilians constitutes a contravention of its obligations under the Convention;

3. *Reaffirms* also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon:

4. *Demands* that Israel, occupying Power, ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied territories of all those deported;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consider dispatching a representative to the area to follow up with the Israeli government with regard to this serious situation and to report to the Security Council;

6. *Decides* to keep the matter actively under review. (Emphasis from original).⁵⁰

In accordance with paragraph Five of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 799, Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali dispatched special U.N. envoys on multiple visits to Israel. However, the envoys' discussions with Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Affairs Minister Peres failed to produce a reversal of the deportation decision in fulfillment of Israel's obligations under Resolution 799. Reporting back to the Security Council, Mr. Ghali called upon the Security Council to make "whatever measures are necessary" to enforce Israel's compliance with the Resolution. Mr. Ghali's report to the UNSC on the outcome of the visits made a draft resolution submitted by the PLO calling for sanctions on Israel appear likely to

⁵⁰ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 3, Spring 1993.

receive considerable backing.⁵¹

The United States, nonetheless, played a significant role in influencing the course of events away from imposing sanctions against Israel and more toward the resolution of the deportees crisis. More precisely, because of its desire to avoid vetoing a United Nations's Security Council resolution that would impose sanctions on Israel for deporting the Palestinians, the United States urged the Rabin Government to find some solution to the deportees issue. Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger vented his concerns over the increasing pressure in the Security Council for a forceful implementation of UNSC Resolution 799, a development which he thought would put Israel and the United States "in an awkward spot." Eagleburger proceeded to strongly emphasize Israel's obligation "to find some solution to the problem, whether it's to take them [the deportees] back and put them in jail or whatever it is."⁵² Also, as a telephone exchange between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian and Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval made clear, the Clinton Administration was convinced that a U.S. veto would blemish American credibility among the Arab public by giving the impression that Washington favored Israeli interests over theirs. Washington calculated that a U.S. veto that would have embittered Arab states would cause Arabs to withdraw from the peace process and undermine efforts to maintain support in the United Nations for the U.S. policies in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia.⁵³

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² *Mideast Mirror*, London, 1/15/1993.

⁵³ *The Jerusalem Post*, 1/31/1993.

In response to the pressure exerted by the newly-inaugurated Clinton Administration which encouraged the Israeli government to act on the deportees problem and, in a gesture to the Clinton Administration and in response to expectations of the European Community, the Israeli cabinet voted unanimously to permit "about 100 selected Hamas activists" to return from Southern Lebanon. The "package deal," which was announced by Prime Minister Rabin after an extraordinary session, was the culmination of several days' worth of very extensive consultations on the deportation issue between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and the Israeli Premier. The deal also included slashing the terms of expulsions for the remaining 300 deportees in half and reviewing deportation cases on an individual bases.

The White House described the measures as "a step in the right direction," and Rabin himself emphasized that "we [Israelis] needed to reach an understanding with the U.S. for the four years ahead and buttress our position in the international arena." The "package deal" therefore was made with, and in deference to, the Clinton Administration, and not with Hamas itself. Israeli Ambassador Gad Ya'accobi stated, "U.S.-Israeli compromise would remove almost all danger of [U.N. Security Council] sanctions, and would hopefully lessen the possible need for a U.S. veto."⁵⁴

The Israeli Cabinet's resolution with respect to the deportees issue was partial and failed to yield to the PLO's demand that the deportation decision be rescinded before the negotiations could be resumed. That partial resolution, however, represented a domestic restructuring which the Israeli government implemented with little enthusiasm in order to salvage the negotiation process from further devastating suspension. The restructuring was

⁵⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 2/2/1993.

especially significant in view of the Rabin Government's concern with curbing the threat Hamas' militancy posed to the security of the Israelis. The fact that the Israeli government has always preferred to have fewer Hamas militants operating in the territories is indicative of the magnitude of the concessions the PLO could muster from Prime Minister Rabin.

Chairman Arafat understood the Israeli offer as important concessions to the Palestinians' staunch stance which demanded the reversal of the deportation decision before going back to the negotiation room. In response to the Israeli offer, Arafat's mainstream PLO also reviewed its uncompromising stance by accepting the immediate return of 100 deportees and proposing the bringing back of the remainder in groups of 50 to 100 to incarceration in the Israeli-controlled security zone over a period of four to five months.⁵⁵

Christopher also presented the Palestinian officials a plan that included six points in order to encourage them to resume peace talks with Israel. The plan included a U.S. statement describing expulsions of civilians illegal and pressing the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 799; affirmation that Resolutions 242 and 338 are bases for peace diplomacy and Jerusalem can be negotiated; Israel makes a binding commitment against expulsions; Israel ensures the speedy return of current deportees; Israel agrees to the return of many of the Palestinians who were deported after the 1967 War; and Israeli commitment to stop human rights violations in the Occupied Territories.⁵⁶ In a statement he delivered on the resumption of peace talks, Prime Minister Rabin affirmed an important concession that his government made to the PLO's demand that Israel commit itself

⁵⁵ *The Jerusalem Post*, 2/5/1993.

⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, 2/25/1993.

to refrain from deporting any Palestinians in the future.⁵⁷

The Israeli government's efforts to find a passageway out of the stalemate caused by the deportees crisis involved a further dynamic linkage between the domestic politics and the negotiating table. On March 11, 1993 the Knesset defeated, 23 to 22, a bill initiated by Binyamin Netanyahu, of the Likud party, designed to temporarily suspend the rights of Palestinian deportees to petition the High Court of Justice before being evicted from the Occupied Territories. The narrow defeat was achieved in the last moment when the Labor Members of the Knesset rushed to the Plenary Hall in order to swing the vote against the proposal. The proposed bill attempted to facilitate the expedited deportation of Palestinians from the territories by eschewing the right of deportees to petition the High Court of Justice, a right that was granted to them after the 1967 Six Day War. Had the proposal been allowed to graduate into a binding law, it would have made the government's decision to deport the 415 Palestinians—which was carried out in full denial of their legal prerogatives to petition—legal. In fact, Netanyahu defended his proposed bill by referring to the legal difficulties which the government encountered when it tried to evade the law. He said that because the law permitted the 415 deportees to petition the High Court of Justice, the government was found at fault and the deportees, therefore, had the right to return back to their homes within a year. Because of their fierce opposition to the peace negotiations with the Palestinians, Netanyahu's Likud party did not want to see the crisis of the deportees unravel successfully and wanted instead to see the peace process collapse because of it.⁵⁸ Rabin's Labor party, on the other

⁵⁷ *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 4/21/1993.

⁵⁸ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/12/1993.

hand, preferred to acknowledge the fact that the forceful eviction of the 415 Palestinians was not administered with due respect to the legal process in order to secure a resolution to the impasse caused by the crisis. By defeating the bill the government seemed to have valued the resumption of the diplomatic talks with the PLO more highly than avoiding the embarrassment of accepting the accusation that the deportation decision was handled in a manner that infringed upon the deportees right to petition. By relinquishing their initial unyielding positions, and by moving toward exchanging offers and counter-offers that contemplated the crisis in a more engaging manner, both the Israeli government and the PLO leadership actually implemented actions that amounted to restructuring their policies with respect to the deportation issue. The effect of such restructuring had been to simultaneously reinvigorate the momentum for the peace process to an extent sufficient to make it bearable for the Palestinian delegation to resume meeting with its Israeli counterpart at the negotiating table.

Both the Israeli proposal and the Palestinian counter proposal failed to resolve the deportation crisis altogether. The resolution was barely adequate to allay the opposition to the resumption of the diplomatic talks which remained strong among the Palestinian rejectionist groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad as well as the communist People's Party. Defending the PLO's decision to resume talks with Israel, Faisal al-Husseini, the Coordinator of the Palestinian Bilateral and Multilateral Teams, told around 300 Palestinian demonstrators and the wives of some of the deportees that "this is not a battle for liberating Palestine . . . We are trying to reach a political solution, not an ideological one." The political support among the Palestinian groups for resuming the talks was the narrowest possible as, in addition to Hamas, ten delegates out of the 22 that comprised the PLO opposed the decision to return

to Washington.⁵⁹ These ten rejectionist PLO factions issued a statement condemning the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy and called for a strike.⁶⁰ When the PLO made the decision to resume the diplomatic talks, Hamas became so frustrated that it issued a death threat against the Palestinian delegation, the first such escalation in PLO-Hamas relations since the peace process began in 1991. The death threat was delivered to the wife of the Deputy Head of the negotiating team, Sa'eb Erekat, in an attack on their residence at Jericho, in the West Bank.⁶¹

To summarize, the diplomatic negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO went through a four-month hiatus because of the devastating ramifications the deportees crisis had inflicted on the Palestinians' psyche in general and Chairman Arafat's conciliatory course in particular. Overcoming the crisis and salvaging the diplomatic negotiations was facilitated by linkages between both the Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics on the one hand and the international negotiating table on the other. Both the PLO and the Israeli government preferred to resume the negotiations and, therefore, restructured their policies with respect to the deportees issue accordingly. But it was primarily the United States' concern over averting the repercussions of vetoing a UNSC resolution on the peace process—a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Israel for its failure to comply with Resolution 799—that served as a catalyst which facilitated the movement toward resolving the crisis. In addition, the Labor Party thwarted the Likud's abortive efforts in the Knesset by

⁵⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 4/25/1993.

⁶⁰ al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio, April 25, 1993, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Summer 1993.

⁶¹ *The Times*, London, 4/20/1993.

defeating a bill designed to obstruct the readmission of the deportees. The effect of the restructuring had been to facilitate a compromise resolution of the deportees issue to the benefit of convincing the Palestinian delegation to return to the negotiating table.

The Case of the Hebron Massacre

In this case, the Palestinian domestic win-set pertained to salvaging the international negotiation table in the aftermath of the devastating effects of the Hebron massacre on both the Palestinian psyche and Chairman Arafat's political status. By strategically implementing certain restructuring measures in the Israeli domestic politics and the Occupied Territories, Prime Minister Rabin significantly revived Chairman Arafat's political status among the Palestinian constituents and, consequently, the peace diplomacy. However, by utilizing the Jewish settlers' staunch opposition to the notion of dismantling their settlements in Hebron, Rabin successfully used the tied-hand technique to convince Arafat that any direct attack on settlers' presence there would greatly harm the negotiation table.

Although violence in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is epidemic, within the peace process certain acts of violence take on added facets of danger. One such action was the massacre perpetrated by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, follower of anti-Arab Meir Kahane, of 29 Palestinian Muslims on the holiest day in the holiest month in the Islamic calendar, while performing the holiest religious duty in the Islamic faith. The massacre of those worshipers by the Brooklyn-born Jewish settler of Kiryat Arba on Friday in the month of Ramadan while performing the dawn prayer in a mosque at the Cave of the Patriarchs (also known as al-Haram al-Ibrahimi in Arabic) in Hebron dealt a major setback to the peace negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Palestinians' familiarity with the culture and

substance of the protracted conflict made the killings appear as a validation of what many rejectionist forces among themselves believed was true about the improbability of peacefully resolving their dispute with the Israelis. The impact of the incidence was so profound that it caused Arab and Muslim people to question the very wisdom of negotiating peaceful settlements with the Israeli government.

The essence of the shock caused by the massacre was simultaneously human and religious. The loss of so many civilians in a killing rampage endangered the already vulnerable peace discourse by exposing it to the most flagrant expression of Orthodox Jews' contempt toward Palestinian Arabs. Although the massacre left many Israelis crestfallen, remorseful, and scared,⁶² many Jewish settlers rejoiced over Goldstein's assault and considered his action heroic, thus further exacerbating the psychological crevasse that separated the two peoples.⁶³ A poll conducted by Teleseker and sponsored by the International Center for Peace in the Middle East found that 3.6 percent of Israelis praised Goldstein for his action, 51.7 percent strongly condemned him, 27.1 percent condemned him, and 6.8 percent expressed no opinion.⁶⁴ Moreover, schoolchildren in Kiryat Arba sang a new national hymn which read "The holy doctor is a saint in his heart, humble in his ways, generous in his acts and holy in his death."⁶⁵ Even a year later, hundreds of settlers from Kiryat Arba, under the leadership of the Head of Kach (which means "thus" or "this is the way" in Hebrew), Baruch Marzel,

⁶² *The New York Times*, 2/27/1994.

⁶³ *The New York Times*, 3/28/1994.

⁶⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/1/1994.

⁶⁵ *The Sunday Times*, London, 3/6/1994.

celebrated the massacre and praised Baruch Goldstein.⁶⁶ In addition, the fact that the assailant chose a timing of profound religious underpinnings to commit his offensive caused the massacre to be interpreted by Palestinians as an outright sacrilege. The attack brought to the forefront the human and religious connotations of the structural conflict and was considered by the Palestinians as the apotheosis of the animosity between themselves and the Israelis.

In addition to the 29 civilians immediately killed during the massacre, six more Palestinians were killed and hundreds were wounded during clashes between angry Arab protesters and the Israeli Defense Forces, thus making the day of the massacre the bloodiest single day in the Occupied Territories since the 1967 War.⁶⁷ In only three days of Palestinian rioting after the massacre, 65 died and 360 were wounded.⁶⁸

The massacre episode constituted a genuine crisis in the course of the peace process and the negotiating table was impacted by the damaging implications it created. The PLO leadership's peaceful discourse with Israel was blazed by Palestinians' rage in the aftermath of the massacre, and Chairman Yasir Arafat's status was especially weakened in relation with the forces which had been steadfastly challenging or doubting any peaceful outcome of the diplomatic talks. Because of the religious dimension of the massacre, Chairman Arafat's standing among his fellow Palestinians was so expressively shaken that he was called "the enemy of God" by demonstrators who demurred the peace negotiations with Israel.⁶⁹ The Chairman's personal safety was threatened as many Palestinians called upon him to commit

⁶⁶ *Palestine Report*, 2/20/1995.

⁶⁷ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 2/25/1994.

⁶⁸ *Washington Post*, 2/28/1994.

⁶⁹ *The New York Times*, 2/27/1994.

suicide and some groups threatened to kill him. Nor was his status spared from the wrath of other PLO's Fatah officials. "It is hard to imagine how Arafat could ever again shake the hand of (Yitzhak) Rabin which is now covered in so much of our people's innocent blood," commented one PLO official.⁷⁰ Peace process momentum plummeted and the Palestinian negotiators practically terminated their participation in the diplomatic talks with Israel, as did the Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese governments.

In general terms, because of the shocking magnitude of the Hebron massacre, Israel's human-rights lapses and the issue of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories were brought under increased criticism. The Israeli government launched investigations into the massacre and entrusted a special commission of inquiry with reporting back on the circumstances which contributed to the failure of security forces to prevent it. The revelations proved to be equally shocking. Commander of Israeli Border Police in Hebron told the commission that, according to regulations, it was forbidden to fire on settlers, even when they were firing on Palestinians.⁷¹ Israeli Defense Forces Brigadier General Moshe Yaalon also informed the commission that the use of live ammunition against settlers was absolutely prohibited.⁷² Prime Minister Rabin conveyed, to his cabinet, his concerns over what he described as the "incalculable" damage the findings of the commission of inquiry had caused to Israel's reputation. In addition, Israeli human-rights group B'Tselem charged that the IDF, Police, and courts had failed to enforce the law on crimes committed by settlers

⁷⁰ *The Times*, London, 2/26/1994.

⁷¹ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 3/10/1994.

⁷² *The New York Times*, 3/22/1994.

against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. In the report that it released, B'Tselem pointed out that 62 Palestinians were killed by settlers between 1988 and 1993, but only one settler was actually convicted of murder. The IDF did not dispute the report.⁷³

The Hebron massacre was a violent expression of the treacherously weak balance between three different parties in the Occupied Territories: the Palestinians, the army, and the Jewish settlers. In fact, periodic assessments by the IDF and the General Security Service recommended that security operatives not consider Jewish zealots and messianic individuals in the territories as simply insane or deranged, but to take into account the cultural and political contexts which produce their interpretations of what was politically permissible. Those assessments had been warning that because of the political uncertainty which characterized the future of the settlements in view of peace negotiations, and because of the uncompromising ideological beliefs and objectives of hundreds of settlers, politically distressed zealots were increasingly perceiving themselves as being delegitimized by the rest of the Israeli society.⁷⁴ The fact that the massacre became part of the bitter reality in Hebron, however, was indicative of the government's failure to pay due respect to what the Israeli preventive intelligence had long warned about.

Attempts to resolve the crisis caused by the Hebron massacre involved endeavors of varying degrees of success to establish linkages between certain domestic politics aspects and the international negotiating table. Those linkages were especially important in view of the pressing need to revive Chairman Arafat's status among his fellow Palestinians—a need which

⁷³ *The New York Times*, 3/15/1994.

⁷⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 2/27/1994.

the Clinton Administration stressed when it called upon the Rabin Government to provide the Palestinian leader with some visible concessions which he could present to the Palestinian masses in order to bolster his political stature.⁷⁵

The massacre had an immediate effect on Arafat's political status by demonstrating to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories that, despite the peace negotiations with Israel, he still could not ensure their personal safety against the threats which the settlers leveled at them. Therefore, the disparity between the settlers and the Palestinians in the territories prompted Arafat to demand that Israel make concessions with respect to the issue of settlements before agreeing to resume the peace talks. Foremost among those demands was the presence of international forces in order to provide protection for the Palestinians in the territories, restricting settlers from Palestinian cities and population centers, dismantling some settlements, as well as measures to disarm the settlers and restrain them. According to the reasoning provided by PLO Official in Tunis Yasir Abed Rabbo, the Palestinian leadership is "not trying to freeze the peace talks . . . We are looking for their resumption. But we have our own public opinion, which demands a minimum for the security of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories."⁷⁶

In response to Palestinian leadership's pressure for Israeli actions to quell Arab anger and strengthen Arafat's political standing, the Israeli government pledged to crack down on Jewish settlers deemed dangerous and the Cabinet followed suite by ordering some settlers disarmed. In addition, orders for immediate 'administrative detention' of five members or

⁷⁵ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/1/1994.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

sympathizers of the Kach and Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives in Hebrew) movements were issued.⁷⁷ Also, in an attempt to provide further assurances to the Palestinians by distancing himself from Jewish extremism, Prime Minister Rabin relentlessly castigated extremist settlers in a speech he delivered to the Knesset saying:

Today I stand before you , members of Knesset, and before the citizens of the State of Israel--and in front of the entire world--and as a Jew, as an Israeli, as a man and as a human being, I am ashamed over the disgrace imposed upon us by a degenerate murderer . . . You are not part of the community of Israel. You are not part of the national democratic camp which we all belong to in this house, and many of the people despise you. You are not partners in the Zionist enterprise. You are a foreign implant. You are an errant weed. Sensible Judaism spits you out. You placed yourself outside the wall of Jewish law. You are a shame on Zionism and an embarrassment to Judaism.⁷⁸

The Israeli Cabinet also attempted to attract the PLO back to the negotiating table by releasing Palestinian security prisoners on three different occasions: on February 27 about 1,000 prisoners were released; on March 1 another 500 were released; and on March 3 another 400 were released. Those freed were all affiliated with PLO factions which supported the peace process.⁷⁹ The measures, however, were perceived by the Palestinian leaders in the territories as sufficient neither to allay the anger caused by the Hebron massacre, nor bring the PLO back to the diplomatic peace talks. PLO Executive Committee member Samir Ghawsha called the gestures a “cosmetic surgery,” and negotiator Ghassan al-Khatib dismissed them as a “cosmetic measure.”

⁷⁷ *The New York Times*, 2/28/1994.

⁷⁸ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 2/28/1994.

⁷⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/2/1994.

Responding to the Israeli government's decision to disarm some extremist Jewish settlers after the massacre, prominent Palestinian leader Faisal al-Husseini underscored the PLO's assessment of the dangerous balance in the territories by saying that the Israeli conciliatory measures were inadequate. Speaking at an Eastern Jerusalem press conference, he also warned that the PLO leaders would call on Palestinians to take up arms if the Israeli government did not effectively disarm the settlers. "If the settlers need guns because they don't trust the army to protect them," al-Husseini reasoned, "then you can't expect the Palestinians to accept being protected by the army." Husseini also established a link between the requirement that the Israeli government redefine who was considered extremists and the PLO's decision to return to the negotiating table. Largely hinting at the settlers' excesses against the Palestinians in the territories, he said that "before returning to the peace negotiations, the Palestinians now want to see what criteria the Israelis set in determining who is an extremist and should be dismissed." As regards the issue of the settlements in general, al-Husseini stated, "What happened in Hebron proved that there is no way to have peace and settlements together . . . It's either peace or settlements."⁸⁰

The Israeli government's concessions, however, stopped short of accepting the major demands advanced by the PLO, including the disarming of all settlers, the dismantling of militant Jewish settlements in Hebron, and permitting international forces to protect the Palestinians in the territories.⁸¹ From the Palestinians' perspective, therefore, the concessions made by the Rabin Government neither comforted their popular human grief nor satisfied their

⁸⁰ *The Jerusalem Post*, 2/28/1994.

⁸¹ *The Times*, London, 3/3/1994.

political leadership's expectations of Israeli compromises sufficient to bring them back to the negotiating table. The concessions, nonetheless, were not actually as trivial as the Palestinians considered them, primarily because they were central to the rivalry between Israeli hawks and doves. As former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) stated three days after the massacre, "the tragedy at Hebron must not influence Israel's ability to stand firm . . . Even though the killing in the Cave of the Patriarchs is a mortal shame for the man who did it and the few who support such a deed, the Government must not feel obligated in any way to make further concessions." Right-wing Tsomet Party even took issue with the Rabin Government's decision to free Palestinian prisoners as a measure designed to convince the PLO to return to the peace negotiations.⁸² The opposition of the Likud and other right-wingers to providing concessions to the Palestinians notwithstanding, the Rabin Government was required by the Palestinians to provide even more concessions in order for the peace process to be salvaged from the massacre crisis.

Major strides toward resolving the impasse caused by the Hebron massacre were achieved when the Israeli government restructured important aspects of domestic politics in Israel proper and the Occupied Territories. The proposition of evacuating militant settlers from Hebron received increased support from Israeli ministers on both the left and the center at a weekly Cabinet meeting, a development which represented a significant, albeit still premature, departure from the kind of thinking that prevailed immediately before the massacre. Explaining why they thought that Jewish settlers should be evacuated from Hebron, Housing Minister and former West Bank Army Commander Binyamin Ben-Eliezer

⁸² *The New York Times*, 3/3/1994.

said, "so long as they are still there, I believe the thing itself creates friction and draws fire." Also, the Minister of Immigrant Absorption Yair Tzaban stated, "To guard the settlers in the midst of the Palestinian population in Hebron, we need to put many forces there."⁸³

Although the final decision to actually evacuate the settlements rested with Prime Minister Rabin, who himself appeared to oppose the idea of implementing such a major concession on a highly divisive issue between Israeli hawks and doves, the very notion of elevating the issue to the level of a cabinet debate must have demonstrated to the PLO how serious the Israeli government was about resuming peace diplomacy. The fact that evacuating the settlements represented a potentially explosive concession that could profoundly anger Israeli right-wingers and, consequently, derail the peace process, however, availed Rabin with the opportunity to convincingly appear to Chairman Arafat that his hands were tied down. Tied-hands technique was especially serviceable to Rabin's desire to, first, not upset militant settlers in Hebron and, second, not to allow the issue of settlements in general to be negotiated during the Interim Self-Government stage of the peace process. Rabin calculated that yielding to the PLO on the settlements in Hebron could incite the Palestinians' appetite for similar Israeli concessions on other Jewish settlements. The fact that by signing the Oslo One Agreement in September 1993 (in which the future of the settlements was relegated to the final-status phase of the negotiations) Arafat had been unexpectedly cooperative with respect to the Israeli Prime Minister's tied-hands claims on the issue of Jewish settlements must have encouraged Rabin to believe that similar cooperation could again reasonably be expected from Arafat on the settlements in Hebron six months later. In short, debating the

⁸³ *The New York Times*, 3/7/1994.

future of the settlements at a cabinet-level meeting was an occasion to demonstrate to Arafat that although the Israeli government was sensitive to the PLO's concerns over the safety of the Palestinians, the Prime Minister could not go as far as evacuating militant settlers because their expected violent response could explode the peace process. Partly because of its weakness in relation to Israel, and partly because of its desire not to jeopardize Rabin's political standing in view of settlers' militancy, the PLO recoiled from insisting on the evacuation of settlements as a prerequisite for resuming peace diplomacy.

Prime Minister Rabin, nonetheless, still needed to make tangible concessions to the PLO in order to encourage it to return to the negotiating table. Therefore, meeting Arafat's demands for providing greater security to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories appeared of utmost priority to the Israeli government. In order for him to be able to satisfy Arafat's demands, however, Rabin had to implement an important restructuring in the Israeli domestic politics.

The government which Prime Minister Rabin was leading was a product of a minority coalition in which he was assured of 44 Labor MKs and 12 leftist Meretz MKs, giving him a total of only 56 out of the 120 MKs in the Knesset, in addition to five Arab party MKs who supported the government from outside the coalition. Rabin expressed the difficulty which the narrowness of the base of his government had been causing to his ability to deal with intricate decisions on the peace talks with the Palestinians. Rabin complained to a Labor Ministerial Caucus by asking "How can a minority government, with only 56 MKs, continue to make all those difficult and fateful decisions on the peace process? How can we deal with the extremist fringes among the settlers when we must look over our shoulders during every

Knesset vote and make sure that we have an ad hoc majority? How can we go on this way?"⁸⁴

In order to correct that troublesome situation, Rabin considered inviting two right-wing religious parties, Tsomet and the Orthodox Shas, to join the coalition he was leading. Junior partner Meretz Party, however, vehemently rejected the participation of the Tsomet Party into the coalition and the Meretz Knesset faction vetoed making any deal with Tsomet and stated that "Meretz supports the coalition's expansion, especially the return of Shas. But the entry of Tsomet at this juncture is undesirable and should be vigorously opposed, as it would constitute a negative message to the Palestinians, to Israeli Arabs, and to the successful continuation of the peace process."⁸⁵ In fact, Meretz opposed the participation of Tsomet because the latter demanded that the government strengthen the Jewish settlements as a condition for joining the coalition. Meretz and segments of Labor also opposed the notion of giving Tsomet any say in the government, fearing that the mere mention of Tsomet's Rafael Eitan--a former Chief of Staff implicated into the Sabra and Shatila massacre during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon--would torpedo the peace process. Rabin, however, calculated that bringing Tsomet into his government and securing its support for any peace deal with the PLO would signify the "disintegration of the right"⁸⁶ and remove major obstacles from the road to peace. But Rabin finally acquiesced to Meretz's opposition to the inclusion of Tsomet and finalized a deal with Shas, thus reaffirming the Labor's partnership with Meretz while expanding the base of the coalition rightward. By joining the coalition,

⁸⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/4/1994.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Shas received promises from Rabin not to dismantle Jewish settlements before their status is determined through a national referendum, thus enabling Rabin to further bolster the appearance that his hands were tied down on the settlement issue.⁸⁷

After expanding the base of the governing coalition, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Rabin implemented a more resolute restructuring against militant settlers in the Occupied Territories by unanimously approving to outlaw two radical Jewish groups, Kach and Kahane Chai, thus making it illegal for individuals to belong to these Arab-hating forces and a crime to give financial or verbal support to them. In making its decision, the Cabinet relied on antiterrorist laws which, until the Hebron massacre, had been applied against Palestinians and not Jews. Commenting on the urgency of the step, Environment Minister Yossi Sarid said, "only a few years ago, I thought that maybe it would not be necessary to outlaw Kach, because Israeli democracy should make the effort to let that despicable thing called Kach stay alive. I was wrong, as were others. Now it may be late, but not too late."⁸⁸

The PLO welcomed the decision to outlaw the two extremist groups as a positive step, but insisted on extracting Israeli concessions on allowing international forces to protect the Palestinians in the territories. Marwan Kanafani, Senior Aid to Chairman Arafat, commented that "Yasir Arafat cannot resume talks without the tangible, concrete measures we are asking for. Any attempt to push him into doing so places the credibility of the peace process on the line with our people in the Occupied Territories and elsewhere."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 3/11/1994.

⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, 3/14/1994.

⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, 3/18/1994.

In a difficult concession which represented a major restructuring in Israel's policy of refusing the presence of foreign forces in the Occupied Territories, the Rabin Government agreed to permit 160 lightly-armed observers (35 observers from Denmark, 35 from Italy, and 90 from Norway) to deploy in Hebron and report to a joint Palestinian-Israeli commander. According to the agreement reached between the two parties, the international force was vested with the responsibility of promoting stability in Hebron and ensuring the safety of the Palestinians,⁹⁰ thus satisfying a major precondition which the PLO had set for the resumption of the peace talks. The magnitude of the Israeli concession to the PLO's demand on the deployment of foreign forces, as well as the significance of the restructuring it implemented with this respect, should become evident by the fact that Israel had been continually opposing the internationalization of the issue of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since these territories became under her control in the aftermath of the 1967 War. Even when the peace process was initiated after the Gulf War, Israel forcefully resisted placing the negotiations within the framework of the United Nations, or under any other international umbrella, and insisted instead that her dispute with the Palestinians be directly addressed with the occupied people. Therefore, the concession to allow foreign forces to patrol Hebron was an occasion for the Likud to attack the Labor coalition government. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (Likud), for example, commented that "the whole world knows that international observers mock a country's independence and sovereignty," and former Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon (Likud), said that the agreement to permit foreign forces in Hebron "created a precedent for international presence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza and, mainly,

⁹⁰ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 3/31/1994.

Jerusalem . . . This will worsen the security situation and will undermine our grip on Jerusalem and our ability to hold other places.” Rabin’s response to those criticisms was that the presence of international forces was an “exceptional case” to which Israel had to agree only because of the massacre in Hebron.⁹¹

Finally, a more complete analysis of the manner in which the crisis of the Hebron massacre unraveled requires mentioning the interactions between the United States, the PLO, and the United Nations during the course of the episode. The PLO pressed for a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Hebron massacre of Palestinian Muslims, but the United States, with Israeli advocacy, initially resisted such efforts by threatening to veto the resolution. As PLO Executive Commander member Samir Ghawsha stated, Chairman Arafat, however, insisted on making the decision to resume peace diplomacy with Israel contingent upon the adoption of such a resolution.⁹² The United States and the PLO reached a standoff because of the refusal of the latter to yield to the Clinton Administration’s demand that Chairman Arafat agree to resume negotiations with Israel before the adoption of the resolution. The deadlock was also caused by the United States’ objection to the wording of the proposed resolution which referred to Jerusalem as part of the Occupied Territories, and not part of Israel proper.⁹³ Eventually, however, the United States cleared the way for Security Council Resolution 904 deploring the Hebron massacre by voting for it and abstaining from voting on paragraphs referring to Jerusalem as an occupied territory. The

⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 4/1/1994.

⁹² *Mideast Mirror*, London, 3/17/1994.

⁹³ *The New York Times*, 3/11/1994.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright commented that her country allowed the passage of the resolution “with great reluctance,” but was encouraged by its importance for restarting the peace process. Although the PLO stopped short of explicitly promising to immediately return to the negotiating table, it nonetheless praised the condemnation resolution.⁹⁴

To summarize, therefore, the successful resolution of the Hebron massacre was primarily attributable to the linkages between the domestic politics and the international negotiating table which Chairman Arafat resolutely insisted on establishing and Prime Minister Rabin, in view of his concerns over preserving the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy, had no choice but to implement. By bringing the structural underpinnings of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the forefront, the massacre caused the popularity of the notion of peacefully resolving the outstanding dispute to dwindle among the Palestinian masses and political forces, thus enabling Arafat to translate his weakened political standing into greater ability to extract major concessions from the Israeli government. More specifically, revoking the licences to possess weapons from Jewish settlers deemed dangerous, releasing large numbers of Palestinian security prisoners, inviting the Orthodox Shas party to join the governing coalition, outlawing two extremist Jewish groups, and taking the unprecedented step of accepting the presence of foreign forces in Hebron in order to protect the Palestinians were major manifestations of the restructuring measures which the Rabin Cabinet implemented in order to secure the PLO’s agreement to return to the negotiating table.

⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, 3/19/1994.

*Preempting the Final Status of Jerusalem:
The case of land-confiscation plan in East Jerusalem*

In this case, the Palestinian domestic win-set pertained to salvaging the negotiation table in the aftermath of the Israeli government's decision to confiscate 134 acres of Arab owned land in East Jerusalem. By threatening to curtail Chairman Arafat's ability to deliver to his constituents on the Jerusalem front, the decision had the effect of dangerously weakening the Palestinian leader's political standing within his respective domestic politics. Prime Minister Rabin showed no interest in directly protecting Arafat's status and was so determined to implement the confiscation decision, thus threatening the peace process. The negotiation table was saved when the Rabin Government implemented a restructuring measure by freezing the confiscation decision. That move, however, resulted from the motion of no-confidence which two Arab parties in the Knesset presented in a bid to prevent the implementation of the confiscation decision and protect the peace process.

Israel captured and annexed East Jerusalem after the downfall of the city from Jordan's control in the aftermath of the 1967 War. Since then the Israeli government had carried out property rights encroachments by continually confiscating Arab-owned land in order to expand Jewish neighborhoods and strengthen her claim to the city. Although Jerusalem technically had been excluded from the Interim Self-Government phase of the peace negotiations, an understanding between the two parties relegated deliberating the status of the disputed city to the final-status phase. The Palestinians, however, had been sensitively cognizant of the Israeli government's efforts to change the facts on the ground in Jerusalem in a manner that prejudiced the outcome of any future negotiations in her favor.

The total population of Jerusalem is 405,000 Jews and 155,000 Palestinians. The population in the eastern precincts of the city is 155,000 Palestinians and 160,000 Jews. Jerusalem is considered a holy city by Muslims, Christians, and Jews. For Jews the holy sites in Jerusalem are the Western or Wailing Wall, which is believed to be the last remnant of the Jewish Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD and the holiest site of Judaism. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem where Jesus Christ is believed to have been crucified and buried has endeared the city to Christians. Muslims consider Jerusalem the third holiest shrine after Mecca and Medina. Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock where Prophet Mohammad is believed to have been ascended to heaven are considered Islamic holy sites.

Neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis could afford a zero-sum resolution with regard to the disputed city. Still, the rhetoric employed by both parties has been indicative of the maximalist stances which they espouse with regard to the preferred final status of the city and, therefore, the issue of Jerusalem has had the potential of becoming the obstacle on which the whole peace process may devastatingly stumble. Certain developments which amounted to preempting the future of Jerusalem, however, caused the problematic complexity of the fate of the holy city to threaten the peace process during the self-rule phase of the negotiations. More specifically, the Rabin Government's decision to confiscate 134 acres of Arab-owned land in April 1995, the largest single confiscation in Jerusalem in 15 years,⁹⁵ and the Republican Senate leadership's proposal in the following month to transfer the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem caused the question of the future of the disputed city to

⁹⁵ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 4/28/1995.

disruptively dominate the international negotiating table.

Because the people of Arab countries have spiritual affiliations with Jerusalem, Arab leaders called for an extraordinary summit meeting to discuss the plan declared by the Israeli government to confiscate 134 acres of Arab-owned land in East Jerusalem. The issue of the confiscation plan also assumed an international status when it was voted in the United Nations's Security Council. A U.N. resolution that would have asked Israel "to rescind the expropriation decision and to refrain from such actions in the future," however, was aborted by the Clinton Administration's first veto, thus engendering the embitterment of the Arab League. Madeleine K. Albright, the Chief United States Representative, said, in a statement delivered to the Council:

This council is not able—and should not seek—to try to resolve sensitive issues in the Middle East peace process . . . That is for the parties, who must live with the outcome of those negotiations . . . The United States has expressed the view that the Israeli notice to expropriate land in Jerusalem is unhelpful. Clearly, this Israeli decision does not move the peace process in the right direction. But by injecting the Council into this issue, this resolution would merely compound the problem.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, State Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns, expressed the United States' languid criticism of the land confiscation plan by stating, "It's difficult to see how this type of action, this land confiscation, can be helpful at this time in the negotiations."⁹⁷

Although the Israeli government had previously expropriated Arab-owned land in East Jerusalem, the fact that the latter expropriation plan was announced while the diplomatic negotiations were underway imparted unique implications to the matter. Responding to the

⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, 5/18/1995.

⁹⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/3/1995.

confiscation designs, Chairman Yasir Arafat impugned the Israeli government and declared that “they [the Israelis] are daily breaching what had been agreed upon, and this confiscation of land is one of those violations.”⁹⁸ Arafat was troubled because the Israeli confiscation plan, by depleting the Arab residents’ property rights, curtailed his ability to territorially deliver to his constituents in Jerusalem during the final-status phase of the negotiations. He also was troubled because the plan made him appear powerless and ineffective in front of Israel’s failure to appreciate the perilous position in which he found himself within his own domestic politics, as well as because of Rabin’s willingness to demonstrate his ability to act unilaterally and irresponsibly on such a pivotal issue as Jerusalem.

Sa’eb Erekat, an official in charge of the local government in the Palestinian Authority, condemned the confiscation plan saying, “This constitutes the highest form of terrorism against the Palestinian people, which really threatens their existence.” Hamas also issued a leaflet in which it demanded the PLO to withdraw from the peace talks. “This Zionist crime represents one of the destructive and catastrophic results of the Oslo-Cairo agreements . . . We hold the Palestinian Authority directly responsible for this crime and we ask it to pull out immediately from the negotiations with the Zionist enemy,” Hamas declared in the leaflet.⁹⁹

As *The Jerusalem Post* reported, the land confiscation plan was strongly attacked by some members of the Israeli Cabinet itself in a meeting in which Prime Minister Rabin declared his approval of the plan. Communication Minister, Shulamit Aloni of the Meretz

⁹⁸ *The New York Times*, 4/28/1995.

⁹⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 4/30/1995.

Party, presented Rabin with a query indicating that Meretz wanted the issue to be debated. Aloni reportedly said that “The Meretz ministers have discussed the issue of land confiscation in Jerusalem with the Prime Minister and Finance Minister, and we are at odds with them. We were told that as soon as possible a general plan of construction for the Arab residents of Jerusalem will be submitted to the cabinet.” Rabin answered Aloni by saying that he was not in favor of mixing Arabs and Israelis in the same neighborhoods and, therefore, Jewish neighborhoods had to be enlarged by further construction. Absorption Minister, Yair Tzaban, disapprovingly intervened in the dialogue and reminded Rabin that most of the land was expropriated from Palestinian residents. “Allow me to provide you with some facts and figures . . . Of the 70,000 dunams¹⁰⁰ [in what was Jordanian-occupied Jerusalem], Israel expropriated 23,000. Some 85 percent were expropriated from Arabs and 15 percent from Jews. However, 35,000 apartments were built for Jews, not even one for Arabs. Whoever thinks we can go on with this policy is making a grave mistake,” said Tzaban. Environment Minister Yosi Sarid expressed his concerns over the political ramifications of the confiscation decision by asking “How big a burden can we place on the Palestinian Authority? It also has public opinion to reckon with.” But Rabin, as some Ministers reported, showed ambivalent attitudes toward the notion of paying attention to Chairman Arafat’s status within Palestinian public opinion and blasted Sarid by angrily emphasizing that “I’m asking the Palestinians to fight terror. This has nothing to do with the public opinion.”¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ One acre equals four dunams.

¹⁰¹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/1/1995.

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, who opposed the land confiscation decision, announced that he was of the opinion that Israel should reexamine the decision in order to avert dangerous complications in the peace process. "We have to reconsider this issue. We are in a very sensitive situation, both with the Palestinians regarding an interim agreement and in a struggle towards final-status negotiations, where we seek to maintain a united Jerusalem under our sovereignty. This is more important to me than anything else," Beilin said in a television appearance on Israeli Channel 2.¹⁰² The opposition to the confiscation decision notwithstanding, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres declared in an Army Radio interview, that the cabinet would not rescind its confiscation designs and reasoned that "It's not so acceptable for a government to renege in the middle of a campaign and I don't think there is room to do so."¹⁰³

From Chairman Arafat's standpoint, the crisis created by the Rabin Government's decision to confiscate Arab-owned land in East Jerusalem was a serious blow to his personal status in relation to Arab public opinion, in general, and Palestinian constituents, in particular. Rabin jeopardized the international negotiating table by hurting Arafat's domestic status twice: first by announcing the confiscation plan and graduating it into a Cabinet decision and second by refusing Arafat's appeals to rescind the decision. During that episode, Prime Minister Rabin was completely adamant that his government should implement the confiscation decision despite the strong opposition expressed by the Palestinian Authority and prominent members in the Israeli Cabinet. Even Foreign Minister Peres' reasoning that it was

¹⁰² *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/11/1995.

¹⁰³ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/14/1995.

politically inappropriate for a government to rescind its decision in the middle of a policy campaign might not have been totally convincing for Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, mainly because only two days before Peres made his statement the Israeli government announced that it had dropped plans to expropriate Vatican-owned land from the Cremisan Monastery outside of Jerusalem--a plan which was to be carried out concurrently with that of confiscating the Arab-owned land--largely in deference to protests from the Vatican.

The land confiscation decision survived Arab and European attacks, U.S. criticism, as well as strong opposition from within the Israeli Cabinet, and was described by Prime Minister Rabin as final, despite the fact that it weakened Arafat's status and placed the peace process in a perilous position. Speaking in the Knesset Plenum, Rabin reportedly described the opposition to the confiscation decision as "much ado about nothing."¹⁰⁴ From the Prime Minister's perspective, the confiscation decision amounted to little more than the prerogative of his coalition to conduct the usual business of governance, which he believed was a legitimately integral part of Israeli sovereignty over its territory, including Jerusalem. Rabin seemed to have refused to establish any linkage between the consequences of the land confiscation decision and concerns over the preservation of the international negotiating table at which the Israeli delegation had been meeting with its Palestinian counterpart.

The Rabin Government, however, unexpectedly suspended the land seizure decision and the threat to the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy was averted. The sudden reversal of the government's position was announced only minutes before a parliamentary vote of no-confidence which threatened to topple the Labor-led coalition. The resolution of the land

¹⁰⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/16/1995.

confiscation crisis, therefore, cannot be directly attributed to the Prime Minister's willingness to salvage the peace process by sparing Chairman Arafat further damage to his status among the Palestinian constituents. The unraveling of the crisis, nonetheless, involved portentous linkages between Israeli domestic politics and the international negotiating table.

The no-confidence motions were submitted by two Arab parties in the Knesset, the Democratic Arab Party (DAP) and Hadash, whose support was crucial to the survival of the parliamentary coalition that Prime Minister Rabin was leading. The motions specifically asked the government to either rescind or freeze its decision to confiscate the 134 acres owned by Jerusalemite Arabs. Understandably, Rabin was alarmed by the motions and, therefore, tried to talk DAP and Hadash out of it. MK Taleb A-Sanaa turned down Rabin's request to abandon the motion and reasoned that DAP would pursue the no-confidence motion "if the government continues making decisions which harm the peace process and/or does not meet its obligations towards the Arab sector." Adding that his party might even withdraw from the governing coalition, A-Sanaa maintained that "we are not captives of this government and our support of it was never unconditional."¹⁰⁵

Although leaders of the Opposition factions in the Knesset who supported the confiscation plan disagreed with the substance of the motions of no-confidence submitted by DAP and Hadash, they nonetheless expressed their position which held that they would support the motions if they appeared to have a chance of passing. "Our aim is to topple the government. If there is a chance of this, we won't check the reason for the motion too

¹⁰⁵ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/22/1995.

carefully,” Likud faction Chairman Moshe Katsav commented.¹⁰⁶

Likud and religious factions in the Knesset strongly supported Rabin’s land confiscation decision because they believed it represented an additional welcomed measure toward consolidating the Jewish character of Jerusalem. In fact, Likud even wanted Rabin to confiscate greater land from Jerusalemite Arabs and Netanyahu declared, on the day on which voting on the no-confidence motions was scheduled, that his faction would refrain from supporting the motions if Rabin would “publicly state that the government would continue with the expropriation of the 500 dunams and their development, continue carrying out expropriations and support opposition bills strengthening the status of Jerusalem and closing the Orient House.”¹⁰⁷ The no-confidence motions submitted by Arab MKs, nonetheless, presented Likud and religious MKs with an even more appealing consequence--i.e., the defeat and eventual ouster of the Rabin governing coalition. So, although they detested the notion of Rabin’s rescinding the confiscation decision, they announced that they preferred to support the motions because they calculated that the payoff was the destruction of the peace talks with the Palestinians. In the context of Israeli domestic politics, for Hawkish Opposition MKs to align with anti-Zionist Arab MKs was something of a parliamentary stigma; but that was a small price to pay compared with the highly prized outcome of deposing the Rabin’s coalition and terminating the conciliatory concessions he offered to the Palestinians through what they thought was a highly permissive and liberal peace diplomacy.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/23/1995.

Ironically, Chairman Arafat asked the Democratic Arab Party to withdraw the no-confidence motion, primarily out of concern that deposing the Labor-led government would almost certainly explode the peace diplomacy with Israel. DAP leader Abdul Wahab Darawshe disclosed that Arafat's Bureau Chief, Ramzi khouri, had asked, in a telephone call, that the DAP drop the motion in order to avoid its serious repercussions on the peace process. Darawshe's response, however, was that "if we decide to drop it, it will be for internal party considerations . . . The same way as we did not consult with Arafat before presenting the motion, we will not, with all due respect to him, drop it just because of Arafat's wishes."¹⁰⁸ Arafat's intervention with the DAP represented an attempt to directly influence Israeli domestic politics with the purpose of securing the very status of Rabin as head of the coalition government. Although he strongly supported the substance of the motions, he was understandably worried that the peace process would irreparably suffer if the government disintegrated over the no-confidence motions and a Likud-led government was instated. Arafat's direct intervention indicated that he opted for the lesser of the two evils; either bowing to the confiscation of Arab-owned land in Jerusalem or risking the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy.

On what Israeli Housing Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer described as "a black day," the government announced the reversal of the expropriation decision in order to avoid the no-confidence motions. As a result of the reversal decision, the problematic issue was effectively dropped out of the political agenda and momentum for Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy was restored. Likud MKs received most of the blame for freezing the

¹⁰⁸ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/18/1995.

expropriation of the 134 acres and the Haredi factions lost the estimated 1,000 housing units which were to be constructed on the expropriated land. Rabin's efforts to solidify the status of Jerusalem as a united Jewish city was depicted by the government as had been victimized by the Likud's blind and parochial concern with toppling the government. "The battle was not with those who brought this no-confidence motion," Foreign Minister Peres stated, "The battle was with . . . Likud, which decided that toppling the government was more important than a united Jerusalem." Embittered Rabin vented his accusation that the Likud was responsible for his decision to suspend the land confiscation by charging that "We were prepared to stand up against the whole world, the Arab League and the U.N. Security Council . . . The last thing we expected was that the Likud and the Opposition parties would harm the decision over the development of Jerusalem." Not to be overwhelmed by the accusations leveled against his party by the Rabin Government, Netanyahu charged that "the government had to decide between Jerusalem and Arafat and chose Arafat. The Prime Minister would have won the full support of the Opposition had he promised to support the unity of Jerusalem [and confiscated more than 134 acres]. Rabin easily gave in to every one of Arafat's dictates."¹⁰⁹

Did Prime Minister Rabin actually choose to capitulate to Arafat's influences as Netanyahu had charged? Not quite so. Granted, the Arab factions in the Knesset achieved an unprecedented victory by simultaneously forcing the government to freeze the land expropriation decision and, consequently, saving the peace process; but that victory was neither the result of influences from Arafat's Palestinian Authority nor Rabin's concerns over

¹⁰⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/23/1995.

saving the peace process. Blaming the Likud for declaring that it would side with the DAP and Hadash MKs on the no-confidence motions is pointless, mainly because, theoretically speaking, it is the function of opposition factions in parliamentary systems to unseat the government of the day. Rabin could have spared his coalition the predicaments of that episode had he simply shown sensitivity toward the negative repercussions of the land confiscation decision on both Chairman Arafat and the international negotiating table. But Rabin's ambivalence, coupled with Likud's active engagement in attempting to topple both the government and the peace process, left Arab MKs with what they perceived as their responsibility to establish and successfully pursue the linkage between Israeli domestic politics and the international negotiating table. In the final analysis, although freezing the land confiscation decision was a restructuring that Rabin involuntarily implemented in his respective domestic politics in order to save his government from being brought down over the motions of no-confidence, that restructuring also turned out to be instrumental to saving the peace process.

*Preempting the Final Status of Jerusalem:
The case of the U.S. embassy transfer from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem*

In this case, the domestic win-set pertained to saving the international negotiation table by averting the potentially damaging consequences of the Republican Congressional leadership's proposal to transfer the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. By threatening to foreclose the future of the disputed city in Israel's favor, the proposal threatened to embarrassingly weaken Chairman Arafat's political standing in relation to his domestic constituents. Prime Minister Rabin understood the negative effects of the proposal

on the Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and, therefore, resisted it. In this episode Rabin had been sensitive to the importance of not weakening Arafat's political status. By discouraging the transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem, Rabin effectively shifted Israel's national priority from securing the U.S. recognition of the disputed city as the united capital of Israel to sparing the peace process. He however needed to collaborate with President Clinton in order to make his resistance to the passage of the proposal practical. By so doing, the President and Congress reached a compromise deal on the issue which effectively contributed to the resolution of the crisis.

In pursuit of its parochial political interests, the Republican Congressional leadership proposed to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Senator Robert Dole first announced the transfer legislation at an American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference on May 8, 1995.¹¹⁰ The proposed bill, which commanded considerable bipartisan support in Congress, required that the United States begin the construction of the embassy in Jerusalem by the end of 1996. The proposal, spearheaded by the Senate Majority Leader Dole and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, not only caused many Palestinian forces to question the impartiality of the United States as a peace broker, but also jeopardized the peace process in that it could easily be interpreted by the PLO as an indication of America's support to Israel's claims to Jerusalem in its entirety. In addition, the Palestinians have wanted East Jerusalem as the capital of the future state which they aspire to declare after the final status of the city is determined in May 1999, hopefully.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ *Mideast Mirror*, London, 5/10/1995.

¹¹¹ *The New York Times*, 5/8/1995.

Chairman Yasir Arafat described the Republican Congressional leadership's move as "dangerous," and Secretary of State Warren Christopher dismissed it as "ill-advised and damaging to the success of the peace negotiations."¹¹² Arafat's status amongst his critics and opponents was weakened because the perception of his ability to deliver on the Jerusalem front dwindled tremendously in view of the U.S. Senate's move which had the potential of foreclosing the future of the disputed city in Israel's favor. In addition, his peaceful course was inflicted with the discrediting ramifications of the increasingly questionable role of the United States as a trustworthy guarantor of the peace process.

Israel had been viewing Jerusalem as the united capital of the country and for decades Israeli officials and pro-Israeli lobbyists in Washington of all political colorings had been advocating the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state. Theoretically, therefore, the Rabin Government must have enthusiastically welcomed the transfer proposal which amounted to the United States's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's united capital and, consequently, her territorial claims to Jerusalem in its entirety, including the eastern portion. The fact that the embassy transfer initiative was made while the diplomatic peace negotiations were still underway, however, ascribed critically unorthodox implications to the issue. The Republican leadership's proposal immediately echoed in Israel's domestic politics and stirred a controversy dominated by concerns over the preservation of the peace process. Although the debate reflected Israeli politicians' continued interest in maintaining control over Jerusalem as their united capital, proponents of the peace talks with the Palestinians were especially sensitive to the potentially precarious position in which Israeli-Palestinian

¹¹² *The New York Times*, 5/18/1995.

diplomacy would be placed because of the timing of the Senate's initiative. In fact, Israeli politicians who desired to guard the peace process even ventured that Likud's attempts to sabotage the peace process eventuated in the embassy transfer bill.

The initial response of the Rabin Government to the embassy transfer proposal was to disapprove of the timing of the move because of the threat it posed to the peace talks with the Palestinians. Rabin commented on the Republicans' proposal by maintaining that Jerusalem was the capital of Israel and that "if other countries, including the U.S., have not recognized it for the last 27--by now, almost 28--years, it's their problem."¹¹³ Also, during his visit to Washington, Rabin emphasized that "the issue is unity of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, regardless of who recognizes it and who does not. I of course, encourage everyone to move their own embassy, but this is not the issue."¹¹⁴

Rabin's comments reflected a calculated attempt to discourage the transfer of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem because he thought the timing of the move would not be beneficial to the peace process. Granted, his government wanted to see the Americans make the decision to transfer their embassy to Jerusalem during his premiership, but he, nonetheless, understood the disruptive consequences of the move on the peace process, and made his opposition to it public. As one Israeli official traveling with Prime Minister Rabin's entourage to the United States hinted, moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem was not a top Israeli priority.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/7/1995.

¹¹⁴ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/8/1995.

¹¹⁵ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/7/1995.

In a special recess session called by the Likud Party, Police Minister Moshe Shahal defended Rabin's cool response to the U.S. Congressional proposal by telling the Knesset Plenum that "Israel does not need any other country to tell it where its capital is." During the same session the Rabin Government's handling of the transfer proposal was attacked by Likud MK Yehoshua Matza, who charged that:

For 47 years of Israeli independence, the US stood by its refusal to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. And now, as fate would have it, when at long last nearly the entire top political echelon in the US . . . declares, 'The time has come,' it encounters an Israeli government with shaking knees, stammering with embarrassment, and saying: 'It's not the time.'¹¹⁶

Prime Minister Rabin's lackadaisical response to the embassy transfer bill represented an important restructuring that he implemented in Israeli domestic politics. That restructuring was signified in resetting the country's priorities with respect to the United States' recognition of Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel. Rabin shifted Israel's priority from having the American embassy moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem toward sparing the peace process the disruptive effects of the move. Rabin performed the restructuring despite the staunch opposition displayed by the Likud party against the way the Senate's proposal was received by his government, and despite the value Israel, in general, and the government, in particular, attached to securing the status of Jerusalem as their united capital. In order for that restructuring to become conceivably practical, however, Rabin needed to orchestrate his actions with those of President Clinton, who was himself facing the domestic predicament of the embassy transfer proposal.

¹¹⁶ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/10/1995.

The Clinton Administration was confronted by a situation in which it had to make a strategic choice between either supporting the embassy transfer proposal, thus jeopardizing the peace process, or vetoing it, thus damaging its own standing with Jews. The Clinton Administration chose to save the peace process by opposing the embassy transfer bill and expending efforts in order to frustrate its passage. Director of the National Security Council Anthony Lake prepared a briefing paper informing three Democrats in the Senate, Senator Daniel Inouye, Senator Joseph Lieberman, and Senator Daniel Moynihan that:

the President's views [on Jerusalem] are well known and have not changed. However, we also have to weigh the impact our actions have on the peace process . . . At this delicate time, what we do not need is to introduce an issue so emotionally charged into the mix. However, if we can keep the party focused on substance, and away from divisive issues, I am convinced--and I think they [the Republicans] are as well--that we can achieve real progress and get to a real peace over time . . . My honest assessment is that bringing the issue of Jerusalem to the fore, which this legislation would do, will have a devastating impact on the peace process. It would lead to a breakdown in the negotiations, and half the gains on normalization that Israel has been making in the Arab world . . . We need your support to insure that we aren't faced with legislation on Jerusalem that undermines our efforts and frankly, put us out of business as a facilitator in moving the parties forward. I am, therefore, asking that if you are asked to support or co-sponsor Senator Dole's bill, that you refrain from doing so.¹¹⁷

The White House was frustrated by Congress' meddling in purely foreign policy issues such as those of the transfer of the embassy and the peace process. Secretary of State Warren Christopher even threatened to recommend to the President vetoing the transfer bill. "Few actions would be more explosive and harmful to [safeguarding the negotiations] than for the U.S., as the key sponsor of this process, to be pushing the Jerusalem issue forward . . . The last thing we should want is for the U.S. at this very moment to put the focus back on

¹¹⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/11/1995.

Jerusalem,” Christopher said in a letter he addressed to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole.¹¹⁸ The entanglements between the Administration’s concern over the future of the peace process and the electoral calculations of both Senator Dole and President Clinton were compounded by Israeli hawks’ interest in derailing the peace process and the political considerations of the 1996 Israeli General Elections. Reconciling electoral interests with concerns over preserving the peace process was a rather difficult undertaking for both the American President and the Israeli Premier. Neither of them could strike a balancing position without help from the other Chief of Government across the Atlantic. The complex predicaments of the embassy transfer proposal that faced the Clinton Administration and the Rabin Government, nonetheless, provided both COGs with the opportunity to collaborate in order to achieve mutually desirable outcomes.

Because of the political calculations of the 1996 Israeli General Elections, Prime Minister Rabin expressed a muted support to the transfer bill when Senator Dole directly confronted him with the question whether he supported his Congressional proposal to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. A participant in the meeting between the two dignitaries reported that Senator Dole asked the Israeli Premier whether he supported his bill to require transferring the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem within the next four years. Rabin replied “We welcome all embassies that move to Jerusalem.” It was only when Senator Dole pressed further, “Does that include the American Embassy?” that Rabin answered, “Yes.” Rabin’s shift away from discouraging the transfer bill and toward expressing half-hearted support to it in his meeting with Senator Dole was a middle-ground

¹¹⁸ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/21/1995.

course that the former opted for in view of the escalation of Likud's accusations that he was yielding to the Palestinians on the issue of Jerusalem. A feature article authored by David Makovsky and published in *The Jerusalem Post* reported that an Israeli Senior Official commented on the shift by saying, "Once the Likud started exploiting this issue, the Prime Minister had no choice but to change gears. From now on you will see more and more of our policy decisions colored by our electoral considerations. It's unfortunate, but true."¹¹⁹

In addition to his desire to avoid the Likud's electorally damaging accusations on the Issue of Jerusalem, Makovsky provided another explanation to Rabin's move toward unenthusiastically supporting Dole's bill. Rabin's experience with the American political system--the cornerstone of which was serving as Ambassador to Washington from 1968 to 1973--had convinced him that it was the Executive Branch, not Congress, which mattered most for Israel. Therefore, by expressing his muted support to Senator Dole's embassy transfer proposal, Rabin believed that appeasing Congress' leadership was inconsequential for the actual future transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem. He, instead, was cognizant of the Executive's position which continued to oppose the transfer proposal, and wanted to spare the President a no-win situation in which he had to choose between jeopardizing either his Presidential election interests or the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. By giving a semblance of cool support to the transfer proposal, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress would feel freer to support moving the embassy to Jerusalem, and the President would avail himself of a greater maneuvering space by reducing his strong opposition to the transfer proposal and, possibly, facilitating a compromise between the White House and

¹¹⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, 5/19/1995.

Congress.

Rabin's hopeful expectations of a compromise between the Executive and the Legislative Branches materialized when Congress overwhelmingly approved, 93 to 5 in the Senate and 374 to 37 in the House, legislation to transfer the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem by the year 1999 after adding a provision that would give the President the power to delay the move indefinitely for national security reasons. The compromise also reflected Senator Dole's consent to remove from the legislation language requiring that ground-breaking for the construction of the embassy in its new location begin in 1996. Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana, the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, commented on the legislation by saying that "All sides should seek to avoid provocative acts, and this is a provocative act . . . We pass this bill to win political and financial support. We pretend we are acting, when we are really just passing this back to the President. We get the political advantage and then we pass on the responsibility to the President."¹²⁰ Inasmuch as Representative Hamilton's observation that the President possessed the ultimate decision on when the embassy would actually be transferred to Jerusalem was accurate, the legislation and the compromise it incorporated was a fulfillment of Prime Minister Rabin's conviction that it was the President who mattered most when it came to Israel.

To summarize, the Republican Senate leadership's proposal to transfer the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem endangered the peace process along the Israeli-Palestinian track by bringing to the forefront the highly divisive issue of the future of the holy city. The resolution of the crisis was facilitated by a linkage that Prime Minister Rabin

¹²⁰ *The New York Times*, 10/25/1995.

established between Israeli domestic politics and the international negotiating table. More specifically, for the sake of saving the diplomatic negotiations, the Rabin Government implemented a crucial domestic restructuring which found expression in relegating both the U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's united capital and the transfer of the embassy to a secondary national priority compared with the priority of avoiding the explosion of the diplomatic talks. The significance of that restructuring in Israeli domestic politics was that for decades the United States resisted Israeli pressures to secure the former's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state. In order for the restructuring to become tenable, moreover, the Rabin Government had to establish a linkage with the White House. Reducing the potential electoral costs of opposing the transfer of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem for both the American and the Israeli COGs required Rabin to express lukewarm support to the proposal, a shift which facilitated the passage of a compromise legislation in Congress.

Conclusion

In this chapter the research problem of the present study was squarely addressed. In accordance with the method of "structured, focused comparison," the general crisis of cooperation between the Israeli government and the PLO was broken down into six major cases which covered the better part of the peace negotiations. These cases were identified as crises, and the critical nature of each was discussed in order to present the context within which the theoretical propositions were evaluated. The analysis raised two theoretically-derived questions based on the Chief of Government's negotiating status proposition and the restructuring of domestic politics proposition. The discussion then attempted to answer the

two questions within the context of the six cases. In accordance with the “congruence procedure,” the explanatory efficacy of the two propositions was evaluated by comparing the theoretical predictions with the answers obtained from analyzing the six cases.

First, in the case of the Oslo One Agreement, a conceptual restructuring in the characterization of Israel’s control of the Occupied Territories facilitated a compromise settlement between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin through the secret Norwegian diplomatic channel. In addition, a number of restructuring measures which the Israeli government and the PLO implemented validated direct and formal contacts between the two parties. The agreement however failed to address the most problematic issues of Jewish settlements, the future of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian refugees.

Second, in the case of Oslo Two Agreement, Islamic fundamentalist groups’ militant attacks against Israeli civilians and military targets succeeded in creating an angry uproar among the Israelis. Consequently, those attacks greatly eroded support to the peace talks with the PLO and made strengthening Arafat’s status appear of utmost priority to the Rabin Government. The analysis showed that the latter’s efforts to protect and enhance Chairman Arafat’s status were effective in preventing the Israeli public’s disenchantment with the peace process from blocking the prospect of accomplishing the Oslo Two Agreement.

Third, in the case of the Palestinian deportees to south Lebanon, the analysis revealed that the Rabin Government’s decision to expel hundreds of Islamic militants echoed in the Palestinian domestic politics and damaged Chairman Arafat’s political standing. Prime Minister Rabin’s position during that episode showed very little concern with directly saving Arafat’s status in relation with the Palestinian public opinion in general and the rejectionist forces in particular. The Israeli government’s concession on the deportees issue was made

in deference to the newly elected Clinton Administration, not to either Arafat's PLO or Hamas. The Rabin Government, however, engaged in actively defeating a bill proposed by the Likud Party that would have hampered the return of the Palestinian deportees and, consequently, the resumption of the peace talks.

Fourth, in the case of the Hebron massacre, at issue was the damaging effects of the killings on both Chairman Arafat's political status and the peace diplomacy. Salvaging the peace process necessitated addressing the issue of the relationship between Jewish settlers and the Palestinians in the territories through the implementation of a number of restructuring policies. The analysis showed that the Rabin Government, to the best of its conceivable political ability, actually undertook a number of important and unprecedented restructuring measures in the territories and in Israel proper designed to revive both Chairman Arafat's political status and the diplomatic peace negotiations.

Fifth, in the case of the land-confiscation decision, the political status of Chairman Arafat suffered from the Rabin Government's move which amounted to curtailing the former's ability to deliver on the Jerusalem front during the final-status phase of the negotiations. In this episode, Prime Minister Rabin did not demonstrate enough concern over the evident effect of his decision to confiscate Jerusalemite Arabs' land on eroding both the political and negotiating status of Chairman Arafat. The resolution of the crisis was facilitated by Rabin's decision to freeze the confiscation decision, thus arresting the government's policy of consolidating the Jewish character of Jerusalem. Yet Rabin's decision, to be sure, was made involuntarily. Had it not been for the two motions of no-confidence presented by the two Arab parties which supported the government from outside the governing coalition, and the Likud's threats to support the motions of no-confidence with the expressive objective of

toppling the government, chances are Prime Minister Rabin would not have been forced to freeze the confiscation decision and, hence, save the peace process.

And finally, in the case of the Republicans' proposal to transfer the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Congress' move threatened the negotiating table by preempting the future of the disputed city in Israel's favor. In addition to weakening Chairman Arafat's status in relation to his constituents, the proposal threatened to damage the role of the United States as an honest broker in the views of the Arab masses in general and the Palestinians in particular. The analysis showed that Prime Minister Rabin correctly understood the negative effects of the proposal, and therefore publicly resisted it. By strategically discouraging the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem, the Israeli government seemed to have restructured its national priorities by moving away from securing the United States' recognition of Jerusalem as the united city of the State of Israel, and more toward saving the peace talks with the Palestinians.

Chapter 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The virtues of this dissertation were both substantive and theoretical. By analyzing the dynamics of the peace negotiations along the Israeli-Palestinian track, the study was configured to substantively examine the politics of a crucial stage in the history of the outstanding conflict in the Middle East--namely, the crisis of cooperation. Also, by utilizing the substantive understanding of the Israeli-PLO peace diplomacy as an opportunity to evaluate the status of COG proposition and the restructuring of domestic politics proposition, the study attempted to test the two-level games theory within the context of the protracted and structural variant of social conflicts.

In the Introduction and Problem chapter a general background of the research problem and the theory employed was discussed. The global, regional, and domestic dimensions of the Israeli-PLO peace process were highlighted, and a case was made to support the argument that linkages between certain aspects of the domestic politics and the international negotiating table should be expected to materialize. Accordingly, the importance of the study and the objectives it attempted to accomplish were specified. In addition, the theoretical framework of the analysis was outlined and the relevance of the two-level games theory was discussed in some detail. Here, the absence of a military crisis between the Palestinians and Israel, as well as the domestic and structural underpinnings of the conflict between the two parties, were utilized to formulate the expectation that the Israeli Prime

Minister and the Chairman of the PLO would have ample opportunity to establish linkages between their respective domestic politics and the international negotiating table.

In the Literature Review chapter, three different bodies of literature were reviewed in large sweeping strokes, and a number of themes were pulled together in order to emphasize the substantive, conceptual, and theoretical dimensions of the present study. The literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process was reviewed first. Here, the historical origins of the territorial dispute were discussed and the major events starting with the creation of the State of Israel until the beginning of the peace process in 1991 were presented. Because of the religious underpinnings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the ideological beliefs and political preferences of Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist groups were discussed to establish the significance of these groups with respect to the territorial conflict. In addition, scholarly works on the Israeli occupation of the territories and its policies there were reviewed, along with the opportunities and challenges which attend the peace negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government.

In order to place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within its proper theoretical and conceptual context, the literature on the structural and protracted variant of conflicts was reviewed next. The distinctive nature of structural conflicts was discussed, and the differences between them and exogenous conflicts were highlighted. Also, a distinction was made between three types of conflictive interactions: fights, games, and debates. The objective in fights is to eliminate the enemy, in games it is to outwit the opponent, and in debates is to convince him. Structural conflicts were shown to be internalized and, hence, institutionalized in the domestic politics.

The discussion then dealt with the basic characteristics of protracted conflicts reminiscent of those in the Third World. Protracted conflicts were shown to share certain characteristics with structural conflicts. By discussing the concept of 'Normal Relations Range,' the review highlighted the crisis of cooperation that is bound to attend attempts to break the cycle of conflict. Here, scholarly works were shown to have emphasized that whereas certain domestic forces actively encourage movements toward peaceful interactions, other forces engage in actively maintaining a certain level of conflictive relations with the enemy.

Because the subject of this study deals primarily with the formulation of foreign policies within the diplomatic interactions between the Israeli government and the PLO, the literature on explaining foreign policy decisions was reviewed next. The three levels of analysis commonly used to account for the international behavior of nation states were identified, and the various strands of domestic explanations of security-related foreign policy decisions were discussed. The review showed that societal forces, state structural considerations, and society-state relations had been the main academic approaches used to incorporate domestic imperatives in explaining foreign policy decisions. Putnam's two-level games theory was then depicted as an approach to studying the simultaneous entanglements between domestic politics and the international negotiating table. The value of the theory as a tool for analyzing the dynamics leading to the conclusion of international agreements within different substantive contexts was demonstrated by the contributors to the *Double-Edged Diplomacy* volume. The review showed, however, that the application of the theory in contexts characterized by unyielding disputes reminiscent of structural and protracted conflicts was lacking. The importance of the present study is derived from its attempt to fill

that void.

In the Methodology chapter the substantive and conceptual considerations utilized in configuring the study as well as the method of the data collection and procession were explicated. The discussion demonstrated that important considerations related to the structural nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and intrinsic characteristics of the Israeli and Palestinian politics were incorporated in the study in order to ensure an unprejudiced evaluation of the two-level games theory. In addition, the general causal relationships proposed by the two-level games theory were presented in greater details. Next, the proposition of restructuring of domestic politics and the proposition of status of Chief of Government were chosen to constitute the theoretical underpinnings upon which the two research questions of the study were based. In addition, the method of “structured, focused comparison” chosen for collecting and processing the data necessary for the analysis was explicated, and its methodological and theoretical merits were highlighted.

In the Data Presentation and Analysis chapter the two theoretically-derived research questions were asked of the six cases which comprised crucial breakthroughs during the course of the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic peace negotiations. In each of these cases the essence of the crisis which either stood in the way of concluding peace agreements or threatened the preservation of the momentum of the peace process was explicated. The performance of the two theoretical propositions was then evaluated in view of their role in handling the crisis of cooperation inherent in each of the six cases.

The resulting analysis warrants a number of concluding remarks:

1. This study has served as an opportunity to communicate structural and protracted conflicts within the context of peace diplomacy. The analysis has verified the basic

characteristics of this variant of social conflicts. First, Azar and Cohen's overall characterization of protracted conflicts and the crisis of cooperation attending endeavors to resolve them is, to a large extent, accurate. By conceptualizing efforts to depart from the conflictive status quo in terms of a crisis that needs to be handled effectively, and by theorizing that opposition forces will challenge cooperative interactions between the disputant parties, the literature on protracted conflict seems to have correctly captured the essence of the difficulties inherent in attempts to resolve this unyielding type of conflicts. As the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy demonstrated, the crisis of cooperation, both as a concept and practical challenge, had been a real one. The crisis continued to be a pressing concern for the Israeli and Palestinian leadership throughout the peace process, and tended to manifest itself in different disguises. On some occasions addressing the crisis of cooperation required effecting certain restructuring measures in the domestic politics; on others, strengthening, or at least refraining from weakening, the negotiating status of the opposing Chief of Government was of primary concern.

Second, the analysis showed, as predicted by the concept of "Normal Relations Range," that movements away from the conflictive status quo aroused active domestic oppositions from certain forces in both the Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics. The bases of the opposition were both nationalistic and religious. Israeli opposition forces, both formal and informal, detested the prospect of disengaging from the Occupied Territories because they believed that doing so would compromise the security of the State of Israel and violate the maximalist drive toward the creation of *Eretz Yisrael*. On the other hand, whereas nationalistic Palestinian opposition forces were mobilized by their belief that Chairman Arafat's conciliatory program would cripple their aspirations after political freedom within

the boundaries of a Palestinian nation state, Islamic fundamentalist groups' refusal to compromise on any part of what used to comprise Mandatory Palestine lead them to violently challenge the peace negotiations with the Israeli government. Both Israeli and Palestinian opposition forces preferred the continuation of the conflictive status quo because, while it did not guarantee them that their religious and nationalistic programs would materialize, it at least did not so openly threaten to foreclose the future of the dispute in a way that jeopardized their objectives and, consequently, identities the way peace diplomacy did. Therefore, it can be concluded that Walter Hill's (1990) identification of the forces which drive the dynamics of the protracted social conflict as the government and the opposition is accurate.

Third, as conceptualized by the literature on structural and protracted conflicts, the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy showed that because the conflict is endogenous and not constrained to differences over material issues, both the history and psychology of the dispute played a significant role in maintaining the distinction between "Us" and "Them" throughout much of the turbulent course of the negotiations. Mutual distrust between the two peoples triggered bitter memories whenever violent attacks were perpetrated against civilians, thus giving militant anti-peace forces added opportunity to capitalize on the heightened sense of mutual hatred to destroy the peace process. Mutual distrust also caused the Palestinians to question the Israeli government's actions in policy areas which the latter perceived to be legitimately within its domain of jurisdiction. Against the general background of internalized hostility, both fatally violent actions (e.g. the Hebron massacre) and vital political decisions (e.g. the deportees issue, the Jerusalemite Arabs' land confiscation plan, the transfer of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem proposal) seemed to have equally endangered the peace process.

The finding that the psychological and historical divide between the Israelis and the Palestinians tended to persist as a problematic concern which augmented to shaping the crisis of cooperation throughout much of the peace process makes it necessary to comment on the implications this study has had on the search for peace breakthroughs. Drawing from the arguments explicated in the Literature Review chapter, It seems that Azar and Cohen's postulation that effective communication between the two belligerents is a prerequisite for cooperation is, by and large, relevant. More specifically, this study has demonstrated that ridding the cooperative engagement between the Israeli government and the PLO from the discrediting connotations of the psychological rejection of the "enemy" and the painful memories of the long historical "fight" that has long characterized the interactions between the two national identities has been an important part of the effort to address the crisis of cooperation.

Throughout much of the peace process in general and during each of the six cases in particular, the Palestinians and the Israelis, both at the level of political leadership and the level of masses, considered each of the episodes analyzed in this study as an occasion to update their long-held beliefs about each others' intentions and attitudes. In other words, violent actions in some of the episodes and heightened sense of distrust caused by specific policy decisions in others engendered concerns among both the Israelis and the Palestinians over the advisability of shifting the characterization of the other party from an "enemy" to an "opponent," or transforming the nature of the relationship from a "fight" to a "debate". Armed with their strategic decision to give peace a chance, and invested with the political dexterity which found expression in attempting to enhance each other's political standing as well as restructuring certain aspects of their respective domestic politics, both Prime Minister

Rabin and Chairman Arafat were able to bolster their cooperative partnership and, thus, propel the peace diplomacy forward.

Nonetheless, the cooperative partnership between Rabin and Arafat should be understood as a relationship which evolved over the course of the peace process, rather than born with the inauguration of the first rounds of diplomatic talks. In fact, much in accordance with the assumption made by this study that negotiators develop more accurate information about their own and each other's constituents' preferences (see the Introduction and Problem chapter), it seems that both COGs actually needed plenty of time to understand and appreciate the structure of constraints and opportunities within which the other party was operating. But the learning process which the Israeli premiership and Palestinian leadership went through can also be said to have involved learning about the importance of tactically using the technique of restructuring of domestic politics and the technique of enhancing the political status of the other COG as tactics that can be used in sustaining the peace process and effecting peace agreements. This is of course not to suggest that either Arafat or Rabin were lacking in political skills when they first became involved in the Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy; rather the point made here is that because of the highly multifaceted and conflictive nature of the outstanding structural conflict between the two parties, the applicability of the these two techniques was not readily feasible or obvious to them at the early stages of the peace process. It seems that both leaders needed that much time in order to appreciate the importance of these two techniques as strategic actions conducive to sustaining the negotiating table and facilitating peace agreements.

This observation can provide a preliminary explanation of why Prime Minister Rabin failed to appreciate the negative effects of his decision to deport 415 militant Palestinians to

Southern Lebanon on Chairman Arafat's political status among his constituents. The explanation posits that, because of Rabin's long experience with the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and because of his short experience with the dynamics and politics of the peace process (only six months separated between Rabin's ascendance to power after the 1992 General Elections and the deportation decisions in December of the same year), assessing the effects of the expulsion of hundreds of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories on the negotiating table can be said to have been left out of the calculations leading to the deportations decision. Driven primarily by his concerns over security issues, and lacking any precedence of such profound decision within his short experience with the peace diplomacy, Rabin seemed to have failed to correctly assess how the decision would be received by the Palestinian masses and what effects it would have on Arafat's political status.

2. This study has shown that the general logic of the two-level games theory is applicable to the context of Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy which had been conducted with the challenging characteristics of structural and protracted conflict operating in the background. Much in line with the argument presented in the Introduction and Problem chapter, the fact that the outstanding conflict is both socially internalized and politically institutionalized in the Palestinian and Israeli domestic politics contributed to the active engagement of domestic institutions, forces, and preferences on both sides in influencing the dynamics of the peace diplomacy. Furthermore, these domestic considerations provided the Israeli Prime Minister and the Chairman of the PLO with structures of opportunities and constraints with which they had to deal while going about making peace. More specifically, Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics considerations presented the two leaders with a mixture of imperatives which echoed at the negotiating table and, consequently, shaped the

dynamics of the peace talks. Also, domestic politics provided the two leaders with an arena in which they pursued specific strategic actions designed to influence the domestic landscape with the purpose of either facilitating peace agreements or preserving the momentum of peace diplomacy.

With that finding in mind, the empirical inquiry demonstrated that the two theoretical propositions which guided the formulation of the two research questions and the subsequent analysis seemed to have performed successfully within the context of the cases analyzed. Both the proposition of strengthening the status of Chiefs of Governments and the proposition of restructuring domestic politics contributed to the resolution of the crisis of cooperation with which Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat continually had to grapple. In general terms, the analysis demonstrated that applying Putnam's two-level games theory within negotiating contexts inflicted with the profound underpinnings of structural and protracted conflicts was both theoretically relevant and substantively fruitful.

3. The "creativity" which Azar and Cohen envisioned as a prerequisite for successful handling of the crisis of cooperation had been evident in, first, the strategic decision which both Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat made in favor of pursuing peaceful relations between the two peoples, and, second, in the tactical policies which they implemented in order to overcome the many obstacles which emerged at different junctures on the road to concluding peace agreements. To be sure, the analysis showed that by restructuring certain aspects of their domestic politics and by strengthening each another's political status, both the Israeli premier and the Palestinian leader consolidated their strategic decision to make peace by tactically establishing linkages between their respective domestic politics and the international negotiating table.

The research reinforced the expectation that factors emanating from the Israeli and Palestinian domestic politics would play a significant role in shaping both achievements and drawbacks in the peace process. However, foremost among the factors which shaped the self-rule phase of the negotiations and are bound to shape the final-status negotiations between the two parties is the Chief of Government's strategic decision to give peace a chance. Peace is a strategic decision, and as such it does not allow for the continuation of the kind of hostile perceptions and mutual mistrust typical of structural conflicts. Drawing from the analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and for the benefit of the final-status phase of the peace process, the engagement between the Israelis and the Palestinians must be transformed from a "fight" in which the objective is to eliminate the enemy to a "debate" in which the objective is to convince the opponent. The diplomatic successes of both Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat can be attributed to the sense of partnership which characterized their relationship as the peace process progressed.

The importance of Rabin and Arafat's clear strategic decisions to pursue peaceful relations in both effecting the two peace agreements and salvaging the peace process had been indicative of the centrality of the role played by Chiefs of Governments in determining and conducting foreign policy decisions. Despite the profound origins, as well as persistent opposition, of domestic Israeli and Palestinian hawkish forces' stances with respect to the peace diplomacy, the two leaders, by and large, had been capable to pursue their own political preferences at the international negotiating table. The fact that Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin had continued to handle domestic and international imperatives simultaneously during the lengthy duration of the peace talks should attest to the ability of Chiefs of Governments to successfully sustain the centrality of their roles in shaping foreign policy

behavior.

Much in agreement with the two-level games theory's characterization of the role played by Chiefs of Governments in formulating foreign policy decisions, both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders seemed motivated by a clear overall concern with pursuing their own political preferences. First, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat were equally concerned with bolstering their standing in the domestic game by either augmenting to their political resources or minimizing the resources they stood to lose. Second, in order to pursue policies that they privately prefer but could not implement at home, both leaders had engaged in influencing the balance of power in favor of those policies. And third, both Chiefs of Government seemed to have assumed a leading position in defining their own visions of the national interest of their respective polities and in pursuing their national objectives at the international scene.

4. As regards the method of "structured, focused comparison" employed in the present study, the method has been evidently useful in enabling the researcher to process a substantial amount of information collected about specific aspects of the analysis without losing sight of either the theoretical or substantive objectives of the study. Because qualitative research almost always requires researchers to collect their own data, the value of the "focused" caliber of the method in sparing researchers who conduct qualitative theory-driven analyses from either unpleasantly becoming overwhelmed by an avalanche of substantive information or distracted by unnecessary details cannot be exaggerated. Because the method requires that focus be placed only on those aspects of the research for which there is theoretical justification to examine in each of the six cases, much of the noise that otherwise would have blurred the theoretically-driven analysis was effectively purged. Also,

the value of the “structured” caliber of the method in streamlining the data in order to evaluate the causality relationships has become evident. By asking the same theory-driven questions of the six cases, and by comparing the answers obtained with the predictions made by the theoretical propositions through the “congruity procedure,” the analysis has been designed to ensure that the hypothesized causality relationships are not spurious. In short, this study has demonstrated that the method of “structured, focused comparison” is capable of transforming the function of qualitative research from production of clinical, thick description to evaluation of causality relationships.

5. In line with the heuristic value of this study, evaluating the two-level games theory within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had a number of impacts on the theory. First, the complications of the episode involving Prime Minister Rabin’s decision to deport Palestinian militants to Southern Lebanon, along with the explanation provided for Rabin’s failure to appreciate its problematic effects on Arafat’s status, raises the need to revisit a research concern which the contributors to the *Double-Edged Diplomacy* volume expressed in the concluding chapter. More specifically, the volume encouraged researchers to evaluate the two-level games theory within historical cases of international bargaining in order to ascertain whether the logic of the theory had been applicable in the past, and to find out how far back in history the COGs’ tendency to simultaneously reconcile domestic and international imperatives can be dated. The authors emphasized the need to know whether the logic of the two-level games theory is a modern international phenomenon or earlier examples of it can be found in history.

The importance of this research agenda notwithstanding, I believe that it is even more important for the development of the theory to systematically pursue the question of whether

Chiefs of Governments actually learn to appreciate the value of simultaneously reconciling the imperatives of domestic politics and the international negotiating table as they progress in both their terms of office and the bargaining process. Doing so is especially relevant in processes of interstate negotiations that are inherently difficult and, therefore, lengthy. Prime Minister Rabin's failure to refrain from embarrassingly damaging Chairman Arafat's negotiating status during the Palestinian deportees episode, to be sure, is indicative of the importance of inquiring into the possibility that COGs undergo a process of political socialization as they further progress into the negotiation process. Here, it can be argued that only six months after his becoming a Prime Minister, it was still too early for the Israeli leader to fully appreciate the negative ramifications of his decision. The fact that Rabin demonstrated more willingness to appreciate the importance of strengthening, as well as refraining from hurting, Arafat's political status in the case of the Oslo Two Agreement, the case of Hebron massacre, and the case of the Republicans' proposal to transfer the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem supports the observation that Chiefs of Governments tend to improve their ability to understand the significance of reconciling domestic and international politics as they become more socialized into the dynamics of the negotiating context.

The second impact this study has had on the two-level games theory is that it has demonstrated that the entanglements between domestic and international imperatives, as well as Chiefs of Governments' central role in simultaneously reconciling these imperatives, is also applicable in cases of international bargaining involving non-state actors. The fact that the PLO is not a nation-state in the common sense of the term has neither degraded the relevance of Putnam's theory nor negatively affected the explanatory efficacy of the two theoretical

propositions which guided the analysis. The theory's emphasis on identifying domestic forces, political and ideological preferences, and political institutions, both formal and informal, as the main clusters of variables in determining the dynamics of interstate bargaining, to be sure, has contributed to making the fact the PLO is not a nation-state irrelevant to the receptivity of this case study to the logic of the two-level games theory. As a result, it seems that this study has given some credence to Putnam's (1988) original contention that the logic of his theory is applicable to all negotiating contexts, regardless of the nature of the negotiating entities.

The third impact this study has had on the two-level games theory is that it has demonstrated that the application of the logic of the entanglements between domestic and international imperatives should not be confined to examining the dynamics leading to the conclusion of formal agreements per se; rather, it is equally important to apply the theory to the efforts expended at ensuring the sustainability of the negotiation process. As this study has demonstrated, the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy was conducted with the challenging characteristics of protracted conflict operative in the background, thus making the need to protect the peace process from dangerously degenerating into lengthy stalemates or totally collapsing a pressing concern for the two leaders. In fact, the study has shown that in four of the six cases examined, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was threatened, thus contributing to the expansion of the problematic crisis of cooperation which the two COGs had to handle beyond the original objective of making formal agreements.

The finding that the logic and propositions of the two-level games theory are also applicable to the dynamics pertaining to the preservation of the negotiation process should be utilized by researchers in order to expand the space of cases within which the theory can

be tested, just as the expansion of the crisis of cooperation in this study was utilized to increase the number of cases within which the theory was evaluated. However, it is more powerful to construe the realization of the objective of increasing the number of cases in a way that serves the inquiry into the substantive problem of the research problem. By breaking down the general crisis of cooperation into six specific and well-defined cases, the research design employed in this study has attempted to marry the objective of increasing the number of cases analyzed with the objective of substantively exploring the underlying research problem. The result of this combination, I contend, has produced a research design that better approximated the requirements of the method of “structured, focused, comparison,” and a greater intrinsic understanding of how the crisis of cooperation was handled.

The finding that the two theoretical propositions which informed both the formulation of the two questions asked of the six cases and the subsequent analysis can be meaningfully asked of the dynamics which influence the sustainability of the negotiation process, it must be noted, makes it necessary to revisit the very definition of the concept of “win-set” presented and employed by the two-level games theory. In the Methodology chapter, domestic “win-set” was defined as the set of all possible *agreements* reached at the international bargaining table that would win the necessary majority among the constituents when presented for ratification by vote at the domestic level. By arguing that this study has demonstrated that throughout much of the Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy the effort expended at achieving the objective of sustaining the negotiation process was, to say the least, as important and relentless as the effort expended at achieving the objective of concluding formal agreements, I propose that the concept of “win-set” be broadened to encompass such breakthroughs as the resolution of the cooperation crises which threaten to topple the

negotiating table itself. Put succinctly, the fact that the unique nature of the structural and protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict has caused the crisis of cooperation to expand beyond the need to merely accomplish formal peace agreements underlies the need to broaden the definition of “win-set” to incorporate Chiefs of Government’s endeavors to salvage the negotiation process at critically dangerous junctures.

6. Finally, by emphasizing the centrality of the role played by Chiefs of Governments in strategically planning and pursuing foreign policy objectives during the self-rule phase of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, this study has facilitated a policy-relevant implication for the final-status phase of the negotiations. After the ouster of the Labour Government in the aftermath of the 1996 Israeli General Elections, the policy of negotiating peace with the Palestinians has been bequeathed to the present Likud Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s performance with regard to the peace diplomacy with the Palestinians can be said to be influenced by at least three considerations. The first of these is his personal attitudes and vision with regard to the proper borders of the State of Israel and the future relations with the Palestinians. On this front, Prime Minister Netanyahu’ formula of peace with maximum security doesn’t seem to either trust Arafat’s Palestinian Authority or make room for the realization of the Palestinian people’s aspiration after the creation of a nation state all their own.

The second consideration is the political and ideological preferences of the governing coalition he is leading. Here, the fact that Netanyahu is heavily dependent on maximalist religious and nationalist political parties to secure the continuation of his government makes any conciliatory movement toward the Palestinian Authority quite difficult. Also, the fact that the Prime Minister’s personal ideological and political preferences overlap with those of the

member parties in his governing coalition, to be sure, places the peace diplomacy with the Palestinians in a double-jeopardy position.

The third consideration has to do with the leadership skills which Prime Minister Netanyahu must display should he decide to reinvigorate peace talks with the Palestinians during the final-status phase of the negotiations. Making the strategic decision to pursue peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in a serious and engaging manner, and overcoming the expected difficulties presented by the maximalist stances of the religious and nationalist parties when doing so, it must be emphasized, would require the Prime Minister to draw upon his political skills to make and implement strategic decisions. This is a significant consideration for the future of the peace process, especially in view of the fact that Netanyahu's political experience throughout his political career has been mostly in the Opposition bench, not as a Prime Minister. Throughout his experience in the Opposition, Netanyahu is more likely to have developed skills in making tactical maneuvers and, therefore, is yet to develop the ability to make and pursue crucial strategic decisions such as pursuing a peaceful discourse with the Palestinian Authority in a sustained manner. The importance of the Prime Minister's role as a strategist, and not merely a tactician, becomes more relevant to the future of the peace talks in view of the staunch opposition which the governing coalition in Israel has expressed against making concessions to the Palestinians. Unless he has already strategically taken the politically easier decision of not seriously pursuing the final-status negotiations, Prime Minister Netanyahu, as a strategist politician, will need to confront the political uncertainty which is most likely to attend that difficult phase with greater vigor and control over the domestic factors which both hamper the conclusion of formal agreements and threaten the sustainability of the negotiation process.

LIST OF REFERENCES

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Abu-Jabarah, Hani. 1993. "The Economics of Peace: Jordan," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Ahiram, Ephraim .1993. "The Future of Economic Development of the West Bank and Gaza and Their Economic Relations with Israel and Jordan," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Allison, Graham T. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Arens, Moshe. 1995. *Broken Covenant: American foreign policy and the crisis between the U.S. and Israel*, New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Aruri, Naseer H. 1993. "U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in *The United States and the Middle East: A search for new perspective*, Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Awad, Mubarak E. 1994. "Non-Violent Resistance: A Strategy for the Occupied Territories," in *Palestinians Under Israeli Rule*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
- Awartani, Hisham. 1993. "Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: Is cooperation Possible?," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Azar, Edward E., Paul Jureidini, and Ronald McLaurin. 1978. "Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 8(1): 41-60.
- Azar, Edward E. and Stephen Cohen. 1979. "Peace as Crisis and War as Status-Quo: The Arab-Israeli conflict environment," *International Interactions*, 6(2): 159-184.
- Azar, Edward E. 1985. "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten propositions," *International Interactions*, 12(1): 59-70.

- Baker, James A. 1995. *Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, war and peace 1989-1992*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Becker, Howard S. 1968. "Social Observation and Social Case Studies," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 11:232-38.
- Beinin, Joel. 1992. "New History, New Politics: A Revisionist Historical View," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Texas press.
- Beloff, Max. 1994. "The Diaspora and the Peace Process," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Ben-Dor, Gabriel and David B. Dewitt. 1994. "Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East," in *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., Boulder: Westview Press.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1977. "Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung," *Journal of Peace Research*, 14(1): 75-86.
- Brawer, Moshe. 1994. "The Boundaries of Peace," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Brecher, Michael. 1984. "International Crises and Protracted Conflicts," *International Interactions*, 11(3-4): 237-297.
- Brynen, Rex. 1994. "The Palestinians and Confidence Building Measures in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The implications of statelessness," in *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. *War and Reason: Domestic and international Imperatives*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Capitanchik, David. 1994. "A New Beginning? The 1992 Israeli General Election," in *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace*, Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., London: British Academic Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1983. *The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*, Boston: South End Press.
- Cromer, Gerald. 1993. "Withdrawal and Conquest: Two Aspects of the Haredi Response to Modernity," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.

- Dowty, Alan. 1994. "Confidence and Security Building: The Israeli Domestic Dimension," in *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Gabriel Ben-Dor and David Dewitt, eds., Boulder: Westview Press.
- Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., vol. 1, *Political Science: Scope and Theory*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
- Efrat, Elisha. 1994. "Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 1993. *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Farrell, R. Barry, ed. 1966. *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press.
- Friedman, Menachem. 1993. "Jewish Zealots: Conservative versus Innovative," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gal-Or, Noemi. 1994. "The Role of Extremist Political groups in the Context of Confidence Building Between the Israelis and Palestinians," in *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., Boulder: Westview.
- Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 6: 167-191.
- George, Alexander and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, 2:21-58.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in world Politics*, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Hagan, Joe. D. 1987. "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., Boston: Allen & Unwin.

- Halevi, Nadav. 1993. "Economic Implications of Peace: The Israeli Perspective," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Hamed, Osama A. and Radwan A. Shaban. 1993. "One-Sided Customs and Monetary Union: The Case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under Israeli Occupation," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Handoussa, Heba and Nemat Sahfik. 1993. "The Economics of Peace : The Egyptian Case," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Harkabi, Yehoshafat. 1992. "Arab-Israeli Conflict at the Threshold of Negotiations," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: Austin University Press.
- Hermann, Charles F., Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds. 1987. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Hilan, Rizkallah. 1993. "The Effects on Economic Development in Syria of a Just and Long-Lasting Peace," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Hill, Walter. 1990. "Persistent Cyclical Conflict by way of a Time Lagged Logistic," *International Interactions*, 16(1): 81-90.
- Holsti, K. J. 1972. *International Politics: A framework for analysis*, Englewood, Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Holsti, K. J. 1991. *Peace and War: Armed conflicts and international order 1648-1989*, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Hruwitz, Deena ed. 1992. *Walking the Red Line: Israelis in Search of Justice for Palestine*, Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers.
- Hunter, James Davison. 1993. "Fundamentalism: An Introduction to a General Theory," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silbertein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Iida, Keisuke. 1993. "When and How Domestic Constraints Matter?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(3): 403-406.

- Inbar, Efraim. 1994. "Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada," in *From Wars Toward Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1993*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
- Jervis, Robert L. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 1994. "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance," in *Religion, Culture, and Psychology in Arab-Israeli Relations*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing Inc.
- Keohane, Robert O. ed. 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- King, Gary. 1995. "Replication of Political Science Research," *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 28, n3.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1993. *Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Kirschenbaum, Aaron. 1993. "Fundamentalism: A Jewish Traditional Perspective," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Kleiman, Ephraim. 1993. "Some Basic Problems of the Economic Relationships between Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza," in *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Klieman, Aharon. 1994. "New directions in Israel's Foreign Policy," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Knopf, Jeffrey W. 1993. "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations," *International Organization*, 47(4): 599-628.
- Larson, Deborah Welch. 1985. *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lustick, Ian S. 1993. "Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Lustick, Ian S. 1994a. "Israeli State-Building in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Theory and Practice," in *Palestinians Under Israeli Rule*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York:

Garland Publishing, Inc..

- Lustick, Ian S. 1994b. "The Political Legacy of *de facto* Annexation: Rabin, the Territories, and the Regime Crisis in Israel," in *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace*, Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., London: British Academy Press.
- Mittleman, Alan L. 1993. "Fundamentalism and Political Development: The Case of Agudat Yisrael," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Morgan, T. Clifton and Sally Howard Campbell. 1991. "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2): 188-211.
- Morgan, T. Clifton and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(1): 25-52.
- Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1954. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 2nd ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morrow, James D. 1991. "Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2): 245-265.
- Muslih, Muhammad. 1992. "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Muslih, Muhammad. 1994. "Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National Council," in *From Wars Toward Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1983*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc..
- Nisan, Mordechai. 1994. "Gush Emunim: A Rational Perspective," in *The Conflict with the Arabs in Israeli Politics and Society*, Ian S. Lustick, New York: Garland publishing, Inc.
- Ostrom, Charles W. Jr. and Brian L. Job. 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force," *American Political Science Review*, 80(2): 541-566.
- Piscatori, James. 1993. "Islamic Fundamentalism in the Wake of the Six Day War: Religion Self-Assertion in Political Conflict," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of two-level games," *International Organization*, 42(3): 427-460.

- Rabbie, Jacob M. 1993. "Determinants of Ingroup Cohesion and Outgroup Hostility," *International Journal of Group Tensions*, 23(4): 309-328.
- Rapoport, Anatol. 1974. *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Reich, Bernard. 1994. "Reassessing the US-Israeli Special Relationship," in *Peace in the Middle East: the Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Rekness, Elie. 1993. "The resurgence of Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books.
- Rosenau, James N., ed. 1967. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press.
- Roy, Sara. 1994. "From Hardship to Hunger: The Economic Impact of the Intifada on the Gaza Strip," in *Palestinians Under Israeli Rule*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing Inc..
- Rubinstein, Robert A. 1992. "Culture and Negotiation," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Rummel, R.J. 1983. "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(1): 27-71.
- Russett, Bruce and Thomas W. Graham. 1988. "Public Opinion and National Security Policy: Relationships and Impacts," in *Handbook of War Studies*, M.I. Midlarsky, ed., Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Russett, Bruce. 1990a. "Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict, in *Prisoners of war?: Nation States in the Modern Era*, C. Gochman and A. Sabrosky, eds., Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath.
- Russett, Bruce. 1990b. *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Sampson, Martin W. 1987. "Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy," in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, eds., Boston: Allen & Unwin.

- Schrodt, Philip A. 1981. "A Mathematical Model of the Persistence of Conflict," *International Interactions*, 8(4): 335-348.
- Shlaim, Avi and Avner Yaniv. 1994. "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel," in *The Conflict with the Arabs in Israeli Politics and Society*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc..
- Sherman, Edward F. 1992. "Applications of Dispute-Resolution Process in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Austin Press.
- Silberstein, Laurence J. 1993. "Religion, Ideology, Modernity: Theoretical Issues in the Study of Jewish Fundamentalism," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Spiegel, L. Steven, ed. 1992. *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sprinzak, Ehud. 1993a. "The Israeli Right," in *Whither Israel?: The domestic challenges*, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Sprinzak, Ehud. 1993b. "The Politics, Institutions, and Culture of Gush Emunim," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Stake, Robert E. 1995. *The Art of Case Study Research*, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.
- Steinbruner, John D. 1974. *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Stork, Joe. 1993. "U.S. Policy and the Palestine Question," in *The United States and the Middle East: A search for new perspectives*, Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Tamari, Salim. 1992. "The Future in the Present: Issues of Palestinian Statehood," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Taraki, Lisa. 1994. "The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising," in *Religion, Culture, and Psychology in Arab-Israeli Relations*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing Inc.

- Tessler, Mark. 1994. "The Intifada and Political Discourse in Israel," in *The Conflict with the Arabs in Israeli Politics and Society*, Ian S. Lustick, ed., New York: Garland Publishing, Inc..
- Tessler, Mark and Jamal Sanad. 1994. "Will the Arab Public Accept Peace with Israel? Evidence from Surveys in Three Arab Societies," in *Israel at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Peace*, Efraim Karsh and Gregory Mahler, eds., London: British Academic Press.
- Vasquez, John A. 1983. *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. 1994. "Peace by the End of the Century? A Personal Gloss on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," in *Peace in the Middle East: The challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal 1959. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1967. *Foreign policy and Domestic Politics: The American and British Experience*, London: Longmans, Green.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
- Yafeh, Hava Lazarus. 1993. "Contemporary Fundamentalism: Judaism, Christianity, Islam," in *Jewish Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective: Religion, ideology, and the crisis of modernity*, Laurence J. Silberstein, ed., New York: New York University Press.
- Zakheim, Dov S. 1994. "Peace and Israeli Security," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Zilberfarb, Ben-Zion. 1994. "The Effects of the Peace Process on the Israeli Economy," in *Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel*, Efraim Karsh, ed., Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass.
- Zilkha, Avraham. 1992. "History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in *The Struggle for Peace: Israelis and Palestinians*, Elizabeth Warnock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking, eds., Austin: University of Texas Press.